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ABSTRACT
The relevant literature suggests that ethical codes regulating mental health 
care are ‘more honoured in the breach than in the observation’ (Pritchard, 
2001) and that current codes of good practice may, paradoxically, be bad for 
this. Patient-centred medicine with its emphasis on user autonomy and 
participation in care plans has provoked harsher questioning of traditional 
deontological codes and renewed interest in those based on neo-Aristotelian 
virtue ethics and the ethic of care. However, much recent work has claimed 
the latter as “essentially feminine”, whilst mental health practice itself is 
considered by feminists to be paternalistic in ideology and attitude. This 
dissertation asks, therefore, which type of ethic is best suited to flourishing 
mental health practice and what are the gender considerations relevant to 
answering this question?
Ethical practice can be understood only in the context of its interpretation by 
the relevant players. This, in turn, requires an investigative approach true to 
the precepts of the relatively new discipline of empirical ethics, which 
combines sociological grounded theory and fieldwork, informed by 
philosophical ethics. This is, therefore, the theoretical and methodological 
framework of this thesis.
Analysis of the data collected suggests that claims of gender differences in 
approaches to caring cannot be substantiated. Mental health professionals of 
both sexes practice either caring or emotional labour, or both, or neither. 
Ethical codes are widely disregarded by both male and female carers, who 
claim to act upon intuition and ‘common sense’ in addressing ethical 
dilemmas. Most users believe codes of good practice to be generally 
respected by healthcare professionals, but describe poor communication, 
disempowerment, a lack of “genuine” caring and, above all, adverse 
discrimination. Whereas practitioners echo their views, they blame poor care 
on a lack of resources. Both consider adverse discrimination in both clinical 
and social settings to reduce all chance of flourishing in mental health care 
today.
Values are inherent to the recurring theme of stigmatisation, and to ethics and 
codes of good practice. Their influence is all-pervading, yet until recently they 
have not been considered central to ethics education curricula. Although all 
codes of ethics, regardless of their orientation, are regularly reviewed, revised 
and extended, until practitioners and policy-makers become fully aware of the 
essential role of values in practice and make education in these an a priori 
condition to training in ethics, such codes, lacking a solid base of 
understanding, will continue to be bad for good practice and the flourishing 
which should result from this.
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PART ONE:
DEFINING THE TASK
‘In philosophy, where one begins generally makes 
a difference to the outcome of one’s enquiries’. 
(Alistair MacIntyre).
Chapter One: Introduction
1.1.Introduction
Recent discussion on empirical ethics in healthcare focuses predominantly on 
controversial issues, such as cloning and euthanasia, which provoke media interest. 
Less attention is given to topics providing a "human context” in which to evaluate 
new pharmacological or technological approaches to healthcare. Mental health 
practice is not immune to this process. With the advance of evidence-based 
psychiatry, the medical model of mental disorder and the increase in managed and 
community-based care, the traditional and dominant form of mental health practice1 
has. in some respects, become divorced from its beneficence-based ethical traditions 
and is increasingly perceived as a form of pharmacologically-based technology, its 
practitioners not so much carers as technicians.
In spite of this, debates on the ethics of the practitioner-user relationship remain 
highly topical. The continuing advance of “science” in mental health practice has 
created a paradox, for although new technologies can be applied in a relatively 
impersonal manner, as a result of pressure from survivor and human rights groups 
more is now demanded of practitioners in terms of meeting users' needs and the 
effects of interpersonal relationships and the professional ambience upon the user’s 
well-being (Lawler. 1991, p35).
Mental health practice is a more divided discipline than any other branch of medicine. 
' Thai based upon pharmacological or physical, rallier than “talk" therapies.
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There are various schools of thought in psychiatry, but the most obvious division is 
between the biological (medical) model, currently favoured by both the American 
Psychiatric Association (A.P.A) and some sectors of the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists (R.C.Psych.)2, and the psychological and social models favoured by 
critical psychiatrists1 and psychoanalysts, amongst others. Those favouring the 
former identify closely with medicine, believing that mental health practice treats 
physical disorders of (generally) unknown aetiology. Those who support the latter 
embrace a variety of opinions as to its causes, ranging from the learned determinants 
of behaviour to the developmental intra-psychic nature of emotional conflict. At best, 
mental health practice includes several approaches and combines the expertise of 
many disciplines. At worst, it is disconcertingly fragmented.
The integration of these different approaches is arguably essential to successful 
mental health practice. In order to avoid categorising the user into the practitioner's 
preferred model of treatment it is necessary to evaluate his/her needs in the light of all 
possible treatments. Good mental health practice is not characterised by unthinking 
allegiance to one particular school of thought, but by the empathic and holistic 
evaluation of the user's needs, aspirations and perspectives, coupled with professional 
technical expertise. Given the present lack of real knowledge of the aetiologies which 
it treats, mental health practice must be considered "peculiar”. It cannot, therefore.
•’ According to a letter sent on the 3011' October. 1997 to Dr. R. Kendall, President of the Royal College 
of Psychiatrists, from Dr. Charles Medawar, Social Audit. Ltd.. London: "The independence of the 
college might be called into question since it has done much to promote the use of, in particular, SSRI 
antidepressants, while receiving major financial contributions from the manufacturers of all such 
products. Some of these companies have also financed the work of leading figures of the Defeat 
Depression Campaign. See Social Audit’s The Antidepressant Web, sent to the R.C.Psych., on 2nd 
December, 1997.
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look to other forms of medicine but, as a result of developing deep understanding of 
various facts and theories, could become a “role model” for medical practice 
generally. In no other area of medicine is the user-practitioner relationship so vital to 
successful outcomes (Dyer, 1988; Fulford et a)., 2002). It is, therefore, this thesis 
argues, the ethics of the professional relationship, as much as scientific knowledge, 
which defines and distinguishes the role of mental health workers.
Amongst other approaches, an ethic based on neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and care 
ethics, such as that described here, would promote the client-practitioner relationship 
and the personal and professional flourishing (eudemonia ) of both parties. 
Eudemonia literally means ‘having a good guardian spirit’, and achieving an 
objectively desirable life, something universally agreed by ancient philosophical 
theory, and popular opinion, to be the supreme human good. This objective character 
distinguishes it from the modern subjective concept of happiness. In the context of 
mental health care ethics, the ‘good guardian spirit' would be the practitioner who, 
whilst discreetly "watching over" the user, intervenes only in critical situations. The 
end of mental health practice itself would be such an ‘objectively desirable life’ for 
both user and practitioner.
1.2. The Rationale und Research Questions
Recent criticism of the predominant deontological and consequentialist theories3 45 in
3 For example, Pat Bracken, whose work is described in later chapters.
4 Usually translated as "nourishing" or "well-being". (See Honderich, 1995, p252)
5 Defined at length in Chapter Two
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healthcare ethics includes references to their relative inflexibility and consequent 
inability to meet either the contingencies of today’s professional practice (Beauchamp 
and Childress, 1984; Hursthouse, 1999; Campbell, 1998), or the concurrent growth of 
patient-centred medicine and demand for increased user participation in care plans 
(Fulford, 2002). As Hursthouse (1999) says, deontological and consequentialist codes 
tend to ignore several topics which any moral philosophy is required to address today. 
These arc motives and moral character; moral education; moral wisdom or 
discernment (phronesis); friendship and family relationships; flourishing (eudemonia) 
in the sense of achieving the objectively desirable life previously described; the role 
of the emotions in moral life, and the questions of what kind of person we should be 
and how we should live. All these topics are discussed in Aristotle’s Ethics6, which 
therefore seems a particularly relevant starting point from which to engage with good 
practice in patient-centred mental health care.
1.2.1. ‘Aristotelian’ Flourishing and ‘Feminine’ Caring in Mental Health 
Practice.
In Poetics (1448a) Aristotle claims that art perfects nature7. For human nature the art 
which would achieve this perfection was ethics, the task of which was to restore 
people to what Aristotle (and Plato) considered their natural nourishing condition. 
Ethics was a kind of healing, an emotional therapy, the end of which was happiness, 
moderation and inner harmony. This "therapeutic” version of ethics appears ideally
6 For many centuries, the Nichomachean Ethics have been regarded as the Ethics of Aristotle. Twenty 
manuscripts on these survive from the Byzantine, whilst only two of the Eudemian Ethic do so. 20th
century scholars have regarded the Eudemian Ethics as the product ‘of a comparatively young 
Aristotle under the stiflingly metaphysical influence of Plato' (Kenny. 1978)
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suited to health care and is quite unlike the justification of the rules for behaviour 
which currently constitutes much moral philosophy.
This thesis will argue that the Aristotelian emphasis on "flourishing” provides a direct 
link with the ethic of care and that in mental health care ‘flourishing- can only occur 
in the presence of the practitioner's caring both for and about the user. This notion is 
central to the ethic of care, whilst central to virtue ethics are those of flourishing 
(eudemonia), the ‘virtuous agent-, moral intelligence (phronesis), and the concept of 
community. Aristotle connects flourishing to proper function in a way which reflects 
some of those values by which psycho-pathological concepts are partly defined, yet 
remains consistent in principle with neuroscientific understanding of brain 
functioning (Fulford, 1998). Given the rapidity of technological advances in 
psychiatry and psychology, this is a vital factor in considering an ethic adequate to 
today's increasingly ‘scientific’ (and potentially dehumanised) mental health practice.
The "Aristotelian” view of mental disorder may be preferable in terms of good 
practice to one posited on a value-free account of human function. This is because a 
central tenet of Aristotelian theory is that practices are associated with certain goods 7
7 'As tragedy is an imitation of personages better than the ordinary man (1448a) we should follow the 
example o f the good portrait painters who reproduce the distinctive features of a man. and ... make 
him handsomer than he is. The poet in like manner, in portraying men ... must know how to represent 
them as such and at the same time as good men” (ibid, 1454b). The quotations are from Hursthouse. R. 
(1992) Truth ami Representation.
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0agatha)8, which exist within a hierarchy of other goods. The relationship between 
goods, which are part of a hierarchy of goods and practices is an internal one. Whilst 
the hierarchy of goods could be the ideal of practice as such, particular goods are 
specific to one user, making this hierarchy notional. This does not imply that a 
specific good relates to an individual’s needs - the sub-set of goods from which we 
might remove a particular hierarchy for an individual user - for example that the risk 
of suicide is more important than hunger. For whilst Aristotle argues (N.E.I.I., 1094a 
8-17;l.2,1094a25ff) that activities (such as psychiatry and nursing) are generally 
believed to have functions, or goals, these are not in themselves goods. Prescribing 
medicines, nursing care and so on are the means to a further good. Their functions 
are. therefore, dependent upon there being at least one further goal that is a good in 
itself. That goal and good in itself is flourishing.
What are the goods internal to mental health practice and how do they relate to 
ethical notions of flourishing and care? Three different senses of “flourishing" must 
be distinguished in this context. In the case of the practitioner “flourishing” is the role 
realisation of ideals of practice applied to particular patients. The “flourishing” of the 
user, on the other hand, implies returning to the community as an accepted member of 
this, without necessarily fully conforming to its ideology and social mores. The 
mental disorder could come to be seen as a catalyst to living an ‘examined’ life. 
"Flourishing" in practice, unlike both the former, is a more abstract ideal, the good 
which is its end being the best possible professional support for those with mental
" Goods are the objects of directed activity and so of desire, the satisfaction of which completes the 
activity. They also contribute to and are partially constitutive of flourishing.
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health problems. What is important is that the functionings which together create a 
picture of each of these kinds o f flourishing within the context of mental health 
practice can be listed. It is also necessary to ask whether ‘flourishing’ in the 
Aristotelian sense can occur in mental health practice in the absence of ‘caring’ both 
for and about the user? Or are these inseparable, complimentary, or quite distinct 
entities, which may or may not be related to the considerations of gender raised by 
feminist such as Gilligan, Noddings et al? (see 1.3.1.).
Whilst respect for user autonomy is a central tenet of patient-centred healthcare ethics 
today, mental health care is a special case insofar as the duty of care often requires 
limiting this (Fulford et al. 2002). Balancing conflicting moral values in particular 
cases is something that requires more study, both empirical and philosophical, than 
has so far taken place (Gillon, 1996). Such balancing would be acceptable to both an 
ethic of care and virtue ethics, in that flourishing does not necessarily entail complete 
freedom of action and allowing this would not necessarily be virtuous or caring. The 
prime virtue is moral intelligence or practical rationality (phronesis) and virtue ethics 
does not suppose that moral dilemmas can be resolved other than by the exercise of 
this. It can therefore accept that two virtuous agents, exercising moral intelligence or 
practical rationality, could reach distinct resolutions to a moral dilemma yet both be 
"right" and "virtuous" (Hursthouse. 1999).
Considering a combination of agent rather than act centred neo-Aristotelian virtue 
ethics, and an ethic of care in mental health practice requires evaluating individual
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practitioners' actions and characters, selves and lives. Such ethics are therefore 
particularly relevant to the psychotherapeutic setting, in which the agent’s character 
and ethical self play a unique part. As Campbell (1998) says, we might trust a dentist, 
even knowing him to be an immature or immoral person, insofar as he is essentially a 
'mechanic of the mouth’. Of the mental health practitioner, whose character is 
inherent to the effectiveness of the therapy, we expect more. In this discipline, 
successful treatment may depend upon the user’s trust and belief in the practitioner’s 
character. The requirements of this unique role and the particular features of mental 
disorder would ostensibly be met by character-based ethics. The ethic of care, too, is 
particularly appropriate given the cultural associations described in Chapter Three, 
which link women to caring and mental disorder, and men to patriarchal attitudes and 
the dominant psychiatric ideology. These ethics can also counteract the 
’dehumanising’ of treatment which has been claimed to accompany scientific 
advances in medicine and can leave the user stripped of dignity, disempowered and 
’labelled' as a diagnosis or clinical artefact, rather than a person.
The notion of flourishing as the empowerment of and respect for the user itself raises 
challenges. Neo-Aristotelianism, as will be seen in Chapter Two, implies a certain 
antagonism towards modem liberal rationalist individualism, invoking instead a 
concept of community. How this concept of community can be reconciled to the 
notion of individual ’flourishing’, given that an ethic of flourishing - in the context of 
mental health practice - would consider empowerment of the user central to treatment 
and essential to both user’s and health worker’s flourishing is also debatable. 
However, there is no conflict between individual and community, since individuals
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are such by virtue of pertaining to a community. Even should they opt out, they are 
already formed, (or perhaps in the case of mental disorder ‘deformed’0) by this 
community. Human inter-dependence is, as MacIntyre (1999) indicates, just a fact. 
That we can only be self-conscious through consciousness of others is what it means 
to be human.
Growing dissatisfaction with current ethical codes has several aspects but this study 
examines in particular the primu facie growing gap between the ethics or codes of 
good practice developed by professional bodies for their members and the latter’s 
own views of what constitutes “good” practice in the context of clinical work. The 
principal aim of existing codes10 is regulation. They also specify rules of etiquette and 
responsibilities towards users and practitioners. Considered ‘beneficial’ if they 
effectively incorporate defensible moral norms, some codes oversimplify moral 
requirements or claim more competence than they reasonably should. As a result, 
health professionals may erroneously believe that they satisfy all moral requirements 
in merely adhering to such codes, just as many people consider themselves to 
discharge their moral obligations when they meet all the relevant legal requirements 
(Beauchamp and Childress. 1994, p7).
However, good practice is not promoted by essentially unrealistic standards which 
can result in (albeit well-motivated) rule-breaking. This can ‘let in just those abuses 
of power that healthcare ethics has properly sought to prevent’ (Fulford et al. 2002,
‘ See Noguera (2000), 'Mad Sad or Bad, Moral Luck and Michael Stone'.
,0 Discussed in detail in Chapters 2.2.4 9. and 6
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p3). Some ethical dilemmas, for example those related to confidentiality, are arguably 
the undesirable result of ever-increasing regulation, both legal and in the form of 
professional ethics and codes of conduct. Indeed, the previously cited work describes 
them as ‘inimical to good' practice’ (Op.cit. p i3).
1.2.2. Ethics and Gender
Further criticism of the dominant deontological and consequentialist theories stems 
from gender-related issues. According to Sayers (2000), Giddens (1976, 1984), 
Habermas (1984, 1987) and others who defend abstract theory, theory itself is only 
contingently gendered (cited in Holmwood. 2001). Like many philosophers, they also 
conceive theoretical discourse as meta-theoretical and therefore independent of 
empirical research. This type of argument led some feminists to refer to a ‘missing 
feminist revolution in sociology’ (Stacey and Thorne, 1985). They complain of a 
‘gender-neutral conception of discourse in sociology, like philosophy, largely the 
preserve of male theorists, which finds ‘no necessary reason to engage in a dialogue 
with ... feminist theory or research’. (Holmwood. 2001, p948). Nonetheless, in 
debating ethical theory and practice today, following the works of feminists such as 
Noddings (1984). Gilligan (1982). Ruddick, (1989) and Tong (1993), it is essential to 
consider, as Chapters Two and Three do. to what extent these are conditioned by 
gender.
In order to test the question of whether neo-Aristotelian virtue, and care ethics could 
prove more appropriate to mental health practice than the dominant quasi-legal 
“principles" approach considered ‘malestream’ by feminist critics, a prior analysis of
I I
the efficacy and appropriateness of the codes of good practice currently adhered to 
(or not) in mental health settings is required. The growth in the quantity and 
exigencies of such codes, is the embodiment of the response of professional colleges 
to increasing ethical challenges in healthcare. Yet the rising number of disciplinary 
hearings involving practitioners of both sexes appears to reveal that the possibility of 
fruitful dialogue between practitioners and users may be forestalled, rather than 
facilitated, by existing codes. Both these and current education in ethics are 
apparently not only inadequate, but may even push healthcare workers into 
malpractice. Paradoxically, current ethics may be bad for good practice.
This is the catalyst to the research question: what type of ethic is best suited to good 
mental health practice? The quasi-legal (deontological and consequentialist) ethics at 
present prevalent are clearly not sufficient. This study attempts to answer this 
question and test this claim - and those of possible alternatives in the form of neo- 
Aristotelian virtue and care ethics - in the specific context of mental health practice.
1.3. Links between the Philosophical and Sociological Literature
Although interpretations of Aristotle vary greatly (Barnes, 1976), Rosalind 
Hursthouse’s (1999) Oil Virtue Ethics, one of the first authoritative accounts of neo- 
Aristotelian virtue ethics, gives what has been described as ‘the defining exposition' 
of ‘how the life of the virtuous agent is both possible and desirable’ (Blackburn, S., 
1999). Her version of a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic is a revival of classical
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Aristotelian virtue ethics without the 'lamentable parochial details’" (Hursthouse, 
1999,p2) of certain aspects of Aristotle’s original ethic. Neo-Aristotelians of this 
school neither restrict themselves to those virtues listed by Aristotle, nor consider him 
right with regard to the treatment of women, slaves and animals. However, 
Hursthouse does follow his ethics closely in other respects. This particular neo- 
Aristotelian virtue ethic promotes the notion of nourishing as the ultimate human 
good and aim of human life and considers phronesis (translated by Hursthouse as 
moral intelligence’ and by MacIntyre (1985) as ’practical rationality') a pre-requisite 
for the practice of all other virtues.
Full appreciation of Hursthouse’s work requires reading several versions of 
Aristotle's Nichomachean and Eudemian Ethics and philosophical commentaries on 
these such as Hutchinson’s (1986). The Virtues o f Aristotle. Elizabeth Anscombe's 
(1958) Modern Moral Philosophy represented the views of an influential group of 
post-war philosophers who, suspicious of the is/ought distinction and the naturalistic 
fallacy, turned instead to traditional concepts of virtue. However. MacIntyre's (1985) 
After Virtue, in which he describes a Nietzsche-Aristolle dichotomy between the will 
to power on one hand and communally defined virtues on the other, presents the most 
impassioned and synoptic case for the revival of virtue theory. MacIntyre argues for 
the 'construction of local forms of community within which civility and the 
intellectual and moral life can be sustained’ (1985. p236). These lines of thought are
"  In making this comment, Hursthouse is referring to what would today be considered Aristotle's 
misogynistic references to women and his claim that neither they, nor slaves and animals had souls, a 
belief common to the Athenian community of 500B.C.
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developed in Chapter Two.
1.3.1. The Feminist Critique
Work by several female philosophers has developed a distinctively “feminine” 
standpoint on healthcare ethics. The first, and arguably most influential, of these was 
Gilligan’s (1982) In a Different Voice, followed by Noddings' (1984) Caring: A 
Feminine Approach to Ethics anti Moral Education and Ruddick’s (1989) Maternal 
Thinking. These writers consider impartial observation inappropriate to ethical 
dilemmas, in which an attitude of caring involvement, such as that reputedly practised 
by women, is the ideal model. Gilligan (1982) set up a categorical distinction 
between the ethic of care, responsibility and relationships and the ethics of justice, 
rights and autonomy. Noddings’ work, which describes her “feminine ethic of care” 
as ‘a woman's morality’, is essentially a philosophical elaboration of Gilligan's 
views. 'Characteristically and essentially feminine’, Noddings claims that it arises 
from the very experience of being a woman.
Noddings also promotes the notion of ‘engrossment’, a type of exaggerated empathy, 
and this perception of empathy as essential to moral behaviour is echoed in Marta 
Nussbaum’s claim, in Finely Aware and Richly Responsible (1985), that acting 
morally requires: ‘thinking oneself into the other’s best possibility’ (p521). Baier’s 
(1991) Who Can Women Trust?; Fox’s (1992) Seeing Through Women's Eyes: The 
Role o f Vision in Women's Moral Theory, and Calhoun’s (1992) Emotional Work, 
also imply this women-care connection. Noddings is particularly critical of the 
'principled' ethic approach which has dominated Anglo-American analytical
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philosophy. This is. on the other hand, considered by Hursthouse (not a feminist) to 
be compatible with virtue ethics, a view elaborated in Chapter Two.
Kuddick (1989) discusses the values and virtues inherent to mothering, using this 
approach to develop a feminist standpoint in moral philosophy. She disagrees with 
Noddings, considering that although traditionally the domain of women, mothering 
(analogous to Noddings' ‘caring’) can be practised by men and women in what, 
although not specifically described as such, is a form of emotional labour (see 
Chapter Three). Development of the argument in favour of caring as a form of 
emotional labour would have been impossible without prior study of Hochschild’s 
seminal work: The Managed Heart: Commercialization o f Human Feeling (1983).
The writings of second-wave feminists: Virginia Held's (1993) Feminist Morality, 
Joan Tronto’s (1993) Moral Boundaries, a Political Argument for an Etliic o f Care 
and Peta Bowden’s (1997) Caring: Gender Sensitive Ethics also posit versions of an 
ethic of care as valid feminine approaches. According to Webb's (1996) Caring, 
curing and coping: towards an integrated model many female healthcare workers 
have found the care perspective highly productive.
However, other feminist philosophers: Claudia Card (1991a) Feminist Ethics and 
E.V. Spelman (1991), The Virtue o f Feeling and the Feeling o f Virtue, criticise care 
ethics, considering it to reinforce ‘conservative gynoccntrism’. They also reject its 
complacency regarding women’s failure to care for other women. In Bubeck (1995) 
Care. Gender and Justice and Baier (1987a) Hume, The Woman's Moral Theorist'!
15
both Aristotle and Hume are (not uncritically) posited as possible theoretical models 
for an alternative care perspective.
In focussing on formal contrasts, the care-justice division converges with those 
critiques of impartial and universalistic deontological approaches predominant in 
contemporary moral philosophy. Consequently, in their quest for ethical theories 
more appropriate to a "Godless" age. those seeking alternative theoretical models 
turned their attention to the newly revived virtue theory (Anscombe, 1958; Murdoch, 
1985; McDowell, 1979; MacIntyre, 1985. et al.) which focuses on the agent’s moral 
character. Rosemary Tong's Feminine and Feminist Ethics (1993) described caring 
as a virtue, and care ethics as a form of virtue ethic, a sentiment echoed in Card's 
(1991) The Feistiness o f  Feminism and (1995) Gender and Moral Luck, and Baier's 
(1987) The Need for More Than Justice and (1994) Moral Prejudices: Essays on 
Ethics. Tong's (1998) A Feminist Virtue Ethics o f Care for Healthcare Practitioners 
provides a specific link between gender, care ethics and health.
Denise Russell's (1995) Women, Madness and Medicine supports both Gilligan's 
notion of women's voices as "different”, and the view that gender discrimination in 
contemporary, reputedly patriarchal, mental health care may exacerbate rather than 
resolve women's psychiatric problems. Elaine Showalter's (1987) The Female 
Malady argues that the construction of madness is the most recent method of 
controlling women by means of misogynistic practices -  citing the 19th century 
growth of "asylums" as the commencement of male medical dominance over 
women's mental health (see also Perkins Gilman. 1892). Phyllis Chesler (1972),
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influenced by Szasz (1972), argues that the use of labels of mental disorder 
conditions male and female behaviour, ensuring that this conforms to social 
expectations. Two key issues emerge from feminist literature on women and mental 
illness. The first is that of psychiatry as a method of socially controlling women. The 
second is the médicalisation of women's unhappiness. However, current debates tend 
to focus on gender relations, rather than exclusively on women’s issues.
Views such as these, together with the gender issues inherent to the ethic of care, 
demand investigation of the relationship between gender, caring and ethics, as well as 
gender and mental health. Arber and Gilbert’s (1989) Men, the Forgotten Carers', 
Sabo and Gordon’s (1998) Men’s Health and Illness; Annandale and Hunt’s (2000) 
Gender Inequalities in Health and Bendelow et al’s (2002) Gender, Health and 
Healing: the Public Private Divide offer a range of views. Most imply that current 
stereotypes of women as carers and men as law-givers are excessively essentialist1".
Works specific to healthcare11 whilst providing useful information and insights into 
the ethical issues pertinent to mental health practice, also sometimes tend to 
perpetuate stereotypical ’gendered’, allegedly “masculine” approaches to ethics. 
More importantly, perhaps, many of these also recognise that current codes of 12
12 Many other recent publications, journals, Internet sites and the press, ensured the topicality of the 
material studied, providing information on recent developments in mental health policy and practice. A 
lull list of sources consulted, hut not directly cited, is given in the References.
"  Beauchamp’s and Childress's (1994) classic: Principles o f Healthcare Ethics', Gillon's (1994) 
Principles o f Health Care Ethics and l-ulford et al's recent Healthcare Ethics and Human Values 
(2(X)2); Barker and Baldwin’s (1991) Ethical Issues in Mental Health'. Allen Dyer's (1988) Ethics and 
Psychiatry, towards Professional Definition, and Bloch. Chodoff and Green's (1999) Mental Health 
Practice Ethics also provided information and insights into the ethical issues most pertinent to mental 
health practice.
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practice are ill equipped to meet the particular requirements of patient-centred mental 
health care.
1.4. The Research Process
The research develops and is described in three stages. First, the problem is identified 
in theoretical and practical terms and the rationale behind combining the disciplines 
of philosophy and applied sociology explained. Specific philosophical (ethical) and 
sociological theories on gender related issues which inform the research are also 
discussed14.
The second stage is empirical, focussing upon exploring ethical attitudes by means of 
sociological fieldwork and qualitative and philosophical analysis of this. It explores 
the extent to which mental health care themes in the ethics literature are identifiable 
in practice, examining the putative gap between present codes and practice and 
evidence of possible reasons for this. At this stage possible gender differences in 
practice and treatment are also sought, and the specifics of various ethical theories 
related to principles, flourishing, practical wisdom and emotional labour in practice 
are identified.
The third stage engages with the research findings and their implications for practice. 
The study concludes by summarising the research process as a whole, before
14 Due U> the limitations inherent to working within a word count, neither all the possible ethical 
theories which might have informed ethical decision-making, nor all the possible ethical problems and 
dilemmas which mighi emerge in mental health practice are described in the research data. Since this 
is not of direct relevance to the flow of the argument there has been no attempt to bring these into the 
work -  they have simply been left out.
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subsequently discussing its implications in terms of a unified and practical ethical 
agenda for care and training in mental health practice.
1.4.1. The Reasons for Combining Philosophical Theory and Applied 
Sociological Methodology in Researching Empirical Ethics
Conventionally, philosophy is normative. Its definitive tools are those of theories of 
morality, practical rationality, analyses of moral concepts and so on. Much 
sociological research, on the other hand, is empirical, providing the ‘facts that 
healthcare ethics grinds in its normative mill’ (Nelson, 2000, pl2). However, the 
distinction is not that clear. To be sure philosophical approaches to ethics are inclined 
to be normative, whilst those of social science are more empirical. However, some 
sociologists working in areas relevant to medical ethics have ‘disavowed any interest 
in the application of their researches to procedures and policy-making. They prefer to 
stress their implications for such abstruse matters as the sociology of the professions, 
"theories” of organisations, or the social organisation of cognition’ (Zussman, 2000,
p7).
A necessary condition for any research on empirical ethics is that it employs the 
'combined philosophical and sociological approach' of the title of this dissertation. In 
such an approach these disciplines have a two-way relationship not unlike that 
between theory and experiment in the natural sciences. Empirical ethics draws 
primarily upon applied sociological research methods to test a number of questions 
raised by the ethics literature and brings in specific sociological theorising in 
discussing the implications of the findings for practice. Philosophy can, in turn.
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enrich the form and content of the empirical study and research findings by providing 
a set of theories and skills which help frame the questions to be asked, especially 
where, as in this case, these involve high-level concepts such as beliefs or values. 
Philosophy also guides analysis of the results, the findings of the empirical study 
informing and contributing to the development of the philosophical theory.
Working simultaneously in both philosophy and applied sociology reveals that the 
difference between these disciplines is more subtle than it might initially seem. 
Perhaps because they believe that it is enough to know that a phenomenon exists, 
regardless of those characteristics such as distribution and social trends which 
interest sociologists, philosophers tend to be less systematic in dealing with empirical 
matters. The former, on the other hand, can says Zussman (2000) sometimes appear 
incapable of making more than a limited range of normative claims. Deontological 
arguments about moral judgements are, this author suggests, remarkable for their 
absence in sociological thought.
Whilst significant, such differences do not imply a deep and totally insuperable 
’incomprehensibility' between philosophical and applied sociological approaches to 
healthcare ethics. Rather, they imply that degree of complementarity described by 
Fulford et al. (2002, p 12) and which this study, in which applied sociological research 
informs substantive philosophical discussion of the ethical issues involved in the care 
of the mentally disordered, aims to demonstrate.
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It could, therefore, be considered surprising, even disappointing, that applied 
sociology has not so far made a valuable contribution to medical ethics. This is 
incongruous given that the questions being examined in this, such as informed 
consent, managed care, and so on. hinge to a very large extent on empirical 
considerations, whilst tending to be based on consequeniialist arguments.
The fact is that at present a good deal of healthcare ethics - the QALYS15 system 
would be a good example - is based upon consequentialist claims which sociologists, 
with tools such as quantitative and qualitative analysis at their disposal, are 
particularly well-equipped to assess. If an ethical claim is based on the belief that a 
practice or arrangement is ethically either desirable or questionable because it results 
in a particular outcome, then that claim - as this research will show - is empirically 
testable. It is, though, most unusual for philosophers specialising in healthcare ethics 
to perform such tests themselves. They often prefer the more conventional 
philosophical tool of the “thought experiment” (see footnote 16 for an example). 
However, sociologists can very effectively carry them out. for regardless of whether 
the issue in question is informed consent, violence, managed care or the withdrawal 
of rights, ethical arguments depend to a great extent on empirical propositions. There 
are many kinds of ethical issue about which an empirical study of mental health care 
practice might ask questions. In this study these questions are raised, and the findings 
which emerge from fieldwork are analysed and discussed.
15 QALYS are quality-adjusted life years and are used to evaluate the number of "quality" years, which 
a user would be likely to live, compared to another, in prioritising treatments. Implicit in their use is 
'the idea that the only objective of health services is health maximisation' (Beauchamp and Childress, 
p3l I)
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According to Beauchamp and Childress (1994), good moral reasoning involves the 
following:
1. Accurate empirical beliefs
2. Defensible moral values
3. Clarity about relevant concepts
4. Formally valid argumentation.
The first of these is an area in which applied sociology would naturally operate. As 
far as Beauchamp’s and Childress's second point is concerned moral philosophy, 
theology and other disciplines all serve to inform the articulating and defence of 
moral values. Finally, philosophy, as the 'guardian of conceptual analysis' (Nelson. 
2000. p i3) and logic informs both point three, conceptual clarity, and point four, the 
formal validity of the arguments.
However. Beauchamp's and Childress's four-step approach to moral reasoning might, 
not unreasonably, be considered by the sociologist to be a gross oversimplification of 
the moral, conceptual and empirical relationship. Sceptics of this so-called 'linear' 
view might, for example, ask how the normative effect upon fact-finding is to be 
recognised without undermining the moral arguments that draw upon the facts. 
Nonetheless, it could equally be argued that the values inherent in applied 
sociological research do not necessarily distort the healthcare ethicist's access to the 
factual world at all. but to the contrary, deepen and enrich the normative 
understandings on which those moral concepts and beliefs employed in analysis are 
based.
22
Clarifying the workings of values in empirical disciplines seems, in itself, to be an 
empirical task. As such this process is potentially subject to undermining by 
distortions caused by the personal scale of values which the researcher inevitably 
brings to enterprises such as that under consideration. Whilst this kind of scepticism 
may be common, it is not necessarily plausible and might even be considered 
paradoxical in that: ‘It makes ambitious knowledge claims itself, concerning what 
knowledge is and what's wrong with all efforts to establish any’ (Nelson, 2000. p 14). 
The fact that empirical enquiry incorporates values does not necessarily imply that it 
is self-defeating. In reaching a better understanding of the norms inherent to factual 
accounts, as Nelson points out, healthcare ethicists can also deepen their 
understanding of values. In addition to providing the latter with facts, sociologists 
may act as “catalysts”, causing ethicists to investigate and challenge their particular 
notions of what is worth studying and, more importantly, whose interests are worth 
serving. This appears to be the result of the research process described here.
Can sociology really embody normative traditions? Sociologists, as human beings 
with all the defects and weaknesses inherent in this condition are, as Nelson says: 
‘hardly likely to be distinguished from philosophers with regard to political and 
ethical affiliations consistently enough to see their fields as sources of distinct moral 
views on features of medicine or any other aspect of society’ (p i4). They do not 
present a ‘morally united front’ (ibid.). However, given their particular interest in 
group dynamics, sociologists may be able to indicate normatively significant features 
of human life which are virtually overlooked by disciplines such as applied ethics,
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which is explicitly concerned and inextricably linked with moral values. Epistemic 
and ethical values can perhaps inform one another in the sense that what sociologists 
consider effective ways in which to study people scientifically can influence what 
ethicists consider to be good ways to think about people morally. Healthcare ethics 
can benefit from using the investigative procedures and engaging with the heuristic 
interests characteristic of applied sociology. This would provide a new and different 
"gaze" and consequent understanding of the ethical inferences to be made from the 
study of individuals, communities, relationships and responsibilities.
Something which originally interested philosophers working in healthcare ethics was 
the notion, held by some, although not all, that 'reflecting on developments in health 
care provided ... a very good way of doing philosophy’ (Op. cit. p i7). However, the 
success of healthcare ethics in informing clinical practice has been relatively minor 
and in some areas, including mental health practice, has arguably proved frustrating. 
Ethics cannot merely give advice. It must improve understanding of morally relevant 
ideas and promote deeper understanding of those aspects of these which can be, as 
the research findings reveal, at best confusing and at worst counterproductive, in both 
clinical and research contexts.
If this is so. philosophical and sociological collaboration is essential insolar as the 
normative understandings which attend sociological practice must come to he 
regarded as significant to ethics generally. This is beginning to happen and healthcare 
ethicists are seeking and creating approaches to ethics which rely quite heavily upon 
empirically demonstrated understandings of social life. Indeed, a recent editorial in 
the Journal o f  Medical Ethics (Gillon, 1996) described the publication of empirical
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studies as a healthy development in what it termed the ‘maturing’ subject of medical 
ethics.
Theoretical tenets of various kinds - ideological, metaphysical and value-based - 
underlie the prescriptions of present mental health ethics, but the resolution of many 
ethical dilemmas within practice demands appeal to sociological theory. Theoretical 
assumptions which raise and affect concerns about mental health practice can also be 
identified. Is it. for example, true that most female health workers care instinctively, 
whilst the majority of their male colleagues tend to exercise paternalistic power? Or 
is this a socially constructed ‘myth' which research, informed by sociological 
theorising on emotional labour, may prove to have little foundation in fact? This is 
important, for if men are revealed as ‘carers' in the feminist sense, or if caring proves 
to be a form of emotional labour, then an ‘ethic of care’ cannot be described as 
uniquely ‘feminine’, in spite of Noddings’ title and the credence given to her views 
by many feminists. (Although it could be argued that this might be the case if this 
was construed as a gender orientation in biologically sexed men/males10).
The conventional contrast between normative philosophical approaches and empirical 
sociological perspectives draws upon excessively clear-cut distinctions. If, as has 
been claimed, different theoretical tenets underlie the prescriptions of mental health 
ethics, any empirical study of these must consequently be informed by philosophical 
and sociological theory and analysis. Theories may be the roots of the tree upon 
which informed knowledge and understanding of social reality grow, but they cannot
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be based upon simple observation of society. Whilst social and medical research are 
essentially about 'humans investigating humans' (Shipman. 1997, p3), this involves 
philosophical and empirical issues. Empirical research aims to ascertain and clarify 
facts, making arguments based on these more substantive. However, although facts 
may thus discipline reason this is: 'the advance guard in any field of learning’. 
‘Empirical projects must have implications for theoretical constructions', (Wright 
Mills. 1959. p205).
From a philosophical point of view, the epistemic strategy described by Deutseh 
(1966) allows for a reflexive dimension, which understands itself as the theory's 
social and historical embeddedness, to be incorporated into this. The Deutschian 
notion of science as the process whereby our world knowledge is acquired is 
represented in the following reflexive cycle (Fig. 1). This shows how early theoretical 
consensus on basic assumptions and methods is followed by a period of empirical 
research, producing data which in turn lead to further philosophical questions.
Figure 1.
PHILOSOPHY ^ OBSERVATION
IT ▼
H A TA  C O L L E C T IO N
PROBLEMS AND ANALYSIS
As Deutsch says:
‘Philosophic stages in the development of a particular science 
are concerned with strategy; they select the targets and the main 
lines of attack. Empirical stages are concerned with tactics', they
Thanks are due to Dr. Simon Williams for pointing this out to me.
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attain the targets, or they accumulate experience indicating that 
the targets cannot be taken in this manner.
(Deutsch, 1966, pp 3-4)
For sociologists who study healthcare ethics, the normative implications of their task 
are unavoidable, although it might be the philosopher who clarifies these. Applied 
sociological research can. on the other hand, effectively inform any philosophical 
discussion of the ethical issues involved in patient-centred practice. Analytic ethics is 
ethically neutral and therefore arguably "needs” the input which only applied 
sociological research methods can provide ’... content must be added to form, data to 
concept, if conclusions bearing on a concrete issue are to be drawn’ (Fulford, 2002, 
p 162). Combining philosophical ethics and social scientific empirical fieldwork in 
researching mental health ethics would, therefore, seem to make good sense.
The relevance of applied sociology to empirical ethics also lies in the fact that: 'moral 
theory begins in practice’ (Hoffmaster, 1992. p 1421). This author points out that 
moral decision making is essentially the search for an adequate response to a 
particular situation and more a question of finding creative solutions than applying 
philosophical formulae17. First, how moral dilemmas are perceived and constructed 
is investigated. Second, how each individual confronts such problems is recorded. 
Third, these attempted resolutions are analysed. Research such as that undertaken for 
this dissertation will reveal the forms of moral rationality in mental health practice, 
provisionally indicating and defining the strengths and limitations ot each form of 
resolving ethical dilemmas. 1
11 This has a certain resonance with Jonsen and Toulmin (1988). See section 2.2.1.
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What Hoffmaster suggests is a style of ethical theory that, like grounded theory, 
works from the (research) ground up and is based on a real and detailed knowledge of 
the situation in question. His argument constitutes what has been described as a 
'virtual manifesto’ (Zussman, 2000. plO) of healthcare ethics for sociology and must 
consequently merit close consideration. If Hoffmaster’s views were taken seriously, 
a radical change could occur in these, the present boundaries between sociology and 
philosophy, between normative and empirical, eventually disappearing. Applied 
sociology’s most important contribution to healthcare ethics could be bringing into 
the practice setting a set of ethical standards which are 'not native to the occupational 
and organisational cultures' (Zussman. plO), such as those pertaining to the 
professional organisations of mental health practitioners of all disciplines.
Hoffmaster also asks how ethical issues are generated. In one form, he claims, the 
medical ethicist merely reacts to issues raised by practitioners. In another (which this 
study seeks to emulate) the former is a Socratic “gadfly”, reading, thinking and then 
researching the potentially awkward questions and situations which serve to make 
users, practitioners and policy-makers question what may be the previously 
unquestioned status quo.
It might be claimed that healthcare ethics has adequately survived without the “help” 
of applied sociology, but the empirical ethicist would claim that being informed by 
this discipline brings a more pragmatic and "practical” dimension to the occasionally
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ludicrous flights of imagination which characterise some works in healthcare ethics18. 
Whilst few sociologists are trained in moral reasoning and analysis, disavowing 
normative concerns will not help sociology, either. Social sciences, sometimes 
thought to provide ‘just the facts’ (Nelson, 2000), may leave attending to moral 
values, clarifying concepts and constructing formally valid arguments to philosophy. 
However, all disciplines are informed by epistemic values, and healthcare ethicists 
are increasingly aware that sociological practices and normative understandings of 
what is relevant to human flourishing are important to ethics generally.
1.4.2. Gender, Ethics and Mental Health Practice
Sociology, rather than philosophy, can also better inform the gender considerations 
inherent to the research questions. The development of a feminist sociology (Bell and 
Roberts, 1984) has had a profound effect upon all areas of healthcare research. It is 
concerned not only with raising gender issues in formulating research questions, 
methods and analysis but also considers ‘differences in the way that research is 
organised, carried out and written up as being based on the gender of the researcher’ 
(Op.cit.,p3). Gender is inscribed on the body and we never interact as genderless 
beings. A nurse, for example, ‘never just interacts with a doctor -  it is a female doctor 
or a male doctor and this makes a difference. Doing gender is accomplished in these 
practices’ (Davies, K. 2002. p65). This notion is explored further in Chapter Three.
In mental health practice, gender also affects women as users. Various authors
u> J. Jarvis Thompson's thought experiment, in which someone wakes in the morning to find a brilliant 
violinist, dependent upon them for life-support, grafted their body, is an example of these.
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suggest that ‘gender affects prevalence rates, diagnostic profiles and service 
utilisation’ (Teplin et al. 1997) and official statistics reflect this. Although some 
studies have found no gender difference in the incidence of depression and the gender 
gap is undoubtedly narrowing, women's greater risk of suffering non-psychotic 
disorders has until recently been a consistent finding in mental health epidemiology 
(see Table 1).
Table 1 - The Prevalence of Neurotic19 Disorders by Gender.
CONDITION WOMEN MEN
Mixed Anxiety 108 68
Generalised 46 43
Depressive 28 24
Obsessive-compulsive 13 9
Panic Disorders 7 7
All Phobias 22 13
(Great Britain, 2000, rates per 1000 population -  
Sourcewww.national-statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nscl.asp?ID=6436 )
Numerous explanations have been offered to account for women’s experiences of 
mental disorder. ‘Reductionist or biological explanations have considered women’s 
hormonal changes (Ussher, 1991), whereas Freud (1935) emphasised women’s 
sexuality as being ‘all important.’ (Wright and Owen, 2001, pl43). Such differences 
cannot feasibly be attributed to purely biological factors, particularly since amongst 
women themselves rates of depression do not vary by parity. It must be concluded 
that females' greater risk is a consequence of gender differences in roles leading to 
differences in the experience of life events20. The fact that in modern society, in 
which such roles are less clearly defined, men are “catching up” with women in 
statistics of this kind may support this view. However, with few exceptions, research
19 Although the term "Neurotic” and "Neurosis" are no longer used in psychiatry, broadly 'neurosis’, 
as used here, covers non-psychotic conditions.
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and official data confirm that gender influences how and if mental disorder is defined 
and, within gender groups, factors such as age, employment, ethnicity and social class 
affect the perception and treatment of this.
Mental health ethics must therefore acknowledge and address gender differences by 
developing a theory of ethics which includes these considerations. It is not merely the 
radically feminist who consider psychiatry to uphold patriarchal power arrangements 
and support a masculine individualism unfitted to women's socialisation and gender 
identity. Such assertions should be taken particularly seriously since psychiatry and 
psychology work directly with the self and self-identity. If they are correct, mental 
health practice must recognise and act upon the kind of value and metaphysical 
assumptions about the nature of '‘self’ and "other" which feminist theorising has 
revealed. It must adopt ethical practices which incorporate and make allowance for 
these. Only an ethic in which possible paternalism on the part of the practitioner is 
counter-balanced by increased user autonomy and participation, thus diminishing the 
"seir’-"other” dichotomy, would meet these requisites.
Various authors previously cited (Davies. C. 1995; Russell, 1995, Chesler, 1972 and 
1990) also claim that female and male healthcare workers’ roles reflect different 
ethical positions: an ethic of care and a principles-based ethic, respectively. In many 
areas of health care, the latter appears to dominate ethical thinking, regardless of the 
fact that female philosophers such as Baier (cited in Fulford et al.1996, pl62) would 
agree that ‘...regulation is the enemy of trust’. However, recent works (Arber and
Some studies have found no gender differences in the incidence of depression, however.
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Gilbert, 1989; Sabo and Gordon, 1998) claim that these different positions are 
artificial and that men. far from wishing to control, can and often do ‘care’ in ways 
similar to women.
Given much feminist literature's claim that men, with few exceptions, are concerned 
with explicit rational principles, right and wrong acts and legal regulations protecting 
society, whilst women emphasise emotions, responsibilities and the social processes 
which protect relationships, the question of whether or not ethical practice is 
gendered is addressed in depth in Chapter Three.
1.5. Context -  Ethics in Mental Health Practice
In the United Kingdom today, although one in four people will experience mental 
health problems of varying severity during the life course, the mental health services 
are ‘widely perceived as the Cinderella of the National Health Service’ (Mental 
Health Today. January 2002. p i2). The proposed new Mental Health Act has 
provoked anxiety amongst users and anger amongst many practitioners and defenders 
of human rights21, as has the possible incarceration of potentially dangerous people 
believed to suffer personality disorders. Copious press coverage with headlines (in 
these examples all from The Guardian) such as: Civil Liberty Row on Mental Health 
Law (9.12.99. p 14); Psychopaths to be Denied Liberty (16.2.99, p9); Mentally III 
Pace Enforced Treatment (17.11.99. p 11) and, ironically, M.P.s Back Detention o f 
Dangerous Psychopaths, (15.3.00.) and M.P.s Criticise Lock-Up Plan fo r  the
21 See ‘Mentally III need help, not locking up', "The Independent", 7.7.02.p9.
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Menially III (25.7.00, p8) has been given to this theme. Discussion on the side-effects 
of medication versus quality of life abounds, whilst cases in which those suffering 
chronic psychotic illness have abandoned prescribed treatments and thrived, or been 
misdiagnosed and wrongly treated for many years, feature regularly in the media".
Recent statutory inquiries into abuse in psychiatric hospitals for chronic and “special” 
users produced vignettes of grossly corrupted professional standards. The 9th biennial 
report of the Mental Health Act Commission (MHAC), based on visits to 2193 units 
in England and Wales, describes dingy, overcrowded wards in which, due to lack of 
other activities and acute staff shortages, users -  including a disproportionate number 
of people from ethnic minorities -  pass their days smoking, sleeping and watching 
television. In many units only psychopharmacological treatments are offered and 
there is increasing use of the temporary holding Section 5.2. to prevent “voluntary" 
patients leaving wards often locked due to staff shortages (Mental Health 
Commission 9th Biennial Report). The number of people forcibly admitted to 
psychiatric hospitals rose from 18,000 in 1990-91 to 26,700 in 2000-01. Other users 
may enter hospital for voluntary treatment and later be refused permission to leave. 
The result is that almost 50,000 people were detained in mental hospitals in 2001, 
20,000 more than in 1991.”  23
22 A well-documented recent case is that of Renee McAllister, diagnosed twenty-three years ago, as 
suffering from schizophrenia after experiencing hallucinations related to the head of a woman whose 
decapitation by a train she had witnessed. In 1999, following attempted suicide, she was re-diagnosed 
as suffering post-traumatic stress disorder. Having abandoned medication in favour of eye-movement 
desensitisation and processing (EMDR) she now wants to “move on and develop my poetry as a way 
of expressing ... this incredible spiritual journey towards recovery” (Guardian Society. 25.10.00.pl2).
23 Laurance (2002) ‘Pure Madness’, London: Routledge.
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It is, therefore, not surprising that ‘survivor’ movements express growing 
dissatisfaction with many areas of present practice. To give the example of nursing: 
more users complain of misconduct by nursing staff; more disciplinary cases are 
processed by their governing bodies and more nurses are being removed from the 
register than ever before. In 2000, allegations of misconduct to the UKCC24 25increased 
by 16%. from 1084 to 1255. The Professional Conduct Committee sat on 205 days, 
compared to 151 in 1999 and 113 practitioners were removed from the register, as 
against 74 the previous year, a rise of 53%. (UKCC Register, Spring 2001, No.35, 
pl2).
This tendency is reflected in studies us far apart as Goffman. 1968. Luing. 1985. 
Bissonette et al. 1995. Ellis. 2000. Pitarka-Carcani. 2000. and Read. J. 2001. to name 
but a few. Possibly the richest source of such information is the World Wide Web 
(WWW) which contains myriad sites in which users and practitioners express 
dissatisfaction with current psychiatric practice (see References). All these sources 
support an ethical erosion hypothesis“’ which, together with the emphasis on "patient 
centred medicine", has made ethics an important and topical subject in mental health 
practice.
Within the health profession, too. reflection upon problems of ethics has evolved 
through formal codes of good practice, of research ethics and reports by government
•’4 United Kingdom Care Council, now the Nurses and Midwives’ Council.
25 A study by Wolf et al. (1989) is. however, ambiguous and that of Price et al. (1988) refutes this 
claim.
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sponsored commissions. Professional organisations currently specify and putatively 
enforce role obligations correlative to the rights of users and practitioners26 by means 
of codes of ethics or good practice. The difference between these is that an ethic sets 
the highest possible standard or principles, whilst a code of practice is essentially rule 
based. As such, it does not allow departures from these on matters of principle, 
demanding total conformity and obedience. An ethic can set standards without being 
a code of conduct, a point relevant to virtue and care ethics. Both ethics and codes are 
intended to ensure that those who enter into professional relationships with their 
members find them competent and trustworthy.
In mental health care today, the relevance of traditional ethical positions depends 
upon whether they resolve the moral dilemmas facing practitioners. It has been 
claimed that an 'enormous disparity’ exists between ethical decisions made by 
participants in recent studies and the ethics and codes of practice prescribed by the 
National Association of Social Workers (N.A.S.W.); the United Kingdom Care 
Council (U.K.C.C.). now the Nursing and Midwifery Council (N&MC); the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists (R.C.Psych.); the General Medical Council (G.M.C.); the 
Royal College of Nurses (R.C.N.) and the British Psychological Society (B.P.S.), 
amongst others. Whereas 'these codes of ethics suggest that, for example, 
confidentiality is maintained more than it is breached ... research would suggest quite 
the opposite.' (Watson, F. 1999 p21).
26 Although the research findings show that some practitioners feel that they do little to defend their 
own interests
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In fairness to practitioners, they are themselves grossly understaffed and 
overworked27. This, together with the increased number of mental health workers 
accused of malpractice each year (UKCC register, No.35, 2001, Pitarka-Carcani, 
2000) brings into question the whole issue of the practicability of "enforcing” ethical 
practice by means of professional codes.
1.5.1.The Institutional Policy/Ethical Practice Dilemma
The National Service Framework for Mental Health states that '...the essence of 
effective care and co-ordination is sound professional judgement and practice’ (p3). 
However, even the most mundane judgements in practice ultimately involve making 
ethical choices. Mental healthcare professionals must be aware of both this and, as is 
manifest in the transcripts of disciplinary hearings2* and reports of the Ombudsman 
for Health29, of a natural human tendency when faced with criticism or 
"uncomfortable” situations, to try to limit their concerns to technical matters which 
can be defended and require little or no emotional involvement.
Ethical dilemmas resulting from the ‘conflict between institutional policy and the 
ethical standards of mental health care professionals’ (Barker and Baldwin, 1991, 
pxiv) are apparently a harsh reality in mental health practice today. Matt Muijen, of 
the Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health describes psychiatric hospitals as the 
“dustbins" of the mental health service, whilst also commenting on the difficulty of 
remedying this when 'national policy is so preoccupied with community care'
J1 See the Mental Health Act Commission’s 9th Annual Report 
Those studied were from UKCC Professional Conduct Case Summaries, August 1999.
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(M e n ta l H ea lth  T o d a y , J a n u a ry  2 0 0 2 . p 9 ) .
Scheid (2000) claims that in mental health practice, overt conflict exists between 
managed care and patient-centred practice. This arises because the former is designed 
to alter the latter. 'Providers must negotiate between contradictory institutional 
demands for cost containment and quality care in their everyday work practices, and 
consequently experience a series of ethical dilemmas’ (p700). The way in which 
mental health care is managed could, this author believes, potentially undermine the 
professional autonomy, prerogative and good practice of all practitioners.
The claim is that ethics no longer pervades professional healthcare, (if it ever did), 
but is usually now employed as a form of analysis in complicated (and potentially 
litigious) ethical dilemmas. Following the displacement of ethical reflection from the 
clinical setting to that of professional/public policy, and attempts to establish ethics as 
an area in which the healthcare professional is no longer considered an expert, even 
considering ethics in today's so-called "patient-centred” medicine might, claims 
Scheid. be seen as complicating decision-making in practice.
1.5.2. The Dynamics of Power in Practice -  Users’ and Practitioners’ Views
Whilst, due to research findings, such definitions are constantly in flux, it is not 
surprising that in an ostensibly democratic society the power to treat people with 
what is frequently ‘no known physical pathology' provokes serious ethical reflection, 
particularly as "madness” is frequently associated with "badness":
See the list of WWW sites in the references for this site
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‘One major purpose of these services is not to "care” for people, but rather to 
control them ... Psychiatry functions ... as a wing of a strategy of transcribing 
problems of collective order ... into problems of morality; that section of the 
population that cannot be assimilated to society by methods of improvement 
must be neutralised as a social danger’.
(Gordon, 1986 cited in Barker and Baldwin, 1991).
Whether ‘controlling' or ‘neutralising’ mentally disordered people, which would 
imply that mental disorder is as much a moral as medical condition, is commonplace 
deserves further elucidation.
Although control and "neutralisation” cannot be condoned as ‘therapy’, since 
suffering physical violence is an increasing hazard in the professional life of mental 
health care workers their use is not. perhaps, surprising. Sixty-five thousand violent 
incidents took place against National Health Service staff during 1998-1999 and the 
average number of such incidents is three times higher in mental health and learning 
disability settings. (UKCC, Register, No.34. 2001, p9). However, the
"dangerousness” of the mentally-disordered population has been grossly exaggerated 
by the popular media and the result of this is reflected in both the National Service 
Framework, which describes risk assessment and management as at the heart of 
effective mental health practice30 and needs to be central to any training developed 
around the care plan approach' (p22. my italics) and the proposed new Mental Health 
Act. This is widely rejected by user movements such as the National Schizophrenia 
Fellowship31 and MIND, practitioners and human rights lawyers:
Although on page 3 of this same document, sound professional judgement and practice are 
considered to be the 'essence' of this.
11 Now renamed "Rethink".
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'I am very concerned with some of the proposals and wonder whether 
some are compliant with European Law. The government seems to have 
gone ahead and ignored the advice it has been given. The system will 
collapse unless they drastically increase funding -  they won't be able to 
afford all the extra tribunals they have promised, for instance.’
(Rebecca Fitzpatrick. Human Rights Lawyer, cited in The Independent 
on Sunday, 7.7.02.p9).
The National Service Framework, on the other hand, claims that: 'Changes in the 
legislative framework to support the effective delivery of modern mental health 
services will arise from the current review of the Mental Health Act’ (p i5).
1.5.3. The “Perils” of Technology
Part of the tension between objectivity and subjectivity which has caused facts and 
values to develop as separate areas of knowledge in practice, originates, according to 
Dyer (1988), in the previously described biological versus psychosocial dichotomy 
evidenced by "scientific rationalists”, who emphasise objectivity, fact, abstraction 
and certainty, and "humanitarian idealists” who stress subjectivity, values, emotions 
and experience. Medical practice should, he continues, be well situated to resolve this 
tension, but most healthcare workers and many users apparently misconceive new 
technologies, overestimating their power. An area as sensitive as mental health 
practice involves far more than technology, yet the science and humanitarian 
empiricism divide in this may have provoked an imbalance in professional healthcare 
ethics between valuing and knowing, between facts and values (see also Fulford et al, 
2002) .
There are currently two prevailing (and competing) views on professional healthcare
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ethics. The first considers the expertise of the practitioner to define the profession. 
The second claims it is based upon a trusting relationship between practitioner and 
user and defined by the ethics, or codes of good practice of the individual healthcare 
discipline. This ethics-knowledge divide was once unthinkable, insofar as these 
factors were inseparable from the personal values of the “knower” in question. 
However, today scientific medical practice sometimes appears to have reduced the 
user to little more than a physically or pharmacologically manipulated artefact 
(Hopkins. 1972 and 1979. Shorter. 1986 and 1996: Dyer, 1988; Jonsen 1998. et al.). 
This process of reducing the user to “clinical material" has facilitated the expertise- 
ethics divide.
Since in a conception of morality based on rules, the sensibilities important to moral 
judgement and action are frequently underestimated, this is arguably of greater 
relevance to mental health practice, which prioritises behaviour, than to surgical 
treatments which prioritise the body. An article trom the New York Times Sunday 
Magazine describes the dilemma of a young intern in psychiatry which illustrates this 
dichotomy between practical technology and personal sensibility:
"... (she) told me she was thinking of abandoning the field. She had studied 
psychiatry to find out how the human mind works ... but all she learned was 
which drug would control socially incorrect behaviour. And who's to say 
what’s incorrect? "If he showed up here tonight”, she said, “I would drug 
Vincent van Gogh so that he would never paint again".' (Alcabete. 2000)
Not that "scientific" treatment is inevitably undesirable to the user. Many people 
suffering mental disorder actively seek professional help, request medication and
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Chapter Two: The Philosophical Concepts
2.1. Introduction
The problem central to this thesis is that of evaluating which of several moral 
theoretical frameworks best undergirds the ethical prescriptions of mental health 
practice. The contrast between deontological, duty-based systems and 
consequentialist1 systems, such as utilitarianism, is familiar to those working in 
medical ethics. However, as was said in Chapter One, in considering mental health 
practice other contenders for preferred ethical framework and their relevance to 
patient-centred practice merit close attention.
Discussion of the theories behind and structure of ethics in mental health practice 
should be informed by the historical context and content of the theories in 
question and the moral dilemmas they are to address. This chapter explores the 
philosophical origins of the relevant theories, identifying the principal 
characteristics and values inherent to each. It compares and contrasts them with 
virtue ethics and the ethic of care, discussing their potential advantages and 
disadvantages for mental health practice. Distinctions are made between clearly 
different major ethical theories, Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian ethics and the 
ethic of care. An ethic based on both the latter, the end of which is 'flourishing’, 
was described (in Chapter 1.2.1) as potentially particularly appropriate to the 
specific needs of mental health practice.
1 Both explained further in 2.2.2.
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2.2. The inadequacy of principles-based ethics and codes of practice
Promoting a case-based approach to virtue ethics, Jonsen and Toulmin (1988) 
reject the ‘tyranny of principles’. This approach, known as casuistry, 
contends that although philosophers believe that moral judgements start with 
principles, upon examining the means by which consensus is reached in 
moral dilemmas, it becomes clear that agreement on principles is not 
inevitable. These authors describe how several people analysing the 
resolution to a particular moral problem could reach agreement on this 
readily, but disagree upon the principles by which the resolution was attained. 
Casuistry argues that the locus o f cert ¡tilde in moral discussions does not lie 
in an agreed set of intrinsically convincing t>eiieral rules or principles, but a 
common perception of the issue specifically at stake in particular kinds of 
human situation (pi 8, their italics). In this case, the focus of ethics should not 
be on normative rules designed, as in professional ethical codes, to apply to a 
range of particular situations, but on the Aristotelian virtue of phronesis, the 
capacity for practical, intelligent reasoning which starts with perceptions 
about cases and moves upwards towards only limited general rules or 
guidelines.
Principles are also rejected by most care ethicists because they are employed 
inflexibly, without regard to context, in moral decision-making. However, 
only the very strong particularists amongst these totally reject the possibility 
of generalisation and of principles. Other feminists are prepared to endorse 
principles as part of an ethic of care, as ‘Aristotelian rules of thumb’. The 
issue is not whether virtues such as justice may be included, but how. It will
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here be argued that this can result from simply recognising the ethic of care as 
a virtue ethic, as do several of those female philosophers cited in Chapter
1.3.1. (Tong, 1998; Card, 1995; Baier, 1994). To be practicable, which at 
present it is arguably not, the ethic of care must include those considerations 
of value which allow carers to seek a balance between caring for others 
(promoting their flourishing) and for themselves (in the context of this thesis, 
flourishing quit health professional), flourishing being the ultimate aim of 
Aristotelian virtue ethics. The crux o f the argument pro virtue and care ethics 
is that real events neither require, nor conform to rigid principles, much less 
norms, for in mental health practice as in no other area of medicine, dealing 
as it does with disorders of emotion, character and behaviour rather than 
specific physical manifestations, each ethical dilemma is unique and 
necessarily resolved as such.
2.3. Historical Background
The recent history of ethics could be described as one of disillusion and 
uncertainty. This results from the post-war shift in emphasis from the problem of 
knowledge to that of meaning, which has separated ethics and epistemology. 
Disinclined to accept the notion of ethical "knowledge”, analytic and linguistic 
philosophers have argued that moral language is, epistemologically speaking, 
empty (Audi, 1995 pp.508-510). Many still believe this, in spite of the excellent 
work currently taking place in this field.
It may be difficult to verify ethical statements such as “abusing the mentally 
disordered is wrong”, much less philosophically validate them by the exercise of
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logic. Consequently, they appear to be purely subjective, emotional utterances and 
if all moral philosophy has done is produce essentially empty “pseudo­
propositions”, then all ethical foundations disappear. Only unverifiable human 
beliefs, lacking a solid base and offering no guarantees remain. However, 
Enlightenment thinkers, such as Hume, suspicious of reason as a source of moral 
wisdom. Hume believed our practical moral distinctions to derive from the 
sentiments, or feelings, provided by our moral sense. ‘Passions direct the will, and 
reason serves the passions’. (Hume, D., 1969 [1739/40] A Treatise on Human 
Nature) is a sentiment which female philosophers (see Chapter 1.3.1.) claim finds 
resonance in both virtue ethics and the ethic of care.
Continental philosophers, such as Lyotard and Derrida, developed similar 
arguments, claiming that reason itself - as a human linguistic construct, rather than 
a transcendent entity - is a fiction. They suggested that adulating reason per se had 
caused much self-inflicted human suffering and questioned many philosophers’ 
faith in rational man’s ability to produce the true, universal and eternal. In addition 
- and importantly to this thesis - they believed that blindness to the fact that beliefs 
are simply selective and contingent linguistic constructs could result in social and 
political creeds which involved excluding the "other”, the dissenter, the political 
opponent, indeed all powerless and non-conforming minorities -  including the 
mentally disordered. This notion of ‘otherness’ must inform any discussion on 
mental health practice given that social exclusion is frequently a consequence of 
mental disorder.
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Roland Barthes suggested that those who control the dominant discourse (in 
mental health practice, policy makers, managers and practitioners) determine what 
is ‘real’ or ‘rational’ and therefore not symptomatic of madness. Barthes 
considered much of the essentially cultural or political to have been naturalised 
and re-presented as “common sense”. He employed the word ‘myths’ to describe 
ostensibly ‘natural’ ideological constructs which, upon examination, frequently 
prove to be subjective and unfounded value judgements - for example those about 
the poor being “work shy”, women more “hysterical” than men, and the mentally 
disordered “dangerous".
Michel Foucault echoed these views, developing the view of knowledge as an 
ideological construct used by the powerful to oppress the weak. In Madness and 
Civilisation (1989), he offers an archaeology of how the exchange between 
madness and reason was silenced. He suggests that the powerful, in claiming to 
know what is ‘reasonable’, claim the right to decide what is permissible and 
rational in thought and behaviour2 (and the proposed new Mental Health Act 
might be said to justify this suggestion). They have convinced everyone that local 
and regional ideologies are, in fact, universal and unquestionable, categorising 
those who dissent from them as mad, even dangerous, and treating them 
accordingly. This could explain, for example, the totally disproportionate number 
of Afro-Caribbean men currently interned in psychiatric hospitals in the U.K. and 
the U.S.A.1 The notion of knowledge of the ‘rational’ as a weapon of social 
control is revisited in Chapters 3 and 5.
2 See Perkins Gilman The Yellow Wallpaper for an example of this.
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Great changes also occurred in post-war Anglo-American analytical moral 
philosophy. Prior to the fifties, discussion of normative ethics centred on those 
two opposing rational traditions: the deontological position favoured, for example, 
by Kant, and the Utilitarian or consequentialist position, favoured, for example, by
J.S. Mill. Obligation-based deontological (from the Greek dei = one must) codes 
are based on moral theories according to which acts must, or must not, be 
performed regardless of the consequences. They are intrinsically right or wrong 
and do not specify good independently of right, or right as maximising the good. 
Deontology is, therefore, perceived as generally opposing consequentialist ethics 
based upon the claim that the rightness or wrongness of an act depends wholly 
upon its consequences. On this view, one should act only in terms of achieving the 
best general state of affairs. There are two classes of utilitarian, or 
consequentialist. The act utilitarian considers what good and bad consequences 
will result from this action, in this circumstance. The rule utilitarian, closer to 
deontology, considers an act’s conformity to a rule justified by the principle of 
utility to be what makes it right. The rule is not expendable in a particular context, 
even when following it does not maximise utility. Both theories base moral worth 
exclusively on rationality, claiming that our development as moral beings depends 
solely upon an ability to rationally perceive universal and impartial rules of 
“rightness" and “wrongness”.
' According to Nazroo, J. (1997) Ethnicity and Mental Health, the 4lh National Survey of Ethnic 
Minorities, the rate of psychosis among Caribbean men is no greater than among white men, but 
they are far more likely than the latter to be receiving hospital treatment for psychosis, 
compulsorily treated, and treated in secure wards. This work provides support for both Foucault’s 
and MacIntyre’s views on the local being considered to be universal.
Great changes also occurred in post-war Anglo-American analytical moral 
philosophy. Prior to the fifties, discussion of normative ethics centred on those 
two opposing rational traditions: the deontological position favoured, for example, 
by Kant, and the Utilitarian or consequentialist position, favoured, for example, by 
J.S. Mill. Obligation-based deontological (from the Greek dei = one must) codes 
are based on moral theories according to which acts must, or must not, be 
performed regardless of the consequences. They are intrinsically right or wrong 
and do not specify good independently of right, or right as maximising the good. 
Deontology is, therefore, perceived as generally oppos'ng consequentialist ethics 
based upon the claim that the rightness or wrongness ° f an act depends wholly 
upon its consequences. On this view, one should act only in terms ot achieving the 
best general state of affairs. There are two classes of utilitarian, or 
consequentialist. The act utilitarian considers what good and bad consequences 
will result from this action, in this circumstance. The rule utilitarian, closer to 
deontology, considers an act’s conformity to a rule justified by the principle of 
utility to be what makes it right. The rule is not expendable in a particular context, 
even when following it does not maximise utility. B01*1 theories base moral worth 
exclusively on rationality, claiming that our development as moral beings depends 
solely upon an ability to rationally perceive universal and impartial rules ol 
“rightness” and “wrongness”.
' According to Nazroo, J. (1997) Ethnicity and Mental Health, the 4 National Survey ol Ethnic 
Minorities, the rate of psychosis among Caribbean men is no greater than among white men, but 
they are far more likely than the latter to be receiving hospital treatment for psychosis, 
compulsorily treated, and treated in secure wards. This work provides support lor both Foucault s 
and MacIntyre's views on the local being considered to be universal.
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G.E.M. Anscombe (1958), attacked deontology and consequentialist theories, 
suggesting that when no law-giver is assumed, a foundation for morality based 
upon legal notions of rules and obligations is nonsense. She believed that secular 
moral philosophy could no longer employ concepts of rightness and wrongness 
linked to moral obligation. Instead ethics should be based on the Aristotelian 
notion of virtue (arete) understood, independently of obligation or good 
consequences, as part of human flourishing. The notions of virtue are, she 
suggested, essentially more “basic” than the concepts central to Kantian and 
Consequentialist theory, and may replace some of these, particularly that of 
"obligation”. Modem virtue ethics focuses on moral agents, their characters and 
lives, specifically emphasising moral education since virtuous character traits are 
developed in one’s youth.
Central to virtue ethics is the notion that sound moral choices depend upon a 
virtuous character, rather than principles and rules. It emphasises the agent who 
performs the act and makes the choices. Aristotle distinguished between right 
action and proper motive by suggesting that an action can be right without being 
virtuous, but can be virtuous only if performed in the right state of mind (Ethics 
1103al0). An intellectual virtue is a trait of character that is socially valued, such 
as intelligence or charm, and a moral virtue is a trait that is morally valued, such 
as courage, temperance or justice (Ethics II -1103a 14-b 1). Virtuous agents must 
consciously decide to perform virtuous actions for themselves and must do so 
from a firm and unchanging state of mind.
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Because of this, McDowell (1979) claimed that virtue has only a secondary role in 
ethical codes primarily concerned with ‘right conduct’ and the principles 
governing this. This a gross oversight: ‘Right conduct’ should come ‘from the 
inside out’ (Virtue and Reason, 1979, pp331-50), beginning with the notion of the 
virtuous agent. Virtue is knowledge and in some sense ‘getting it right’ from a 
sensitivity to the demands inherent to the particular situation.
McDowell’s ‘sensitivity’ is arguably closely related to Aristotle’s phronesis, the 
deliberative excellence necessary to realise the true conception of the good life in 
practice via choice (Honderich, 1995, p679). Phronesis is, in Aristotle, natural to 
the virtuous agent, who sees things as they are and acts accordingly. That 
awareness of how to live cannot be captured in a set of universal principles (or 
deontological codes) is implied in Ethics, Book V-l 137a35-b24, in which 
Aristotle insists that laws cannot (or should not) be applied indiscriminately, even 
when framed universally. The virtue of equity is needed to balance a law’s 
universality against the canons of justice. Morality cannot be coded, nor the 
virtuous agent’s awareness of how to live captured in a set of universal principles 
or codes. Virtue is a question of character, not act.
Iris Murdoch (1985) relates virtue and care ethics, claiming that morality cannot 
be understood as a set of contractual arrangements, but involves our whole way of 
life, hence the Socratic question: “How should one live...?” For her, respect is 
found in the ethical sphere, particularly in the exercise of altruistic love and 
justice. In Murdoch’s account, virtue consists in a movement beyond the self 
which includes a capacity for love itself and, ultimately, for love of “the Good”.
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This altruistic love has points in common with Noddings’ (1984) and Ruddick’s 
(1989) description of the feminine “ethic of caring”. However, Murdoch believes 
not only that the self is a source of falsity and deception, but also -  and here her 
thinking is opposed to that of both Aristotle and Noddings - that human beings are 
naturally selfish. Noddings would totally reject this notion, at least in so far as 
women are concerned. Only in moving beyond the self, says Murdoch, can one 
contact with the world as it is, a view which links philosophical moral theory to 
the need for sociological empirical observation.
These arguments contain scepticism about objective accounts of the good and 
aspects of virtue ethics, representative of much contemporary work on this. In 
After Virtue, MacIntyre (1985) adopted elements of all these themes, moving 
towards the creation of a neo-Aristotelian variant of virtue-centred ethics. He 
claims that much contemporary moral decision making, based on fallacious 
notions of timeless truths about the nature of moral discourse or foundations of 
moral judgement, is nonsense. Developing Aristotle’s view that there should be no 
conflict between the individual and communitarianism, MacIntyre suggested that 
ethics concentrate less on individuals and private moral decisions and more on the 
moral health and welfare of the community.
Communal life is, MacIntyre believes, maintained by tradition and the dispositions 
of virtue which groups encourage in individual members. All morality results 
from tradition and believing one can exist as a ‘pure individual’, or formulate a 
tradition-free and timeless moral system based upon reason alone, is futile. Greek 
morals have, says MacIntyre, been undermined by sceptics such as Hume. Kant,
like other deontologists, reduces morality to a cold exercise in reason, whilst 
consequentialists produce a set of unworkable pseudo-scientific calculations.
In addition, these doctrines claim to be universal when, like Foucault, MacIntyre 
considers them essentially ‘local’. For him, modem ethical philosophy either 
covers the internal warfare between deontology and consequentialistism described 
earlier, or is unfeelingly analytic and theoretical. Consequently, in After Virtue 
(1985), MacIntyre recommends a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic based on one of 
Aristotle’s central tenets -  that people should be habituated into having a good 
disposition towards others. Morality consists in three parts: the raw nature of 
human beings, the laws of morality, and a conception of human nature as it would 
be if it realised its goal (telos). Ethics, MacIntyre argues, is the means to this, the 
fulfilled (eudemon) existence or flourishing (1985, p53). Aristotle describes this 
goal as our biological nature qua human beings, but MacIntyre argues that it is 
acquired within a communal practice, shaped by an historical tradition. 
Interestingly, given the nature of this thesis, MacIntyre claims that ‘a moral 
philosophy ... presupposes a sociology’ (1985, p23). His example is the virtue 
ethics of the heroic societies of military aristocracies. This was first raised by 
Plato (.Republic) and Aristotle as a result of the shift to the polis and subsequently 
further displaced by the transformations of Christianity and modem Western 
individualism. MacIntyre overlooks Goffman’s (1961) suggestion that the 
"mechanical solidarity” of loyalty to the group never entirely disappears, but 
continues to be generated wherever social interaction has the characteristics of 
interaction rituals.
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For neo-Aristotelians, moral behaviour cannot be reduced to a set of principles or 
rules since these are frequently inapplicable in ‘unusual’ situations. Any principle 
is liable to exception and ‘any universal moral judgement (strictly construed) is 
false’ (Barnes, 1976, p21). At best one can aspire to a set of general principles 
which will cover the exigencies of most commonplace situations, but always risk 
coming ‘unstuck’ (ibid). In such a situation, Aristotle himself would recommend 
abandoning these in favour of a more satisfactory set, or resorting to moral 
intuition.
Although somewhat uninformative about the nature of the dispositions or virtues 
(aretes) that he believes would produce excellent moral behaviour, MacIntyre 
describes them as qualities which enable us to achieve “eternal goods” which arc 
grounded in human practices and ‘the wisdom of ages’. What he may have in 
mind is that the practice of the virtues is constitutive of excellent practice, a notion 
central to the study of ethics in mental health settings.
2.4. An Empirical Ethic for Mental Health Practice
Descriptive theory explains how things are. Normative theory tells us what 
morally ought to be the case. In focusing on ethics, we are normally understood to 
be concerned with the latter and in assessing actions and behaviour all ethical 
theories use some kind of normative ethical principles. To be workable and 
beneficial an ethical discourse must employ understandings, procedures and 
judgement criteria which all those concerned with morality and ethics can affirm.
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This thesis argues that as the fact that codes would appear to be more honoured ‘in 
the breach than in the observance’ (Pritchard, 2001) reveals, current principles- 
based ethics are insufficiently adaptable to the subtleties of ethical dilemmas in 
patient-centred mental health practice, in which the user’s values, priorities and 
psychological and social circumstances (Barker and Baldwin, 1991) are 
emphasised. Necessary to this is an awareness of the importance of good user- 
practitioner communication and the ability to integrate this with the demands of 
today’s highly technical bio-medicine.
From the perspective of empirical ethics what is interesting about Aristotle’s 
virtue ethics is the seriousness of his attempt to ground ethical life in a realistic 
understanding of human psychology, in which both character and virtues are type- 
specific4. Aristotle amassed empirical observations on an enormous scale and 
believed that ‘it is the business of experience to give the basic principles which 
belong to each subject’ (Prior Analytics, 1.30). Aristotle’s insistence that the 
ethical life is primarily concerned with the agent’s character and experience of 
life, rather than with abstract moral rules and their logical justification, appears to 
make virtue ethics particularly relevant to the irrational and unclear situations 
frequently encountered in mental health practice.
Dconlological codes of good practice appear, to judge by the disproportionately 
large proportion of disciplinary hearings related to mental health practice, ill-fitted 
to deal with the ethical dilemmas inherent to mental health practice. A courageous
4 In philosophy, type is contrasted with, or compared to token. Types are abstract things and tokens 
are particulars. It could be said, for example, that ‘the event which is now your reading is a token 
of the type reading' (Honderich, p877).
person faced with violence would, for example, be sensitive and responsive to 
what in any particular circumstance was the courageous thing to do without 
needing to refer to “the rules”. There is no authority independent of this 
courageous person, such as a fixed moral code, which could explain or justify that 
judgement. According to Aristotle (Metaphysics 1078b27-32), Socrates himself 
showed that any attempt to define courage by prescribing particular rules will 
admit obvious counterexamples. As McDowell (1979) said, virtue is ‘getting it 
right’ due to a sensitivity to the demands of the situation. This has nothing to do 
with rules, but relates to moral “intuition”, experience and phronesis.
The Aristotelian virtue ethical theory employed here is ‘neo’ insofar as whilst 
generally embracing his ethical writings, its proponents regard some of Aristotle’s 
views, particularly those on women, slaves and animals as ‘just plain wrong’ 
(Hursthouse, 1999, p8). It also includes virtues such as charity and concern for all 
sentient beings, something Aristotle, due to the cultural context of Athenian 
society of the 5lh century B.C., did not consider. Neo-Aristotelian virtues ethics, in 
various “formats”, is widely recognised as a rival to what many modem 
philosophers now consider outdated and insensitive deontological and 
consequentialist ethics. Virtue ethics seems particularly relevant to healthcare 
practice insofar as Aristotle prescribes as a realisable universal in what good 
practice should consist - the exercise of the virtues, particularly phronesis, in the 
professional task. Mental health practitioners must aspire to achieve in terms of 
that definition in order to ‘flourish’ qua practitioner in the clinical context. This 
contrasts with the flourishing of the user, which is essentially being able to resume 
a full and satisfying life. The main problems here lie in considering how to
educate those who lack them in the necessary virtues and in redefining these in the 
context of mental health practice.
In addition, there is a distinction between Aristotle’s abstract universal and the 
real. In the Politics, Aristotle claims that those lacking the abilities necessary to a 
life of excellence or virtue are natural slaves and therefore rightfully deprived of 
the freedoms enjoyed by those with higher capacities. By this very harsh 
criterion5, the mentally disordered would apparently fall short - would be, as it 
were, Aristotelian untermensch. Chapter 1.5. showed that even today they are 
frequently perceived and treated as such.
Neo-Aristotelian ethics totally rejects the notion of untermensch and the 
possibility of socially excluding the mentally ill for the reasons that Aristotle 
might have done. Respect and care for all sentient beings is a central tenet of neo- 
Aristotelianism. Such an ethic, requiring as it does the practice of the virtue of 
phronesis, is highly relevant in the context of mental health care, since this would 
permit guidelines, rather than rules, to be employed in both encouraging good 
practice and in ethics education. A greater emphasis would be placed upon on 
values, reflexivity, role models and mentors, than on apparently unrealistic and 
unhelpful codes.
5 It should be remembered that Aristotle’s views on only free Cireek mule citizens as fully worthy 
human beings were typical of his age and culture, although Plato held a more magnanimous view 
of (some) women.
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2.4.1 Flourishing (eudemonia) and the good (agatlios) in the context of mental 
health practice
Having defined flourishing for mental health practice in general terms in Chapter
1.2.1, it is necessary to consider and define it in the context of mental disorder, for 
it might appear that the concept of universal flourishing is questionably realisable 
in this. Flourishing was earlier described as a function, that is, as a purpose or 
goal. We define some things, such as man, in terms of function. Some men are 
considered more ‘manly’ than others, and so on. Structures make this realisable, 
indeed it is only realisable as a structure. Insofar as the universal of nursing 
cannot, for example, be separated from the nurse, good mental health practice can 
arguably only be as good as its health care workers, regardless of the codes of 
practice stipulated by professional bodies.
Whether this 'good practice’ is a real or an ideal thing is unproblematic in that it is 
workable either way, but the flourishing of users must always be conceived in real 
terms. The good practitioner’s principle aim is to discern and develop the user’s 
potential for flourishing which, for Aristotle, is the greatest good. As was 
indicated in Chapter 1, (p9) a central tenet of neo-Aristotelian theory is that 
■practices’ are associated with certain goods (agatlia), which exist within a 
hierarchy of other goods. Aristotle held that flourishing consisted in the exercise 
of the virtues and this in itself instantiates all the human goods. In Nichomachean 
Ethics, he develops the idea of a good-in-itself or intrinsic good, distinguishing 
between things pursued for their own sake, for example health, and things pursued 
for the sake of their consequences, such as fame. He considered many things to be 
goods in themselves, including intelligence, wit and so on. Neo-Aristotelians
would add to this modem values such as the conservation of the bio-system. 
(Honderich, pp322-323).
At this juncture it is necessary to consider the nature of the goods internal to 
mental health practice and their relationship to notions of function, flourishing and 
care. Flourishing in practice could be described as an abstract ideal, yet meeting 
this would serve for little if the practitioner did not at the same time meet the ideal 
for flourishing and make his/her professional objective the simultaneous 
flourishing of the user. In speaking of functions, as for example in the case of the 
nurse, these are universal, based on commonly shared notions of what a good 
nurse is. But what is a ‘good’ mentally disordered person? Does it mean that in 
diagnostic terms, for example, a ‘good’ psychopath has to lie, rob or murder? This 
is obviously not the case.
The conflict lies in the fact that one individual’s flourishing is not necessarily 
another’s. Common ground is needed in order to be able to say that one person’s 
flourishing is effectively not exactly the same as another’s, but that it does fit a 
universal description. This enables us to claim, for instance, that it is definitive of 
psychopathy to cause harm to others, but this is obviously not what is meant by 
the psychopath’s “nourishing”. Can ‘nourishing’, in the Aristotelian sense of 
eudemonia, occur in mental health practice in the absence of ‘caring’ both for and 
about the user, or are the two inseparable, complimentary, or quite distinct entities 
which may or may not be related to considerations of gender?
How, too, is the user’s ‘good’ or best interest discerned? It initially seems that 
mental health practitioners would almost inevitably fall short in this function in 
the case of the highly irrational or sedated user, incapable of clearly expressing 
him or herself. In a sense, this aim appears unrealisable for lack of resources and 
therefore, like rules, more likely to be honoured in the breach than in the 
observance. But this is not an excuse for not at least trying. If mental health 
professionals are to be educated in what to strive for, the objective must be clear. 
It may fall short of an ideal, but if only a minimum, such as containment, is 
attempted, practitioners could fail in other important ways.
To return to the example, how can the flourishing of the nurse, versus that of the 
psychopath, best be described? The aim of each is quite different and almost 
certainly mutually incompatible, but in any Aristotelian ethic a sense of 
community is essential and this implies a sense of responsibility towards the 
psychopath. This is something fully and increasingly, should proposed changes in 
the Mental Health Act become law, coherent with the role of professional mental 
health practitioners. However, abuse must be guarded against. From this point of 
view, the nature of flourishing for the psychopath might be described, but the 
description will refer solely to this particular psychopath, not to psychopaths in 
general. "This-ness” must be considered for there can be no prescriptions or rules 
of good conduct in dealing with this, or that, particular sufferer from 
schizophrenia or bi-polar disorder. In order to promote user flourishing it is 
essential that the good practitioner discerns the individual interest and values of
each user.
It could be objected that we talk of this, but that in talking of psychiatric practice, 
we are generalising. However, when talking at all we universalise. Assuming this 
is not an excuse for failing to address the problem, there is another way. Although 
this commonly occurs, we should not, for example, reduce the person who suffers 
from schizophrenia to the label “schizophrenic” simply because we know nothing 
more of him or her. Ignorance cannot absolve us of the need to go beyond the 
label. Phrases such as “only five minutes to visit”, “no nurses” and so on, are all 
variables to be considered, but we cannot talk in general terms, for example, of 
“the psychiatric service we deserve”. However, a universal concept of flourishing 
for practice is still necessary, even if we need its anti-thesis for individuals. 
Guidelines, which are realistic, without being so low-level or inflexible as to 
actually hinder good practice are necessary. Having an ideal of practice, a 
eudemonia for practice, is another matter. A dialectical process comes of good 
practice, but given the nature of some dilemmas inherent to treating mental 
disorder it is essential to remember that this must be enshrined in law.
The concept of eudemonia could be said to cause problems in Aristotelian ethics 
itself, in relation to both user and practitioner, due to Aristotle’s tendency to 
“pigeonhole”, someone either making the universal grade, or failing to do so. 
However, although what is good for A is not necessarily equally good for B, A 
may still be useful as a model because the flourishing of both A and B depends on 
knowing and analysing their desires and potential. We cannot make rules about A 
or B, but neither can we generalise about flourishing. Both for mental health care 
workers and users this is different, but not antithetical. To some degree it is also 
different to Aristotle’s universals, because whilst universal are necessary to
diagnosis, they must not be confused with the individual user for whom 
flourishing begins in not being dehumanised, either chemically or psychologically, 
and lost in a sea of diagnostic labels. This is not to condemn diagnosis or 
treatment, but given the variety and nature of mental disorders and our relative 
ignorance of the aetiology of some of these it is vital to take a whole view and to 
question both, if necessary.
Perhaps practice cannot be perfect, but we should, nonetheless, strive for 
perfection. What is proposed here is to take Aristotle’s notion of virtue as a model 
and adapt it, saying that it is not a universal, except in the abstract sense of 
flourishing practice and in relation to flourishing mental health care workers (and 
users). A realistic core of flourishing is thus achieved in practice, which does not 
condemn both practitioners and users to being incapable of meeting the ideal, nor 
reduce them to the lowest common denominator. This relates to the realism of a 
universalism of eudemonia in practice. How this is best achieved will be discussed 
in part three.
2.4.2. Virtue and Care Ethics as Normative Ethics
Another argument against neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics is that it does not produce 
specific rules of the kind necessary to professional colleges’ deontological codes. 
However, virtues can generate prescriptions (and vices prohibitions), it cannot 
therefore justifiably be claimed that virtue ethics does not involve "rules”, 
although these are couched in evaluative, rather than dogmatic terms. Developing 
and defining a normative ethic is a complex task and while it is legitimate to 
believe in a normative virtue ethic, safeguards arc necessary to ensure that this is
part of a dialectical process. Normative ethics always run the risk of being 
excessively rigid or too fluid and both extremes must be avoided. Given that a 
large body of evidence indicates that deontological codes are frequently ignored 
by mental health practitioners, something new, less rule-bound and more sensitive 
to individual circumstances is required. As MacIntyre (1985) indicates, each 
community creates its own set of norms and allows for only relatively subtle 
variations from these. But individuals, mental health professionals or users, should 
be urged to be as autonomous as possible. ‘Properly motivated people often do 
not merely follow the rules. They also have a morally appropriate desire to act as 
they do’ (Beauchamp and Childress, p64). Given this requirement, how a virtue- 
care ethic can, in fact, be a normative ethic will now be discussed.
As Barnes (1976) says:
“The Ethics is a work of practical science ... the aim of studying ethics is 
not the acquisition of knowledge about action, but action itself -  we read 
the Ethics ... not in order to know what good men are like, but in order to 
act as good men do (1095a5; 1103b25)’ (pl7).
Virtue theory, then, is not only concerned with character, at the expense of act, but 
answers the questions: “What kind of person should 1 be?” (Answer: Flourishing) 
and "What should I do? (Answer: Practice the virtues, for in the absence of virtue 
there is no real flourishing). In the case of an ethic of care, these answers would be 
“caring” and “empathically care for and about” respectively. Both describe 
particular "rules” and principles, although they differ from deontological codes in 
that, according to Hursthouse (1996), virtues generate positive instructions, for 
example: "Act kindly”, whereas vices generate prohibitions such as: “Do not be 
cruel”.
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Deciding on how to act within the framework of virtue theory does not necessarily 
involve asking what an “ideal” virtuous or caring person would do in similar 
circumstances. Exercising plironesis, the agent simply considers whether in 
behaving in a specific fashion s/he will be acting justly or unjustly, for or against 
the patient’s, the family’s or society’s flourishing, and so on. Where this question 
elicits a clear answer, the agent employs his/her own concepts of virtue or vice 
directly. Whilst Aristotle’s original ethic did not allow for open-ended virtues, nor 
for all individuals to be accorded equal rights, neo-Aristotelianism accords greater 
attention to the particular than to the universal. This makes this ethic ‘adaptive to 
novelty’ and capable of meeting problems with ‘creative and practical solutions’, 
both criteria of acceptability that promote ‘reflective equilibrium’ (Beauchamp 
and Childress, p26) in a principle or theory.
Neither is virtue theory committed to a reductionism which defines all moral 
concepts in terms of the virtuous agent. As Hursthouse (1996) points out, the 
virtue of charity, for example, is concerned with the good of others. Good, as 
Aristotle explains (Ethics 1096al9-b296), is related to evil or harm, in turn related 
to the concepts of the worthwhile, advantageous, or pleasant. If the agent’s 
conception of the latter is erroneous, so will his/her conception of what is good for 
or harmful to him/herself and others and it will consequently lack, for instance, the 
virtue of charity. Neo-Aristotelian virtue theory cannot, therefore, contemplate 
reductionism. 4
4 •... things are called good in as many senses as they are said to exist; for they are so-called in the 
category of Substance (e g. God or mind) and in Quality (ihe virtues) and in Quantity (what is 
moderate) and in Relation (what is useful) and in Time (opportunity) and in Place (habitat) and so 
on’ (Ethics, trans. Thomson, p70)
Virtue ethics also shares some problems with deontology. Defining the virtues is 
difficult and ‘subject to the threats of moral scepticism or pluralism7 or cultural 
relativism’ (Hursthouse, 1996, p222), a thought which echoes the danger, pointed 
out by Foucault and MacIntyre, of local and regional ethics being passed off as 
‘universal’. Every rule specified in deontological codes could be disputed on 
philosophical or cultural grounds and this applies equally to the virtues, since the 
character traits necessary for nourishing may be contested, or not even considered 
virtues by others.
Critics could also claim that unreasonable conflict is inherent in virtue theory, for 
the exigencies of virtue frequently clash in much the same way as values might. 
Charity, for example, can demand one line of action, whilst justice requires 
another. This is a problem for virtue theory, but deontology can confront the same 
dilemma. Rules may clash because acts can be at the same lime prima facie right 
and prima facie wrong. For example, the rule “save lives”, can, under certain 
circumstances, yield conflicting instructions’* . The act of killing may involve the 
relief of suffering and respect for the person’s autonomy, if it is at his request, but 
this does not necessarily make it right. Aristotle emphasises that the sciences 
cannot attain equal precision because: ‘different subject matters make different 
demands ... ethics in particular allows only a modest amount of precision’ 
(Bames, 1970, p20). Ethical judgements inevitably lack precision because they
llursthouse claims lhal virtue theory is not compatible with all forms of pluralism since it allows 
for competing conceptions of eudaimonia, for example, in that it allows for a plurality of eudaimon 
lives. It does not by any means follow Aristotle in perceiving the life of contemplation as uniquely 
constituting eudaimonia.
* See William’s Jim and Pedro case in Smart, J.C. and Williams, B. (1973) Conscqucntialism: For 
and Against.
only hold ‘for the most part’ (ibid) and moralists are restricted to generalisations, 
examples of which are found in Ethics IX.2.1165a.
Critics also claim that virtue theory is not based on argument. But requires 
simplistically asserting that certain actions are, for example, just or unjust. 
Deciding upon and applying such criteria is difficult, but this is a criticism of the 
theory as such if, and only if, we assume ‘as a condition of adequacy’ 
(Hursthouse, 1996, p223) that an action-guiding theory must stipulate what 
constitutes acting well and what should not be done. This condition is implausible, 
says Hursthouse, because the relevant condition of adequacy - and virtue theory 
does meet this - is that it should incorporate a truth expressed by Aristotle in the 
Nichomachean Ethics (1142a. 12-29): that moral knowledge requires phronesis 
and is therefore unlikely to be found in those lacking wisdom and experience of 
life. Neither can it be acquired by attending lectures (although it will later be 
claimed that ethics and good practice can be taught to mental health practitioners).
To conclude, a virtue theorist would say that meeting obligations is a means to an 
end, which is flourishing. However, a deontologist would say that meeting one’s 
obligations is itself an obligation and that if this results in happiness, all well and 
good, but this is not the specific end of doing so. For Aristotle, in order to achieve 
flourishing, man must engage in activities which elicit those feelings of happiness 
inseparable from this. There is a very real difference in these concepts of what 
constitutes happiness, or flourishing, for whilst Aristotle would contemplate 
different types of flourishing for different people and this dissertation posits 
different flourishing for users and mental health practitioners, a deontologist
would probably claim that there is a blanket, humanoid flourishing in doing one’s 
duty.
2.5. Identifying Virtuous Act and Virtuous Agent
In Book One of the Nichomacheati Ethics, Aristotle says: the Good has been
rightly defined as that at which all things aim’ (1094a). Our task is to become 
good men and achieve the highest human good, which is flourishing, an activity of 
the soul in accordance with virtue. How can virtue ethics define good and right in 
terms of the virtuous agent? If the question is how can virtue ethics specify right 
action, the answer is apparently straightforward: “An action is right i f f  it is what a 
virtuous agent ... acting in character would do in the circumstances” (Hursthouse, 
1991, p22). In this case, she adds, it is also necessary for virtue ethics to identify 
virtuous agents, giving a non-deontological specification of their characteristics by 
means of a specification of their virtues:
A virtuous agent is one who acts virtuously, both possessing and 
exercising the virtues 
• A virtue is a character trait that...
The standard neo-Aristotelian completion describes a virtue as a character trait 
necessary to flourishing. This structurally resembles the specifications of act- 
consequentialistism and various forms of deontology. If virtue ethics can generate 
such a specification, it is reasonable to claim that it, like these, can tell us how to 
act. Virtuous agents are not merely caring, truthful and so on, their actions arc 
also based on excellent practical reasoning (phronesis) referred to by Barnes as 
‘fine excogitations’ (1977, p37). Conditions for virtuous action are stipulated in
Ethics Books I -  III, and Aristotle later goes on, in Books IV -  IX, to clarify the 
characteristics of certain ‘moral’ and ‘intellectual’ virtues. Most people have clear 
ideas as to what the virtuous agent would do in a given situation. In the 
philosophical analysis of the research data in Chapter Six, the character traits and 
values exhibited by practitioners and users are enumerated and analysed in terms 
of virtue and care ethics theory and deontological codes.
In the Eudemian Ethics (EE 1220b7-10).>, Aristotle describes character traits, 
dispositions and capacities (Hexei* 10). Virtues (aretai)" are those traits by which a 
man’s character is capable of obeying reason (EE 1220b5-6) and are therefore 
Hexei of character. According to Hutchinson, a hexis is a disposition of character 
in virtue of which:
the object disposed is both stably and well (or badly) disposed,
- the object is in a natural and perfect (or unnatural or imperfect) condition,
- the object has a dispositional property to perform its characteristic task 
(ergon) well (or badly).
In the context of healthcare, all these can be linked to the notion of emotional 
labour, to be discussed in Chapter Three.
In order to decide whether a virtue and care ethic would be appropriate to 
nourishing mental health practice it is necessary to answer the following 
questions:
What is a practitioner’s/user’s characteristic task?
'' Iff = If and only if
10 A liexis is a "having", a disposition, capacity, ability or faculty ( 1098b30 -  I097a7)
What are character traits exhibited by and necessary to mental health 
practitioners? Are these those of emotional labour according to the 
criteria described by Hochschild (1983)?
What arc the specific virtues necessary to practitioner and user?
Are there different, yet equally legitimate concepts of human 
flourishing for mental health care workers and users?
Is it true that, with regard to ethical practice, there are gender 
differences in the type of virtue exercised in mental health practice? 
Aristotle says that virtues of character are special traits of this, and qualities of the 
non-rational part of the soul. Although non-rational, they can be trained, by the 
repeated disciplines of prescriptive reason, to be capable of obeying reason. In 
acquiring the virtues the spontaneous capacity to act and feel reasonably (as 
opposed to the capacity which most12 people have to allow the voice of reason to 
overcome that of the emotions) develops. To paraphrase Beauchamp and 
Childress: character is more important than conformity to rules and virtue should 
be inculcated and cultivated over time through educational interactions, role 
models and so on (1994, p65). How this may best be done in the case of mental 
health professionals is discussed in Chapter Seven.
2.6. A Proposal for an Ethic for Flourishing in Mental Health Practice
As it cannot be commanded, Kant claimed that love has no part in moral agency. 
Duty requires total obedience to the moral law and adding other emotions to this 
basic requirement can only result in contingency in the moral life and the 1
11 Arete, virtue, is commonly used as the abstract noun for anallwi or good. Goodness' or 
‘excellence* is, therefore, sometimes a better translation than “virtue".
subsequent loss of its universal application to all rational beings. Kant’s rules are 
rules for their own sake, to be generated purely rationally, independently of their 
impact on people. They should be obeyed from a sense of duty, rather than any 
kind of human sympathy since acting out of sympathy for others is to act on a 
mere inclination and consequently entirely lacking in moral worth.
Such principles are said to be paralleled in the quest for an over-riding framework 
of principles for healthcare ethics (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994). Most 
medical codes develop general principles such as “do not harm” and rules such as 
those concerning medical confidentiality and informed consent. However, few 
engage with their implications in terms of virtues such as veracity and justice, 
although some have recently been incorporated into statements of patients’ rights 
which invoke, for example, the principle of respect for autonomy. These 
professional codes also differ from others by focussing on the rights o f users, as 
much as the obligations of practitioners. At times, they apparently conflict with 
more general moral norms and the pursuit of professional norms may appear to do 
more to promote the professions’ corporate interests than an impartial and 
comprehensive moral viewpoint. Both an ethic of care and virtue ethics on the 
other hand: ‘share a willingness to return to the uncertainties and contingencies of 
emotion and character in describing the moral life’ (Campbell, 1998, p353). What 
could be better than ethics based on both the former, in dealing with what are also 
the uncertainties and contingencies of emotion and character inherent to mental 
disorder? 12
12 (Although (his capacity is often claimed to be absent in the case of those suffering psychotic 
disorders)
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2.6.1. An Ethic of (Health) Care
The ethic of care is a group of moral reflections emphasising those traits most 
valued in intimate personal relationships - sympathy, compassion, fidelity, 
discernment and love. Care refers to caring both for and about -  an emotional 
commitment to other people and, if necessary, a willingness to act on their behalf. 
It downplays deontological rules, impartial consequentialist calculations and, 
perhaps paradoxically, individual rights.
In healthcare, it grew from two roots: the first, the traditional Hippocratic 
emphasis in medical ethics on the beneficence of the doctor (Campbell, 1998). 
An ethic of care appears to offer more benevolent resolution to dilemmas than the 
mere completion of rule-base obligations and is widely considered to result in 
better care than duty-based ethics. As a form of virtue ethic it does not guarantee 
any particular resolution to ethical dilemmas, but considers the interests of all 
involved parties in terms of fairness and beneficial outcomes. Emphasising the 
practitioner's role in including the user as the primary agent in care plans, it is not 
inevitably “matemalistic” since the user’s good is often equated with his/her own 
choices. Overt “matemalism” only occurs when the health professional, 
considering his/her ‘scientific’ knowledge more relevant to treatment than the 
users’ own desires and rights, decides independently what is “in his/her best 
interest” and tries to impose this view.
Where science or technology is "God”, the most scientific or technologically 
minded tend to be perceived as the purest and the highest, but scientific 
explanation need not necessarily imply a lack of communication with the user.
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Professional beneficence must adopt ‘a consistently supportive role’ (Campbell, 
1998, p356), whilst the latter, as well-informed as possible as to the nature of 
his/her disorder, decides what is in his/her own best interest. The involvement of 
the professional as an empathic individual, attentive to the user’s own values is 
central to the ethic of care. The aim of the doctor-patient interaction has probably 
always been the same: to empathise, to ‘think oneself into the other’s possibility’ 
(Nussbaum, 1985, p521) by asking: ‘If I was this person and had been given all 
the appropriate medical information about this condition, how would I want to be 
related to, and what management decisions would be important to me?’ (Law, D. 
1998). The paternalistic ‘doctor as God’, not unknown in practice, in spite of the 
fact that: ‘this (paternalism) has turned out to be a limited and generally unreliable 
basis for medical ethics’ (Beauchamp and Childress, p25), is far removed from 
the ideal of professional beneficence, or even genuine caring.
Not that mental health professionals arc necessarily to hlame for what is 
sometimes an abuse of power. As Laing (1985) explains, it is ensured that they 
perform their tasks by giving them such power. If they wished to practice as 
psychiatric specialists they could not refuse this and many do not find such power 
ethically problematic. This arguably regresses to traditional associations between 
mental disorder and dangerousness which persist today. These place the former 
between ‘badness’ and ‘illness’, pertaining to deviant acts as well as deviant 
stales, and therefore needing treatment and control (S/.asz, 1972). Campaigning 
against such discrimination and disempowerment is a major activity of user 
groups such as "Mind". With the increasing influence of these and a growing 
tendency to litigation, the time has come for mental health practitioners to
•renounce control that traditionally has been in the hands of the professional. This 
is the moral imperative of patient-centred practice.’ (Stewart and Weston, 1995 
pi 6).
This comment leads to the second root of the ethic of care. Critiques of patriarchy 
and over-rationalist, “masculine” medical ethics (described in Chapter 1.2.), have 
been important in recent work on healthcare ethics, particularly in nursing, as 
distinct from male, medically dominated traditional healthcare ethics. Some 
versions of the ethic of care have a highly emotional content -  something which 
could be construed as relating to Aristotle’s own claim that the virtues of character 
are linked to pleasure and pain because they are related to feelings which provoke 
these sensations. This is what legitimates the description by Tong (1998) of care 
ethics as ‘a virtue ethics of a certain kind’ (p i61) and a ‘contemporary feminist 
virtue ethic’ (Conly, 2001, p 12).
A key factor in care ethics is user empowerment. Decision-making, although not 
entirely one-sided, is primarily under the user’s control. Therapeutic decisions 
normally depend upon his/her own evaluation of the relative importance of 
different life factors, informed by that of his/her carers. This relates to Aristotle:
‘On important issues, we do not trust our own ability to decide and call in
others to help us deliberate’ (N E III, 1112b.p43).
Providing care would thus become an 'exercise in power-shifting’ (Campbell, 
p357), something important given the views of users such as the late Marion 
Bccforth, who claimed that the user becomes totally "disempowered” and helpless
in traditional mental health settings13. Creating a care plan for flourishing, in 
which all those involved can participate in a spirit of Aristotelian-type friendship, 
in which the user benefits from friendship as an “instrumental good” becomes the 
central concern. To paraphrase MacIntyre (1999, p67): In order to flourish we 
need to learn to understand ourselves as practical reasoners about goods, about 
what on particular occasions is best for us to do and about how it is best for us to 
live out our lives. Without learning this, no-one, health care professional or user, 
can flourish
The development of an ethic of care is informed by: A ‘progressively more 
adequate understanding of the psychology of human relationship -  an increasing 
differentiation of self and other and a growing comprehension of the dynamics of 
social interaction’ (Gilligan, p74). It ‘... evolves around a central insight, that self 
and other are interdependent’ (ibid). In practising this ethic, the practitioner 
becomes, qua Noddings, ‘engrossed’ with the client’s own reality. There is 
something vaguely alarming in the notion that care consists in mutual dependence 
to the point of “engrossment”. The sympathy and empathy implied in this term, 
whilst enabling recognition of another’s suffering, fail to raise awareness of how 
most constructively to respond to this. Such "engrossment” could cause 
practitioners to act not merely in an irrational and excessively subjective fashion, 
but might, in some situations, cause more harm than good to the object of this.
15 As u result of her own experiences us u mental hospital in-patient, Marion Beeforth, a physicist, 
mathematician, pioneer researcher into colour television, and committed Christian, developed an 
acute awareness of the powerlessness of psychiatric patients and spent most of her life campaigning 
for patients' rights and user involvement.
In mental health settings, allowing the user total autonomy in decision making 
could raise difficult questions with regard to professional responsibility and the 
duty of care14. In acute mental disorder, the user is not necessarily always 
authoritative in judgements about what is good or best in terms of eventual 
nourishing. In the temporary absence of the ability to reason rationally on his/her 
part, virtue and care ethics could conceivably concede that the care team and those 
closest to the user should make a decision, albeit contrary to the latter’s own 
wishes. However, this process must be clearly understood as one of caring for and 
about, rather than power over the user.
Nussbaum’s (1988) Non-relative Virtues discusses situations such as that 
described above, suggesting that an objective account of human good, according 
to which non-relative virtues can be specified should be possible. We may also 
recognise certain areas in which, due to our own limitations as human-beings, the 
decisions we make arc ‘non-optional and somewhat problematic’ (Op.cit.p37). In 
mental health practice, legal factors may inhibit choice and in such a situation, it 
could become necessary to distinguish between “thick” and “thin” accounts of 
virtue. A “thin” account identifies ‘whatever it is to be stably disposed to act 
appropriately in that sphere’ (ibid) whilst a “thick” account requires more detailed 
specifications and is therefore more vulnerable to the cultural values and 
influences described by Foucault and MacIntyre. Debate on virtue ethics in 
mental health practice may concentrate on the correct identification of the relevant 
spheres of human experience, or on the adequate “thick” description of the virtues 
necessary to good practice, but sometimes the more we try to "thicken” these
14 See l-'ulford, 1996,
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virtues, the less we are able to find a common view of what they involve. 
“Sectioning”, in a particular case might, for example, be considered justified by 
one practitioner and an abuse of power by another, yet both could be acting as 
virtuous agents. This echoes the Aristotelian view that there is more than one 
virtuous stance in some dilemmas. This is a key difference from the prescriptive 
right answer of quasi-legal codes.
Such situations show why Nodding’s person-centred approach cannot stand alone 
in the context of mental health care, but must be combined with a neo-Aristotelian 
virtue ethic. Her notion of individuality and respect for user autonomy, whilst 
recognising the mutual dependence of human beings, overlooks something central 
to virtue ethics, the fact of belonging to a community. The ethic of care alone is 
inadequate, for virtues other than caring must be exercised in the quest for 
individual and community flourishing.
In the sexual division of labour, loo, care performed by women, associated with 
women and traditionally expressing and symbolising femininity (Harding, 1987) is 
inseparable from oppressive gender divisions. If only women embrace a care 
perspective whilst they care (emotionally, morally and physically), men, more 
concerned with liberty and rights, remain free to pursue more profitable activities. 
Such reinforcement of the sexual division of labour should make feminists highly 
suspicious of the ethic of care. As Harding says, the problem of exploitation, 
located as it is at the social level, points to the need for an examination of this 
ethic beyond the boundaries of moral philosophy and towards sociological 
critiques of the kind to be made in the chapter which follows.
2.6.2. Virtue + care ethics = nourishing?
In comparing and contrasting care and virtue ethics, the focus shifts from issues of 
choice to those of character and attitudes towards self and others. Most modem 
moral philosophy has asked: “How should I act?” Virtue ethics attempts to answer 
the question: “How should I live?” the shift being from act to agent. This makes it 
particularly relevant to chronic mental disorder. Every user must, as an ethic of 
care demands, make specific treatment-related decisions, but these form part of 
the ongoing question: ‘How can I best achieve flourishing?’. There are well- 
documented cases of people suffering severe mental disorder who have been 
highly successful in answering this question for themselves15 - contrary to the 
advice of mental health professionals. Such cases make an eloquent case for virtue 
and care ethics.
The genuine act of caring is love (Campbell and Solomon, 1988). In this sense it is 
similar to goodwill since it wills that its object should flourish, achieving 
whatever is good for him/her. Referring to Scheler’s work. The Nature o f  
Sympathy, Campbell describes love as ‘an active valuing of the other, one which 
both discloses and enhances’ their self-esteem and worth and is thus, in itself, 
therapeutic. It is:
‘... that movement wherein every concrete individual 
object that possesses value achieves the highest 
value compatible with its nature and ideal vocation’
(Scheler, 1954, pl61)
This is also the nature of flourishing.
15 David Crepaz’Keay, for example, has .suffered from schizophrenia for over twenty years, lie  
claims that he has only led a "normal" life as the happily-married, successful director of a mental 
health media organisation since defying clinical advice and abandoning the medication which he 
felt was destroying his quality of life.
It has been said that caring has two dimensions, caring for and caring about. To 
care for someone involves developing their potential, understanding their struggle 
and supporting them in this. The ethic of care as a form of virtue ethics unites 
user’s and practitioners’ quests for what is ‘good’ in provoking personal and 
professional flourishing. Acknowledging and promoting value in the other in the 
awareness that humans fully flourish only upon achieving that state of being able 
to perform ‘with some success the most perfect of typically human tasks’ (Bames, 
1976, p36). It encourages both to look to the future in terms of the capacities 
(hexei) which might be cultivated in order to transcend the difficulties of the 
present and flourish. Good practice in mental health should therefore involve the 
virtuous/caring agent embracing a ‘Biophysical Philosophy of Care’ Scheid (2000) 
which ‘emphasises community integration, continual personal growth and 
awareness, rather than simply the relief of symptoms’ (p703).
Whilst accepting that there is an intrinsic value in actions performed for moral 
reasons, Aristotle insists in Books VI and VII of the Nichomachean Ethics, that 
the principles of the virtues themselves are arrived at by phronesis. The virtuous 
agent necessarily exercises this, all choices made by him/her for moral reasons 
following a process of deliberation. Paradoxically, Aristotle also says that it is a 
surer sign of courage when an agent acts virtuously in a crisis than where there is 
time to deliberate upon the pros and cons of action (NE1117a, p53). This is 
because he considers an “impetuous” act of virtue to be a clear manifestation of a 
firm character. However, earlier, (NE 1105a, p27), he describes choosing an act 
after deliberation, for its own sake, as a necessary condition of its being
‘virtuously’ performed. It is possible to interpret these remarks not as meaning 
that “impulsive” acts of virtue are not chosen, but that as expressions of a virtuous 
character they are not “calculated” in the pejorative sense of this word. (Cooper, J. 
1986).
This is important insofar as Aristotle, contra Noddings, states (NE 2.2.4) that the 
disposition to choose to act in certain ways, in full knowledge o f our acts, is the 
result of habituation and training (NE 1104a-b, p24-25) rather than instinct. It 
requires educating the mind by making oneself act repeatedly in a caring and 
virtuous fashion. As those undertaking moral “education” become accustomed to 
acting virtuously, they achieve understanding of the nature and the motives behind 
the acts in which they are being educated. Thus the adoption of virtuous policies is 
founded upon phronesis, upon explicitly deliberated decisions. This does not 
imply that virtuous agents spend hours deliberating, but that they could, if 
necessary, defend their acceptance of virtuous policies and justify their acts, since 
virtue always entails phronesis.
2.7. Conclusion
‘We don't much hold with talking to patients in this ward. Our main objective is 
to break the cycle of madness and get them out’, a charge nurse once said to the 
psychiatrist Ronald Laing10. How much has changed in this respect in the face of 
patient-centred medicine and user movements’ demands for more "talking
therapies”?
In spite of the brave words and good intentions of the National Service 
Framework, public mental health care, as Chapter One indicated, is notoriously 
under-funded. There is also constant managerial pressure to treat and discharge 
users as fast as possible, thus avoiding “bed-blocking” 17. Social factors, too, play a 
part. In today’s “wellness” obsessed society, good health is regarded as a symbol 
of success and the chronically mentally or physically ill person becomes an 
‘embarrassing anomaly’. Mulvany (2000) reveals that those who suffer mental 
disorder are excluded from ‘generic disability programmes in areas such as 
employment and training, housing and accommodation support, generic social 
support, recreation and disability services’ (p586). The final indignity, therefore, is 
to be more or less cared for, but not to be cared about, receiving the concern of 
others, but not being considered by them to be a potential source of value or 
insight. We may eventually return to the kind of society and culture described by 
MacIntyre (1985) in which our essential vulnerability and dependency upon one 
another are the dominant theme in ethics. If this is to occur, a process of 
transformation is required. Those who formulate and teach ethics in mental health 
practice must not avoid the question of how to persevere in the quest for human 
flourishing in the miserable circumstances in which many of those using and 
working in mental health services find themselves. *1
16 The conversation is described in Laing, R. Op.cit. p i8.
11 According to the 'T oday" programme on BBC 4, 30lh August, 2002, mental hospitals are 
currently running at 120% of their capacity, users being sent home “on leave” simply so that 
another user can occupy their bed.
Providers, too, should be concerned not only with the quality of the care ‘but also 
adhere to a professional rationality which is shaped by ethical standards’ (Scheid, 
p704). What is needed is an ethic which, like that described by Campbell (1998), 
is ‘communal in scope ... forward looking in its delineation of values’ (p364) and 
which directs the attention of both mental health practitioners and users to those 
‘fundamental human experiences in which virtue gains its richest and most
complex expression’ (ibid).
Chapter Three: Sex, Gender, Power, Caring and Emotional Labour
3.1. Introduction
Whilst “sex” refers to the biological dimorphic division of male and female, gender 
refers to the culturally constructed meanings attributed to these. Women have come 
to be defined not only in relation to men. but also as dependent upon and subordinate 
to them. 'Men's specific gender is ignored, they represent the universal and human to 
which women are the "Other”) McDowell and Pringle, 1992, p3). First discussed by 
Simone de Beauvoir (1972) in The Second Sex, this perception has been taken for 
granted at all levels of socio-political functioning and the status of men and women is 
consequently constructed around a series of dichotomous categories.
Gender is now considered to be one of the principle axes around which social life is 
organised, ‘both at macro-structural level of the allocation and distribution of rewards 
in a hierarchical society, and at the macro-psychological level of individual identity 
formation and interpersonal interaction' (Sabo and Gordon, 1998). Conell (1987) 
argued that, at any given time, in any society, a hegemonic gender ideology that 
prescribes socially acceptable norms and behaviour will exist (pp98-99). In 
healthcare, this ideology has traditionally been that of the male middle-class and is 
considered to have empowered men at the expense of women and the socially 
underprivileged.
However, the term "sex" has been critically questioned not simply as 'dimorphic' but
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as discursively constructed and. indeed, variations are apparent in patterns of female 
“nurturing” and male "aggression" at all levels. Women do not inevitably assume the 
responsibilities associated with child care. Men are increasingly assuming the role of 
primary child carer and appear to have no less nurturing capacity than that 
traditionally attributed to mothers. Rather than addressing these situations, however, 
many sociobiologists ignore them. This may be due to their lack of knowledge of 
feminist critiques which ‘rest on a vast array of scientific research that casts doubt on 
physiological explanations for gender hierarchies’ (Rhode, 1997. p26). Some of 
these are examined in this chapter, which discusses issues of sex and gender in 
relation to mental health practice and to the culturally constructed meanings 
attributed to these terms.
3.2. Theories of Sex and Gender
Explanations as to the origins of the difference between males and females have 
existed since antiquity, but substantiated evidence for these is highly contested and 
controversial. Aristotle suggested that their source lay in the fact that women were 
biologically ‘defective’, amongst other reasons because they lacked bodily heat, 
something, which rendered them less perfect than men. In other ways, male and 
female bodies were considered structurally similar and ‘what could be seen of men’s 
bodies was assumed as the pattern for what could not be seen of women’s’ (Martin, 
P30).
Many gender scholars are currently modifying feminist theory to accommodate 
analyses of differences in power and privilege amongst the inter-male dominance
81
hierarchies described by Dominelli and Gollins (1997), which constitute the larger 
gender order. Busfield (1996) claims that an adequate theory of gender must be based 
on feminist foundations. However, if feminist theory itself is to develop, it needs to 
evolve and be ’mature' enough to recognise, as did Enlightenment intellectuals such 
as Hume (Essays, 560) and Choderlos de Laclos, that women should not be assumed 
by either other women or men to never themselves jockey for places in dominance 
hierarchies and achieve power simply because they have frequently been “victims”. 
Baier (1991), says that having been subject to deceit, exploitation and betrayal 
’cannot be expected to make (women) less ready themselves to lie. cheat and betray’ 
(p234). This view severely undermines Wolf’s, (1996) and Noddings’ description of 
almost all typical women as self-abnegating, altruistic carers.
Gender relations are also subject to on-going negotiation within the workplace. 
Whilst everyone is now aware of them, there has been little research into their 
implications for gender inequalities in mental health practice, in spite of the fact that 
male health care workers, whilst greatly outnumbered by their female colleagues, 
occupy a disproportionate number of senior positions in professional hierarchies' and. 
somewhat ironically, are also far more likely to be subject to disciplinary hearings for 
professional misconduct2 *1
1 The incidence of men amongst policy makers in nursing, for example, is quite disproportionate to 
their numbers in the profession as a whole. Two new professional officers were appointed to the 
UKCC (now N&MC) in 2001, both were male.
1 'The UKCC (now N&MC) id currently commissioning research into this area of concern. Whereas 
male members of the nursing professions comprise only 9% of the Register, almost 50% of the 
respondents on PCC (Professional Conduct Committee) hearings are men. More information needs to 
be gathered as to the types of allegations of misconduct that are made against male practitioners and
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In view of this, Annandale and Hunt’s (2000) assertion that: ‘The closer we move 
towards embracing complexity, inevitably the closer we simultaneously move 
towards undermining the primacy of gender as difference, that is male/female as a 
binary division of power’ (p25) is intriguing. Recently, it has been suggested that 
gender should not be perceived as a set of fixed attributes and behaviour, but more as 
a process -  ‘doing gender' -  in which gender is continually ‘re-established, sustained 
or modified’, depending on the extent to which actions, and the rationales for these, 
conform to particular gender ideologies (Dunscombe & Marsden, 1998, Berk, 1985; 
West and Zimmerman, 1987). Others claim that it is necessary to retain gender and 
sex as dichotomies in order to facilitate recognition of the means by which women 
are oppressed as ‘others’ and the implications of this for health care (Doyal, 1998, 
Scambler, 1998).
On this theme of 'selves' and ‘others’, Anthony Giddens (1991), referring to men and 
women, suggests that self-identity can be continuously rellexively rewritten. This is 
the result of a continuous dialogue with the self, in the face of new social experiences 
and dilemmas. This view is endorsed by Butler (1990) and Hood-Williams (1996) 
who stress the relative fluidity of gender as it is currently enacted in everyday life. 
Dunscombe and Marsden (1998), on the other hand, suggest that the processes 
involved in becoming an ‘emotionally warm and sensitive new man’ or a ‘ruthless 
career woman' arc not simply those of re-inventing self-identity to make it
further scrutiny of the available data is necessary’ (UKCC, 1996, Issues arising from professional 
conduct complaints. p6)
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correspond to a chosen gender ideal. ‘Doing gender’ involves ‘the more complex task 
of displaying the emotional skills, capacities and propensities to do emotional labour3 
in a manner appropriate to the chosen gender ideology’ (p218). They believe that in 
this process individuals may experience a tension between the strain of the emotion 
work involved in reconciling the feeling ‘rules’ of the gender ideology to which they 
aspire and how they ‘really’ feel as a consequence of the 'core self’ or ‘core identity’ 
developed in childhood (ibid).
From the analysis of how male practitioners in mental health perceive themselves as 
carers and are perceived by users, it should be possible to ascertain whether this 
tension exists in the therapeutic use of the self in caring and emotional labour. 
Gender structures appear to be changing in a manner likely to affect different social 
groups in diverse ways. Inevitably some similarities may emerge between men and 
women but the overall picture remains generally obscure. Hence the need to re­
examine the gender inequalities inherent to health care from user and carer 
perspectives.
3.3. The Effect of Gender Upon Moral Reasoning in Healthcare.
Many feminist care theorists (Gilligan, 1982; Ungerson, 1983; Harding. 1987 and 
Card. 1991) argue that traditional female virtues such as co-operation and caring, 
should be accorded greater value in the masculine sphere of public health. They 
suggest that we are mistaken in accepting the domination of what they consider
•’ By emotion “work" Hochschild refers to the emotional management which is carried out in private. 
By emotional “labour", she means the emotion management done for a wage.
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patriarchal and inflexible codes of professional practice based upon duties, rights and 
obligations. In their view, women, unlike men, look not only at the 'specifics’ of a 
moral dilemma but also at the emotions involved in this and will always try to 
negotiate, rather than impose.
Prioritising agent over act and negotiating rather than imposing would initially seem a 
more humane and less disempowering form of engaging with someone as vulnerable 
as the mentally disordered person. But whether only women are equipped to practice 
an ethic of care in this way - or even genuinely desirous of doing so - is a 
controversial matter. Ungerson (1983) argues that the skills involved in caring are 
imbued with sex-role stereotypes and the view that women's unique “expertise” in 
caring is the result of their sex can trap men and women into socialised gender roles. 
Hursthouse (1999) joins those who rebut gender essentialism, arguing that it is far 
from ''essential” to women to care and that they do so because society has 
traditionally cast them in the role of carers. She suggests that in some cases ‘caring’ 
women are demonstrating virtue and in others, practising emotional labour. Although 
some feminists have condemned virtue ethics as ‘misogynistic’ due to Aristotle’s 
views on women, neo-Aristotelianism of the kind espoused by Hursthouse cannot be 
accused of this. It is, therefore, necessary to examine gendered attitudes to care 
closely in considering ethics and codes of good practice.
It has long been claimed that that the moral judgements of women and men differ 
(Freud, 1925, Hahn, 1975, Holstein, 1976, Gilligan, 1982) insofar as those of women 
are based upon feelings of empathy and compassion, whilst men seek the rational
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resolution of real, rather than hypothetical dilemmas. Gilligan (1982) believes that 
women's deference is 'rooted not only in their social subordination but also in the 
substance of their moral concern, which is a sensitivity to the needs of others and the 
assumption of responsibility for taking care of others’ (pp 16-17). This, in her 
opinion, makes them better inclined to listen to other points of view and include these 
in moral judgements.
Consequently, women's so called moral “weakness” (diffusion and confusion in 
judgement) is inseparable from their moral “strength” (concern for relationships and 
responsibilities). Gilligan believes that women's reluctance to make moral 
judgements may indicate the concern for others that infuses the psychology of 
women's development generally and is responsible for what is seen as ‘problematic 
in its nature' (ibid).
Those qualities and capacities considered characteristic of the mature adult -  
'autonomous thinking, clear decision making and responsible action’ (Gilligan. p 17) 
-  are normally associated with masculinity. Men are reputed to reach moral and 
ethical decisions through the application of rational, logical thinking and law, whilst 
women are popularly seen as relying on ‘communication, assuming connection and 
believing that (their) voices will be heard’ (p27). This implies that only women’s 
moral and ethical judgements contain those insights and understandings of the nature 
of choice essential to an ethic of care. Men’s, reflecting the 'logic of the justification 
approach’ (ibid), might be better suited to what Meerabeau and Page (1998) considers 
the alien rules of feeling related to managed, technical care, rather than to any real
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v o c a tio n  to  c a re  fo r  p e o p le .
That women are widely considered to be less rational then men and more intuitive 
and emotional in their decision-making processes could be perceived as a weakness, 
rather than a strength, in their ability to resolve ethical dilemmas. This would clearly 
be the case for philosophers such as Kant, who favour deontological approaches and 
consider the central feature of ethics to be its universality. They would reject the 
notion of agent-based negotiation of the kind implicit to virtue ethics and the 
feminine ethic of care. However, this same negotiation might prove essential in 
meeting the growing demands of user groups and human rights movements and the 
increasing tendency to litigation characteristic of modern medicine.
In reality little is known of how gender and other axes of inequality mediate exposure 
to the influences of underlying inequalities and differences in health care and in the 
moral judgements made by health practitioners (Graham, H., 1983,1993; Dominelli 
and Gollins, 1997. Arber, S. and Cooper. H. 2000). Until the mid-nineties many 
theorists considered gender inequalities in healthcare settings to be socially 
constructed (Chesler, 1972, Davies and Rosser. 1986. Miles, 1988, Russell, 1995). 
Later, doubts about the theoretical and conceptual foundations of this belief set in and 
Graham, (2000) highlights the ‘systematic way in which men's and women’s health 
is shaped by socio-economic circumstances' such as class and ethnicity, rather than 
by gender per se and how these are ‘polarising due to broader social trends' (p92). In 
the social context, factors such as status, power and so on also combine with 
reproductive biology to shape experiences and relations between the sexes. Because
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of this, Gilligan (1982) says:
‘...the discrepant data on women’s experience provide a basis upon which to 
generate a new theory, potentially yielding a more encompassing view of the 
lives of both sexes’ (p4).
Her opinion is reflected by Arber and Cooper (2000) who say that it is necessary to 
take a 'life course perspective’ insofar as only this: ‘...takes social change seriously 
and sees lives as dynamic and responsive to changed circumstances and 
opportunities' As a result of views such as these: ‘a new vibrancy is being injected 
into debates on gender inequalities in health as an emerging “new agenda” challenges 
received wisdom' (Annandale and Hunt, 2000, p2).
3.4. Gender and Mental Health Practice
What distinguishes a feminist from a non-feminist history of psychiatry is that gender 
is seen as a social construct and masculine and feminine as cultural comparisons, not 
objective factors. Feminism critiques the assumption central to medicine and 
psychiatry, that the differences between the genders are biologically or psycho- 
dynamically determined. It re-evaluates psychiatric concepts and the treatment of 
women. In particular feminism examines the social construction of disease, 
psychiatry as a means of social control, and deconstructs scientific claims to 
objectivity.
‘In the life-cycle, as in the Garden of Eden, the woman has been seen as the deviant' 
(Gilligan, 1982, p6). Consequently, when women have not conformed to the 
expectations of psychological theories based upon the white, middle-class male as
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norm, the conclusion has been that something is wrong with them, that they are 
mentally “ill”. (Russell, 1995, Chesler, 1972, 1990) and need to be “cured”. This 
claim is supported by statistics such as those which reveal not only that more women 
than men suffer non-psychotic mental disorders4, but also that two-thirds of those 
treated with electro-convulsive therapy are women (Breeding, 2000). These statistics 
are currently in a process of rapid change, but with few exceptions, research literature 
agrees that gender affects psychiatric prevalence, diagnosis and treatment. According 
to the Psychiatric Morbidity Survey of Adults, 2001, although more males than 
females commit suicide, men's mental health is generally better. In 2000, 135 men 
per 1000 were assessed as having "some kind of neurotic disorder’, whilst for women 
the rate was 194 per 1000. Men also had ‘significantly lower rates of phobias and 
mixed anxiety and depressive disorders’. 68 men per 1000, as compared to 108 per 
1000 in the case of women. Against this, according to GPRD5 data, the number of 
mules aged between 16 and 24 treated for depression in 1998 (16 per 1000) was 
almost double that of 1994. (Dataset SFM 509, The Prevalence of Neurotic 
Disorders, by Gender, 2000. Social Focus on Men).
A large body of research indicates that such differences cannot be attributed to 
biological variations between the sexes. They appear to be the result of gender 
differences in roles which, in turn, lead to differences in the experience and 
expression of life events. Changing gender roles in society would also explain why 
men increasingly suffer traditionally ‘female’ mental disorders. It has, over recent
4 See Table I . However, psychotic disorders do not reveal such clear cut differences.
' The General Practice Research Database
years, become acceptable in western society for men to 'get in touch with their 
feminine side’ and express, rather than repress emotion. If this phenomenon has 
extended to the psychiatric consultation, this may account for the increase in 
diagnoses of male 'neurotic disorder'. Changing roles may also explain why more 
women are now imprisoned for violent crime. “P.M.T.” is possibly no longer a valid 
excuse for aggression.
Given growing interest in and awareness of such issues, mental health practice must 
address the adoption of an ethic informed by a theory of gender. This must not only 
be based upon a clear comprehension of what gender actually means but should 
recognise and act upon the values and metaphysical assumptions about the nature of 
the self which sociology and recent feminist thinking, have revealed.
It has been suggested (Miller. 1976. Wolf, 1996) that women judge themselves by 
their ability to care, whilst men tend to assume or devalue that care because maturity 
is equated with personal autonomy and concern with relationships seen as a 
weakness, not a strength. Herein lies the paradox described earlier which implies that 
the traits that traditionally define the ‘goodness' of women, such as care for and 
sensitivity to others, are also those that 'mark them as deficient in moral 
development' (Gilligan. p 19). However, in spite of the predomination in both society, 
and many works on the ethic of care, of descriptions of women as 'helpful, loving, 
without expectation of return, emotionally dependable, supportive and generally 
nurturing’ (Strickling, 1988) and of men as ill-disposed towards and incapable of 
caring, the current increase in the number of men engaged in this, and a re-evaluation
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of their attitudes to this work, could lead to a re-thinking of the image of men as 
carers and the social meanings attached to the words “gender” and “caring" per se.
3.5. Women’s Health
Echoing women's image of themselves as inseparable from the role of altruistic carer, 
Susan Wolf (1996) claims that those suffering terminal illnesses are more likely to 
request euthanasia than men. in an attempt to avoid burdening their families. She 
considers this a perversion of the feminist ethic of care that appears to take women’s 
caring for and about others to the extreme. Wolf also suggests that doctors are more 
disposed to fulfil women's petitions for euthanasia, basing their decisions on ‘the 
same historical valorisation of women's self-sacrifice and the same background 
sexism- (pp. 282-317).
Jennifer Parks (2000). on the other hand, suggests that women's requests for 
euthanasia may be ignored for exactly the same reasons that Wolf believes them 
likely to be fulfilled. 'By virtue of the fact that women will be altruistic, self- 
abnegating carers, women's own voices and their claims to autonomy in requesting 
death are easily dismissed' (p31).
These statements, whilst disagreeing as to the results, consolidate feminine and 
feminist thinking on the negative effects in terms of choice, perceived capacity to 
reason, and their ability to defend their own interests, of the stereotypical image of 
women as altruistic carers. Certainly they seem to have been historically victimised in 
mental health practice which has a long tradition of male practitioners imposing their
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own ideologies of 'normal' femininity on helpless female patients (Perkins Gilman, 
1892, Showalter, 1985, Ussher, 1991, Russell, 1995). Nurses’ understandings of and 
contribution to health care are also, claims Davies (1995), systematically undervalued 
as a result of the perspectives of those in power and the patriarchal criteria by which 
nurses' views are judged.
A study by N. Charles and V. Walters, Age and Gender in Women’s Accounts o f their 
Health (1998) reveals the extent to which women’s caring roles are implicated in 
their health concerns and self-image. That women are no more naturally disposed to 
caring than men is very strongly implied in this study, in which almost all younger 
women expressed ambivalence about the relative merits of employment and caring. 
The exigencies of caring for a terminally ill relative often precipitated feelings of 
anxiety and depression in older women, one of whom described herself as holding the 
family together and keeping the anxiety which this responsibility provoked hidden 
from them by 'crying in the bath'.
That women's lives are demanding and that women, old and young, attribute this to 
material circumstances structured by class and gender is undoubtedly frequently the 
case. According to Whitehead (1992). due to social isolation and lack of support 
networks, working class women in urban areas run three times more risk of suffering 
depression than professional women (p247). This claim is supported by many works 
on the psycho-social causes of disease and the role of life events, difficulties and 
social support in the onset of physical and mental illness (Brown and Harris, 1989, 
Thoits, 1995, Williams, S. 1996) There is also a marked generational difference, new
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patterns emerging in gender relationships between younger, educated and employed 
females and males and older, educationally disadvantaged women and men ‘who 
built their life trajectories around patterns of private patriarchy’ (ibid). Bendelow 
(1993) reports physical pain as considered ‘normal’ for women as a result of their 
experiences of childbirth and differential socialisation. If they need to hide in the 
bathroom to cry, it would certainly appear that some women consider it ‘normal’ to 
suffer emotional pain, too. Their disadvantaged position may explain women’s higher 
morbidity in mental disorder, particularly anxiety states and depression.
In view of this, it seems reasonable to conclude that women amongst themselves 
employ different discourses in discussing health and related issues. Whether this 
extends to the discourse between female mental health practitioners and users is 
something, which is explored here. Since feminists claim that men and women also 
employ different discourses, one empowered and the other disempowered or 
diffident, communication, particularly with a practitioner of the opposite sex, or of a 
different generation would seem problematic for both sexes.
Atkinson and Coffey (1995) describe a major centrifugal tendency in contemporary 
sociology, which has given rise to a variety of standpoints. Throughout these runs a 
‘discursive turn’ which treats as central the relationship between language, 
knowledge and power. Women are usually regarded as highly verbal yet 
paradoxically language is one of the means by which they have been disempowered 
in psychiatry as in many other areas of life. The lack of words to refer to experiences 
unique to women has been discussed by many feminist writers, and social and
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institutional factors often impede women’s access to certain forms of knowledge and 
to certain ways of speaking (Ussher, 1991, Crowley and Himmelweit (eds.) 1994). It 
also affects how women are perceived when they do speak. These restrictions on 
women's speech need to be seen as part of more general social restrictions imposed 
upon women. One claim frequently made about their speech is that it is more hesitant 
and uncertain than men’s is, that it is "powerless”. This is often apparent in 
psychiatric interviews, in which hesitation could be misconstrued as a manifestation 
of anxiety or depression. On the other hand it has also been claimed that women's 
speech is more supportive than men's, in which case females could prove to have an 
advantage in all forms of caring. Whether the "supportive" nature of this speech is 
"natural” in the sense of being innate to women, or socially constructed remains to be 
seen.
Miller (1976) calls for a new language in psychology to separate the description of 
care and connection from the vocabulary of inequality and oppression. She envisages 
this new language as originating from women’s experience of relationships. As long 
as it does not exist. Miller feels that problems of interpretation will continue to 
impede psychological understanding of women's experience. The ‘different voice’ to 
which Gilligan (1982) refers is not characterised by gender in this way, but by theme. 
The central assumptions of Gilligan’s work are that it is the way in which people talk 
about their lives that is significant and that the language which they employ in doing 
this and connections which they make reveal the world in which they act as they see 
it, a view apparently echoed in Charles and Walters (1998).
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Fishman (1983) goes so far as to speak of ‘male interactional shitwork’, in describing
how men support a male conversational partner’s topic, but do not enable women to
put across their own points of view. Various studies also show that in talk between
men and women, the interruptions are almost invariably from the man. These
different interactional styles tend to operate to the man’s advantage since they
dominate, whilst women cede power in the face of this type of interaction,
characterised as ‘small insults’ (West and Zimmerman (1983). Can insults, however
small, ever be considered therapeutic, much less ethical? Do women, both health care
workers and users, feel that men listen to them and. more importantly, take what they
say at face value, resisting the temptation to ‘interpret’ it according to male criteria of
rationality? Do male users, in turn, feel that female health care workers can fully
understand men’s ‘rational’ use of language and, what, in any case, is the nature of
this rationality in the context of the mental health disorder? This issue of
communication is absolutely vital in considering ethics for:
‘The outputs from analytic ethical reasoning, combined with empirical 
methods, are not ethical rules, conventionally understood, but improved 
clinical skills, notably of communication ... Communication skills have a 
substantive rather than a merely executive role in healthcare ethics’. 
(Fulfordet al„ 2002,pl63).
These considerations are relevant to examining the ethics of psychiatric interviews 
for how the practitioner’s speech is perceived by the user must also affect his/her 
assessment of their attitude.
Related to this is Scheff’s labelling theory, which claims that it is not falsity, but 
power, which is central to the diagnosis of delusions, and that in situations of conflict
'the most powerful party’s views are counted as real and the less powerful’s are 
discounted as delusions’ (Palmer. 2000. p666). If this is so. women should be more 
frequently diagnosed as suffering from delusions than male users, yet this does not 
appear to be the case. Unlike “neurotic” disorders, those conditions most commonly 
associated with delusions such as schizophrenia, paranoid states and mania (i.e. those 
considered the paradigm of real madness), do not manifest clear-cut gender 
differences. ‘It is less madness that is identified as the female malady than the 
broader territory of more minor psychiatric conditions’ (Busfield, 1996, p 19). She 
talks of the 'gendered landscape' which prevails in Western communities, where in 
disorders of thought, such as schizophrenia and dementia the male/female balance is 
approximately the same, whilst in other disorders such as depression, anxiety and so 
on. there tends to be a female predominance. In behaviour and personality disorder, 
as in drug and alcohol abuse, males outnumber females. 'There tends to be a roughly 
even gender balance in disorders structured around thought, a female predominance 
in disorders structured around emotion and a male predominance in disorders 
structured around behaviour' (Op.cit. 1996. pp3-4).
3.6 Men’s Health
Annandale and Hunt (2000) reveal that: *... at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, being mule or female remains a key organisational feature o f all aspects o f 
our lives, systematically structuring opportunities and experience’ (p20, my italics). 
Until fairly recently, men have been comparatively neglected in sociological studies 
on health, but the emergence of special interest groups such as "The Men’s Health
Forum”6 and works such as that of Sabo and Gordon (1995), which question feminist 
orthodoxy to the effect that men in their approach to health, as to all other social 
institution, deem only their own manner of 'rational' thinking and acting to be 
'normal' and valuable is changing this.
Busfield (1996). for example, argues that there is 'no single rationality, but rather a 
set of traditions of rationality that are normatively governed and whose influence 
varies across time and place' (p73, cited in Williams, S., 2000). These traditions may 
not. as Williams points out. themselves be particularly 'reasonable' and feminists and 
post-modernists have sought to redress the balance by championing ‘more 
emotionally founded ways of being and knowing as a challenge to dominant 
Cartesian traditions’ (Op.cit. p565). These challenge the disdain for and pathologising 
of, not just in psychiatric settings but also in quotidian life, female 'emotion-driven 
thought' and practice in favour of male 'disembodied reason'.
It has been long argued by feminists that claiming masculine values as the “norm” 
and female ones as "odd" (belonging to the "other") and therefore needing 
explanation, is one way in which men’s power is sustained. As a result of feminist 
research, men may have become 'decentred' and their angle of vision changed. No 
longer those who "gaze” and define, men are just one possible identity which can 
itself be examined. This research will ask if patriarchy has, in fact, been superseded 
in health care? Or has it simply assumed new forms which are not dependent upon 
the binary division of gender which Annandale and Hunt (2000) describe as a 'key
6 See menshealthforum.org.uk
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organisational feature of all aspects of our lives' (p20)? Does it continue to exist and 
could it be the case that as Annandale (1998) suggests, far from being advantageous 
to men. patriarchy undermines their health as much, or perhaps more than women’s?
Walby (1990) makes a distinction between degrees of patriarchy, referring to the 
'intensity of oppression within a specified dimension' of social life and to forms of 
patriarchy as referring to the ’overall type’ of patriarchy within a society (p 174). 
Stanton (1981) suggests that men's vices (publicly represented as virtues) have set the 
wrong standards for behaviour in the public world. She warns that women’s self- 
abnegating benevolence may effectively perpetuate their second-class status, and asks 
if they can afford to be benevolent in an essentially patriarchal society. Male doctors, 
including psychiatrists, are frequently accused of adopting patriarchal attitudes 
towards users, something which would seem to conflict with the notion of patient- 
centred medicine. However, with the rise of the men's health movement, the very 
notion of patriarchy is now in question.
As far as relationships amongst practitioners are concerned, ninety percent of nurses 
are female but the way in which conduct is evaluated as moral and rational ergo 
professional, has been masculinised7. Davies (1995) insists that the ways in which 
men and women conduct themselves in professional and social spheres are affected 
not only by culturally coded notions of masculinity and femininity, but also by a 
historically hierarchical relationship between the two. She discusses a Weberian 
model of bureaucracy, traditional models of professionalism and managerialism in
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health care, describing them as masculinised versions of reality which, whilst relying 
upon the work of females, simultaneously devaluates and displaces it. Critical 
feminists (Chodorow, 1978) have long pointed out that men’s institutional 
domination of women has caused men to learn to function psychologically in ways 
which maintain their authority and psychosocial priorities rather than women’s in 
male-dominated institutions and cultures. On this view, men’s psychology and gender 
identity derives from and revolves around status and power differences between the 
sexes and also among men.
3.7 Gender and Power
Gender and class relationships in medical practice, including mental health, have 
been described as based on power and it is often claimed that social power and status 
inequalities fundamentally influence the content of user/practitioner and 
practitioner/practitioner relations. Armstrong's Political Anatomy of the Body (1983), 
referring to decision-making in health care, tells us that it is not the members of given 
communities themselves who decide their own needs and how these can best be met. 
Such decisions are taken by ‘experts’ such as mental health professionals and 
managers. Resources and services are distributed by the latter on the strength of their 
ability to define what the object of health care is and how best to meet its 
requirements. This ability, Armstrong claims, rests as much on the power of the 
professional groups to retain control over this task as on a ‘correct analysis’ of what 
makes us ill or healthy. Is this still the case, twenty years on? 7
7 See footnote 1 of this Chapter.
99
Oakley (1998) maintains that authoritarian power patterns can not only engender 
feelings of hostility and anger, but also a consequent refusal to collaborate with the 
therapist8. Differences in status sometimes appear to produce what is experienced, 
rightly or wrongly, as contempt from those above and insecurity in those below 
(Dominelli and Gollins, 1997). It is therefore necessary to explore the gender factors 
inherent to empowerment and the exercise of power in caring, on the part of user and 
carer.
'Disempowerment’ is a term which regularly occurs in users’ descriptions of their 
experience of mental health care regardless of their sex. Power is often perceived as 
related to notions of class and gender, male practitioners exercising power over 
female colleagues and users'^ and also over more vulnerable males, whether users or 
amongst lower professional 'ranks’:
’... although my intentions were only to serve what I conceived as her 
welfare, I was guilty of the worst sort of paternalism. I had withheld 
information because I was afraid the patient might use it to make what I 
thought of as a wrong decision’.
(Nuland, 1993, cited in Webb. 1996).
Battersby (1988) defines patriarchy as ‘that form of social organisation which takes 
male bodies and life-patternings as both norm and ideal in the exercise of power’ 
(p i5). But power of this kind is, in fact, a complex phenomenon, undergoing 
continuous re-negotiation in all areas of life, including mental health practice. 'No *
1 Sec grapli in Chapter 5 on fieldwork research findings
* For feminist critiques of psychotherapy and associated forms of psychological and psychiatric 
treatment see Showalter (1987), Russell (1995), Chesler (1972, 1990) and Ussher (1991). All these 
examine women’s past and present experiences in a patriarchal society and culture.
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one party to any interaction is either all-powerful or all powerless’ (Dominelli and 
Gollins, 1997). Although social contract theorists such as Hobbes and sociological 
and political thinkers such as Marx and Weber have described power as a game, with 
a clear winner and a loser, their views may be excessively simplistic, even 
misleading. On the other hand, as Lawler (1991) says a good working relationship in 
healthcare requires the user’s compliance and that s/he does not 'resist or obstruct' 
the practitioner, who ‘...assumes and at times demands control. “Good" patients 
relinquish that control and unpopular patients do not ... all the literature suggests this 
to be so' (pl47. My italics).
It would be ingenuous to suggest that only male workers demand compliance and 
control in mental health practice. Matriarchal power too. although rarely mentioned 
in the literature, could be as effective in gaining control over users as that of 
patriarchy. Indeed, history and literature describe numerous examples of 
manipulative women and domineering, insensitive female healthcare practitioners 
belie the stereotypical image of the gentle "lady with the lamp".
The most common manifestation of male power in mental health practice is that of 
paternalism, which has long been a part of medical culture. Medical ethics not only 
tolerated, bul endorsed this and this endorsement is characterised by 'a remarkable 
degree of continuity and consistency from the days of Hippocrates until the mid­
twentieth century’ (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, p3). Paternalism has been 
reinforced by the social status accorded to medical doctors over the last two hundred 
years, evidenced by the respect which they have traditionally been shown by the
101
general public and until recently been accorded in media and literary accounts of 
medical practice. Even those who were during this period proclaiming the need for 
patient-centred medicine, such as Balint (1957) seemed to endorse paternalism, 
except when the user showed ‘mature responsibility’ towards his/her condition, 
although how this would be recognised is not explained"’.
Is the use/abuse of this kind of power in the practitioner-user relationship ever 
justified? In mental health practice, in crisis situations in which the user is considered 
a danger to him/herself or others, many health care practitioners and, indeed, users 
believe that it is. Patient-centred medicine has recently been at the forefront of the 
movement against medical paternalism and in favour of user empowerment and 
autonomy, central issues in mental health practice. Stewart and Weston (1995) 
demand that doctors: ‘renounce control that (has) traditionally been in the hands of 
the professional' (pxvi). The user's desires are now, at least theoretically, central to 
care plan decision-making.
Power, as implied earlier, is more complex than the issue of paternalism alone 
suggests. Dominelli and Gollins (1997) believe that male carers, professional and 
informal, simultaneously form part of a ‘hegemonic masculinity’ by virtue of their 
sex. and of a 'subordinated masculinity’ by virtue of their role as carers. Such men 
are perceived as being in an ambiguous position in relation to power and. according 10
10 During the course of the fieldwork, I interviewed Dr. Phillip Hopkins, one of Balint’s earliest 
disciples in Britain. Although very enthusiastic about patient-centred medicine, even he was not 
convinced that the user necessarily had a “right" to full information on his/her condition.
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to these authors, when working in the public arena engage in ‘power over’ dynamics 
as part of the dominant group, whilst at the same time struggling against their own 
potential subordination as male carers engaged in what they themselves may consider 
"female" work. Awareness of this conflict within themselves perhaps also -  at least in 
some areas of mental health practice -  facilitates a greater ability to ‘power share’ 
with female health care workers (and possibly users). In patient-centred treatments, 
power must in all but the most exceptional circumstances be shared between carers 
and users, even when the practitioner ostensibly has far more structural or 
institutional power than the user, object of this care.
Central to flourishing is the maximum possible empowerment of the user, supported, 
not (except in emergencies) controlled by the mental health practitioner. As a result 
of this, a hegemonic male practitioner of the type just described as formally holding 
all the power could be said to be himself controlled (at least temporarily) by the 
challenges and struggles of a vulnerable and relatively powerless user, seeking to 
establish his or her own autonomy. (Users, too, are sometimes themselves remarkably 
efficient in attaining power over other users and, in some cases, practitioners).11 
When the caring relationship is satisfactory, the healthcare worker, regardless of 
professional status, will encourage users to develop their own agendas, retaining or 
recovering the power of individual agency and autonomy. In other words, to flourish 
and to be once again able to perform 'with some success the most perfect of all 
typically human tasks' (Barnes, 1976, p36).
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As the relationship between practitioner and user develops, bonds which encourage 
this temporary mutual dependency in attaining autonomy should be established, 
fomenting the user’s possibilities of self-empowerment. Power thus becomes a 
process of negotiation and the therapeutic tool by means of which previously 
disempowered users attain sufficient status to influence interactions between 
themselves and the more powerful health care workers (Dominelli and Gollins, 1997 
and Campbell. 1998). Like Hochschild. Williams, S.J. (2000) seems to lend support 
to their views in suggesting that someone’s social status determines their ability to 
construct and defend the boundaries of the self, thus countering ’the potential for 
invalidation by powerful and significant others’ (p568).
Powerlessness of the kind described here and suffered not just by Marian Beeforth1 2, 
but by many of the users interviewed, heightens the chances of experiencing 
emotionally disagreeable ways of being (Hochschild, 1983). Disempowered people 
are inherently handicapped in managing the social and emotional situations 
encountered in mental disorder, including, for example, the practical problems of 
being in a mixed sex hospital ward. These have, according to the ’Women's 
Psychiatry Group’ of the ’Royal College of Psychiatrists’11, attracted much negative 
feedback from female in-patients whose need for privacy and intimacy is not 
respected. These women can, according to this report, be greatly distressed by the 
proximity of physically and sexually uninhibited male patients.
11 Such situations are described in Chapters 7 and 8
12 See Chapter 2
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There have also been repeated and well-documented incidents of rape and sexual 
assault in what should be the ‘safe’ setting of the psychiatric ward. In addition, 
behaviourally disturbed patients may get all the attention, whilst sedated and non- 
assertive women are consequently neglected. Therapeutic activities such as 
movement therapies, in-patient groups and sensitivity meetings, important to many 
women, are, according to this report, sometimes “sabotaged” by male patients. This 
'may contribute to existential fear, anxiety and neuro-physiological perturbation of 
many different sorts’ (Freund, 1990, p466) particularly when, as is frequently the 
case, male users are in the majority on the ward. However, harassment is not 
necessarily something only perpetrated by males upon females. In mixed sex wards, 
female users have been known to harass males. The difference lies in the reaction of 
ward staff, who treat male upon female harassment as an aggression, but for some 
reason regard female upon male harassment as trivial, even amusing.
3.8. Caring and Kmotlonal Labour
To satisfactorily examine the notion of care, we need a prior understanding of 
'caring'. According to Webb (1996), to say that there is a lack of consensus about the 
definition of care is a major understatement’ (p962). Ungerson (1990) indicates that 
the term ‘caring’ and the noun 'carer' have come to refer to a very specific kind of 
relationship, usually between two people, one highly dependent and frequently adult, 
and the other, traditionally female, who looks after the dependent person at home, 
unremunerated. Caring is traditionally not perceived as "proper”, that is “public” 1
1' See References
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work, but rather as the result of innate female nurturing qualities (Porter, 1992). 
Dunlop (1986) describes caring as 'an interactive process requiring the carer to be 
responsive to the needs of the person cared for, the resources available and the 
context in which care occurs. This involves skilled assessment, planning, action and 
evaluation of the implications and nuances of all these factors’ (p661). The same 
could be said of emotional labour.
That caring is a gendered, unrewarding and, in the domestic context at least, 
ultimately disempowering form of emotional labour has become accepted gospel in 
writings on the subject. Whilst accepted, it may not be entirely accurate. Describing 
the work of feminist philosophers such as Noddings, Alistair MacIntyre (1998) 
suggests that they have to a certain extent, acknowledged the enormity of our 
dependence upon one another, which stems from 'our vulnerability and our 
afflictions' (p3). They have also tried to remedy traditional moral philosophy's 
apparent refusal to recognise this: 'not only by their understandings of the 
connections between blindness to and denigration of women, and male attempts to 
ignore the facts of dependence, but also by this emphasis upon their importance to the 
mother-child relationship as a paradigm for moral relationships', (ibid. My italics).
This gendered image has recently undergone a slow, but constant metamorphosis. It 
is now believed that looking separately at men's and women's positions in 
occupational and family structures may 'obscure some very gendered patterns' 
(Annandale and Hunt, 2000, p 17). which have little or nothing to do with those 
previously described. Due to its traditional location within the domestic sphere, the
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labouring aspect of care can be lost in a ‘loving’ image. It then becomes possible to 
perceive the type of domestic care, based on affection, as superior to the professional 
‘technical’ care given by health care practitioners, male and female, in clinical 
settings. The need felt by some female professional carers to promote the former in 
the ‘technical’ setting might explain the highly emotional and ‘quasi- 
psychotherapeutic’ jargon employed by some recent female writers on ‘new nursing’, 
which caused one midwife to describe examining the placenta as: ‘...sorting the 
particles and waves in the spectrum o f light’ (Krysl, 1988, cited in Webb. 1996 
p963). ‘Managing emotions requires skill over and above ‘natural’ caring qualities 
and is different to love', says Smith (1992, pl8). However, there exists an extensive 
and rapidly growing literature on how feeling in general and love in particular do 
'enter the formal domain of care’ (Ungerson, 1990, p i2).
Is it true that women are ‘loving carers’, but men not? Should this not be the case, 
then an ethic of care which finds its roots in feminist critiques of the paternalistic and 
over-rationalist character of much contemporary medical ethics may prove to have 
very weak roots indeed. Feminist discourses such as those previously cited, which 
promote the image of women as more emotionally ‘knowledgeable’ than men should 
be approached with a healthy scepticism for they may over-generalise. Women’s 
emotional competence may have its origins precisely in their socially allocated and 
constructed role as carers, rather than vice-versa. As Jackson and Scott (1995) claim, 
we should be wary of valorising what is merely a symptom of subordination, no 
matter how tempting it might be to scorn, as feminists have, masculine ‘emotional 
incompetence'. Such stereotyping may be based upon erroneous beliefs. The
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emotions inherent to caring could prove to be socially constructed and managed -  a 
thesis central to the notion of 'emotional labour'.
It may also be the case that, contrary to popular belief, men including those involved 
in caring for the mentally disordered, tend to spontaneously practice a form of 
emotional labour, or at least employ the same tools of affection, respect and empathy 
as females. They too may try to ensure the user his/her own ‘space' in which to 
exercise a degree of autonomy, thus avoiding the situation in which 'the thinking of 
one party is reified, the thinking of the other party is stigmatised and the selection of 
which is which gets settled in a contest of social power, with the lower subject to 
social control' (Heise. 1988. cited in Palmer. 2000. p666). Compromise of the kind 
necessary to patient-centred practice is an inherent part of the caring process, 
regardless of whether this is administered by a male or a female hand.
Mental health practitioners, of both sexes, are required to control the user when 
necessary, as well as their own emotions. It has been claimed (Fineman, 1993, p 19) 
that the 'benign detachment' displayed by healthcare workers is a defence against the 
'loss of face- inherent in revealing personal feelings. Emotional detachment, or 
control, in this context, becomes a coping strategy since 'losing face’ is perceived as 
involving a loss of control which would change the power relationship between 
healthcare worker and user. 'The professional becomes too closely linked with the ... 
user’ (Hugrnan, 1992, p 133) and the idealised image of the healthcare worker as calm 
and ‘‘in control" is consequently damaged.
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The use of emotional "tools” is today considered to be central to good health care and 
to all forms of emotional labour. James (1992, a, b,) suggests that it will be 
increasingly recognised as part of health care, but what exactly is meant by 
"emotional labour”? In The Managed Heart, Hochschild (1983) employs Marx’s 
notion of use-value and exchange-value, describing the expression of emotions as 
work insofar as thought and energy are expended in showing sympathy, trust, 
warmth, suspicion and so on. She first employed this term to describe jobs which 
'necessitate contact with other people external to or within the organisation, usually 
involving face-to-face or voice-to-voice contact, especially in service work' 
(Steinberg and Figart. 1999, p.8).
Hochschild argues that emotions are social and can act as signals concerning the 
relationship between the environment and the self. In a sense, emotions are symbols. 
Our ability to manage them is based upon our expectations, which are, in turn, 
founded on experience. Emotions form part of the interpretative process, those which 
have become part of the social self being the means by which we interpret stimuli and 
develop a response. In the process of socialization, we learn the ’feeling rules’ and 
proper expressions of emotion, although there is great flexibility in how these are 
managed. Men. for example, are not normally expected to show grief or sorrow by 
crying, but are allowed to express anger, whereas in women quite the contrary occurs.
Hochschild maintains that efficient emotional labour requires the employee to create 
or conceal feeling in order to achieve the ‘outward countenance’ that ‘produces the 
proper state of mind in others’. This ’surface acting' is ‘the body language, the put on
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sneer ... the controlled sigh' (Hochschild, p35) whereas ‘deep acting' is where 
‘display is a natural result of working on feeling’ (ibid). This difference parallels 
Goffman’s (1959) front and back stage14, although it expresses the presentation of the 
self differently. The importance of emotional labour to good mental health practice 
can be appreciated upon reading:
T transferred to ... another hospital ... the nurses were very belligerent. They 
mocked us and they would say things like: “Oh, we’re going crazy. We must 
have been on this ward for too long” . You could be within earshot and they 
wouldn't care. There was no warmth ... they would try to maintain their 
distance and I really hated it’ (USA user, 14)
Jobs involving emotional labour, such as mental health care, have three aspects. They 
are face-to-face or involve voice contact; the employee must produce a particular 
emotional state in others and since producing these feelings is part of the employee's 
job. the employer exercises some control over the former's emotional activities. In 
some cases, emotional dissonance can occur, tensions developing between the 
employee's genuine feelings and what s/he is expected to portray towards the public, 
(ienuine expressions of emotion are hard to fake since smiles, anger, fear and so on. 
all involve employing certain facial muscles which cannot be voluntarily controlled. 
Whilst the most accessible signs of emotion are facial expressions, body language, 
intonation and even syntax also help to reveal this. Lack of facial and corporeal 
expression of emotion suggests that the emotions we declare in words or deeds are a 
sham. From our own encounters with others we know that we tend to be vigilant for 
faked expressions of emotion and put great faith in involuntary “give-aways”. Given
14 Despite their similarities, Hochschild strays from Goffman's analysis in that she believes there is no 
sense of inner 'se lf in Goffman’s writing. She considers his performances to be 'acts’ untouched by
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the importance of communication, awareness of these should be a two-way process 
between practitioner and user.
Jasperian empathy could be said to be based on this kind of observation, rather than 
on the patient’s words alone and an awareness of non-verbal language would not only 
better the accuracy of practitioners' observations of the user’s emotional state, but 
also better their own ability to communicate, thus improving their practice of 
emotional labour. In mental health practice as in any similar setting, as Pinker (1997) 
says, ’the agents may outwit one another with devious tactics’ for self-control is 
'unmistakably a tactical battle between parts of the mind’ (p419) and several users 
report deliberately deceiving health care workers as to their mental and emotional 
state. The latter, too, frequently do the same when relating to users.
Central to both the ethics of care and flourishing, is the notion that the user should be 
made to feel not only physically cared for but also emotionally cared about by the 
practitioner. (See Chapter 2.5.1.). Whether practising an ‘outward countenance’ of 
caring could be classed as exercising the virtue of, for example, charity, is a debatable 
point. It could be said that Goffman’s (1961) insights into the presentation of the self 
might be a more apt description of the mental health practitioner's need to present 
many different “faces” depending on the clinical context. Indeed, in spite of the fact 
that she is critical of some aspects of his work, Hochschild draws heavily upon 
Coffman in constructing her theory of emotional labour.
feelings: Goff man's actors actively manage outer impressions, hut the do not actively manage inner 
feelings' (Hochschild, 1983, p2!8; 1979, p262). They are carrying out "surface” acting
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Merely presenting an ‘outward countenance’, whilst not necessarily virtuous, is 
surely better, from both therapeutic and ethical points of view, than offering no 
warmth at all. On the other hand, it cannot be overlooked that according to several 
authors (Larson, 1981. Mayer 1987) patients focus on technical expertise, rather than 
emotional caring as ‘most important in making them feel cared for’ (Gooding et al., 
1993. cited in Webb. 1996. p964). In health care, the “rules" which provide the 
framework within which holistic caring is to take place must be based not only on 
emotional but also on clinical, technical, organisational, legal and social factors.
However, emotional labour, emphasises the relational, rather than task-based aspect 
of work in health care. It is labour and effort intensive work, the front-line service 
workers and paraprofessionals of which have been referred to by Cameron 
Macdonald and Carmen Sirianni (1996) as the 'emotional proletariat' (Op.cit. p9). 
Other researchers in this field claim that emotional labour demands ‘efforts made to 
understand others, to have empathy with their situation, to feel their feelings as part 
of one's own’ (England and Farkas, 1986, p91). This resembles not only traditional 
definitions of caring, but also Noddings' ‘engrossment’ and reflects the attitude of 
the adherents of the 'new nursing’ (Webb, 1988, Meerabeau and Page, 1998). Even 
the genuine expression of emotion is seen as work, for example, a practitioner’s 
concern for patients expressed in consoling, comforting and empathic terms.
In performing emotional labour in health care, employees give something of 
themselves to others with whom they will normally have no ongoing personal
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relationship. Whether they genuinely care or not, they must appear to do so. 
'Emotional labour also requires a worker to produce an emotional state in another 
person, whilst at the same time managing one's own emotions’ (Steinberg and Figart, 
1999. p 13). This may also involve the practitioner in what Goffman describes as an 
actor's ability to 'execute the double stance’. Whilst ostensibly adhering to the 
'official definition of the situation’, the actor simultaneously (and discreetly) shows 
that s/he 'has not agreed to having himself defined by what is officially in progress’ 
(Goffman 1961. p i33). This is an "invisible” task and in consequence the exercise of 
skill or effort which, as the previous sentence shows is involved, receives no 
economic remuneration. Lawler (1991) says that if nurses, for example, ‘do not 
overtly acknowledge the real nature of their work and the extent to which it requires 
... considerable emotional labour, they have a double bind. To make their true 
feelings felt would clearly not be in the patient's interests, but not to do so contributes 
to the camouflaging and privatising of nursing work' (p i69). Perhaps it is the lack of 
financial recognition, rather than an innate inability to care, which explains why 
relatively few men are engaged in the caring professions at the lower levels. It might 
also explain why. to judge by media articles and accounts of disciplinary proceedings, 
some so-called ‘carers’ no longer even pretend to care, robbing users of their 
possessions and their dignity.
The rethinking of ethics in the face of the technological onslaught in healthcare has 
also generated a growing literature 'on the linked concepts of emotional labour and 
caring...’ (Meerabeau and Page. 1998, p296). Mental health care workers, male and 
female are, according to this view, deeply involved in emotional labour, because in
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addition to the physical care which they deliver, they are expected to control their 
own emotions whilst tending to the emotional needs of the client. ‘Such emotional 
control is part of a ... professional approach, that is learning how to do body care and 
perform other functions in a manner typical of the occupation. The emotional 
control/labour may also be seen in the commitment which (they) are exhorted to 
demonstrate towards their patient whilst at the same time avoiding “over­
involvement" (Lawler. 1991, p.126). On Noddings’ view, this last term is nonsensical 
for the term "engrossment” implies an “over-involvement” of exactly this kind. 
Goffman’s (1961) account of the merry-go-round in which:
’... there is a circulation of feeling among participants and an “involvement 
contour” may emerge, with collective shifts in the intensity, quality and 
objects of involvement’ (p i39)
may, in view of what has been said so far. be a more adequate model for the mental 
health practitioner’s emotional (and ethical) task of continually evaluating the level of 
involvement required in each individual user’s case. Such judgements can only result 
from the exercise of implicit “feeling rules” acquired as the result of active 
participation in health care. This process seems to have little to do with gender -  
knowledge and experience are almost certainly more relevant. For Goffman. unlike 
Hochschild, carers do not simply connect and disconnect emotions, but move from 
one episode of "face work” to another, flexibly matching feelings and facial 
expression to the situation encountered, a notion of caring far removed from 
Noddings' ’engrossment'. Going 'public' with emotion, or what Goffman (1967) 
would term ‘presenting a face’ show how inextricably linked emotional management 
is with social life. Goffman’s ’traffic rules of interaction’ (Op. cit) ensure that actors
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constantly monitor their own acts and those of others in order to sustain the 
■predictability’ of quotidian social interactions. Many routines, qua caring, virtuous 
agent, are discreetly carried out as a means of saving the user’s of agent's 'face' and 
other agents reflexively (exercising phronesis) may adjust their own performances 
accordingly. Goffman’s analogy of social action as ‘performance’ is. therefore, a 
useful description of how actors manage themselves (and their emotions) and reveals 
that these performances can become extremely polished. This is important in view of 
the claim made in Part Three of this dissertation, that virtuous agents can be educated 
to behave as such.
In the mental health context, the need for such emotional self-control may apply, for
example, in the face of aggressive behaviour. The harsh reality of everyday clinical
settings would seem to make such control difficult, but highly necessary. Describing
her reaction to a situation which had occurred the night before, in which a user had
broken a male nurse’s nose, a female nurse respondent (PLN) says:
’... we also get told as well that ... we’re not allowed to inflict pain upon 
the patient in terms of, for instance, I got told you’re not allowed to knee 
them in the balls. You know, to actually protect yourself ... but in my, 
obviously if I feel as though my life is at risk, I’m going to naturally do 
that and I’m going to do anything to get this man, stopping this man 
from killing you’ .
Whilst a male psychiatrist interviewed, when asked about this, said:
*... the best weapon that staff have to combat any sort of distress is 
talking things over and having adequate numbers of staff on duty’ (PLR).
Curiously, the male psychiatrist’s view seems closer to the ethos of the "new 
nursing", which involves a close partnership with patients and greater informality, in
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which ‘nurses may feel able to loosen this control' (Meerabeau and Page, 1998, 
p297) simply getting on with caring for and about the user in the fullest sense of the 
word. This is essential to flourishing, but whether the desired ‘partnership’ is likely to 
be viable is something which remains to be seen.
Several writers have discussed how caring is enacted in a technological environment. 
Ray (1987) argues for the equal importance of technical competence and humanistic 
caring, something which mirrors users’ and mental health care workers’ own desire0. 
Others consider that the greatest future challenge will be to confront the 
dehumanising impact of technological advances on health care workers, to ‘temper 
the insults of technology with care’ (Cooper, 1993, p30). However, critics such as 
Dunlop argue that emotional labour theory has become disembodied insofar as ‘it 
etherealises the body’, removing ‘the mess and dirt of bodily life’ (Dunlop 1986, 
p664). For this reason. Goffman’s ‘presentation of the se lf is also a more useful 
model than Hoffman’s notion of emotional labour per se, for in health care work in 
all areas, not simply mental health, the division between the public and private worlds 
of emotion is not as clear cut as Hochschild’s views imply. Practitioners need to 
exercise different sets of ‘feeling rules’ depending upon the circumstances. 
Presentation of a purely professional façade is not necessarily useful in dealing with 
the complex emotional and moral dilemmas encountered in mental health care. In 
this, the feelings of user and practitioner, are more than “commodities” to be 
managed or taught by supervisors. Whatever the case, in the technological 
environment of today’s mental health care the subjective (emotional) experience of 
professionally interacting with users is inseparable from the objective (technical)
116
criteria of prescribed therapies, whether medical, surgical, psychological or 
psychotherapeutic.
The emotional labour debate has changed the simplistic conception of the workplace 
as somewhere where, in a Cartesian type mind-body split, we left our emotions at the 
door upon entering the workplace. The emotional dimension introduces complexity 
into the analysis of work and its relationship to gender, and to physical and mental 
health.
3.8. Conclusion
A task central to this dissertation is answering three gender-related questions. The 
first is whether men and women function differently as caregivers, the former 
applying a rational approach, as compared to the latter’s emotional one. (Or does the 
role of caregiver demand the same reactions, feelings and emotions, independent of 
sex and gender?) The second asks if there is anything necessarily ’fixed’ in the 
relationship between gender and particular manifestations of psychiatric disorder, or 
whether this notion is a misapprehension based upon a lack of the communication 
described by Fulford et al. (2002) as central to ethical practice. The third is whether 
men and women adopt similar approaches to ethics specifically involving virtue and 
caring.
From the point of view of the first, as we have seen, cultural stereotypes surrounding 
the role of the carer in formal and informal settings endow this with ‘feminine’ 
qualities. Recent statistics (Miller, 1986, Sabo and Gordon, 1998) challenge this
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stereotypical assumption, showing that in addition to entering the caring professions 
in increasing numbers, male caregivers, informal and professional, are adopting 
emotionally expressive ways of being men that go beyond the traditional role of 
hunter-gatherer and protector. Men’s increasing involvement in public and private 
care giving is part of a larger social change which could well result in a 
transformation of the social meaning of gender as such. If women can be socially 
conditioned to care, so can men. That is what emotional labour is about.
As far as the second question is concerned, an understanding of the relationship 
between gender and psychiatric diagnosis would demand ‘a very careful unravelling 
of the complex branches of psychiatric ideas and practice as well as of gender 
relations’ (Busfield, p25). Although such ’unravelling’ is beyond the scope of this 
study on ethics, research such as that described here offers a means of exploring the 
relationship between social constructs, individual agency and gender differences, 
illuminating the ways in which men’s and women’s lives, ethical practices, emotions 
and mental health are moulded and experienced, in order to assess any hypothetical 
differences in these. In view of what has been said so far, what the fieldwork and 
subsequent analysis will reveal in terms of gender, rather than women, and caring 
could prove most interesting.
The third question is possibly that most relevant to this study. John Stuart Mill, a 
utilitarian philosopher, believed that intellect and virtue are gender neutral and that 
society errs in assessing women’s intellectual ability and moral fibre as distinct to 
that of men. He wrote: ‘I do not know of a more signal instance of the blindness with 
which the world, including the herd of studious men, ignore and pass over all the
influences of social circumstances, than their silly deprecation of the intellectual and 
silly panegyric on the moral nature of women' (Mill, 1811, pl69). Mills believed that 
women's moral nature was entirely the result of systematic social conditioning and 
that to praise them for their feminine 'virtue’ (that of being self-abnegating carers) 
was to praise them for having allowed a patriarchal society to convince them that they 
had a moral duty to sacrifice their lives to those of men and children and that men had 
a moral right to be served by women. He implied that male-female inequalities 
especially patterns of male domination and female submission made it almost 
impossible for women to cultivate what Galsworthy (1922) called 'that secret sense 
of self-esteem without which no one can live’. Mill also thought that power 
imbalance impedes the development of true human moral virtues and facilitates, in its 
place, the development of a range of negative masculine and feminine psychological 
traits. Tong (1998) echoes this in asking if it is not rather the case that each human 
being, regardless of gender, is responsible for their own moral character. Like Wolf 
(1996) and Parks (2000). she considers the possibility that only women are expected 
to practice self-denying altruism and benevolence. If this is so. she asks, as in essence 
does this dissertation, what kind of "virtue” self-denying benevolence is if only 
female members of society are expected to cultivate it?
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PART 2
THE EMPIRICAL STUDY: 
FIELDWORK AND FINDINGS
Be a good craftsman; avoid any rigid set o f procedures. Above all, seek to 
develop and use the sociological imagination. Avoid the fetishism o f method and 
technique. Let every man be his own methodologist; let every man be his own 
theorist; let theory and method again become part o f the craft. Stand for the 
primacy o f the individual scholar; stand opposed to the ascendancy o f research 
teams o f technicians. Be one mind that is on its own confronting the problems o f 
man and society'
(Mills. C.W. 1959, p224)
Chapter Four: The Empirical Study: Research Methods and 
Study Design.
4.1. Introduction
The main purpose of the empirical component of the study is to explore and 
evaluate three specific areas. The first, is the extent to which the themes in the 
ethics literature, described in Chapters One and Two are identifiable in practice. 1 
shall, for example ask, as does Smith, P. (1992), whether nurses (and other 
practitioners) can, in what would appear to be an example of an ethic for 
nourishing in practice, ‘learn through experience and systematic training to 
recognise and use’ their feelings to ‘remain therapeutically involved’ both for 
themselves and for the patient? (p i5).
The second, linked to this, is whether the sociological beliefs and practices on 
gender issues in health care described in Chapter Three are identifiable in practice. 
A review of the literature on gender and caring in Chapter 3.5 implied, contrary to 
Noddings (1984), that male workers are capable of the same instincts for caring as 
their female counterparts. In other words, caring is not instinctive to either women 
or men, but is a form of emotional labour which social stereotyping has 
traditionally attributed as ‘natural’ to women, but which can be equally well 
performed by men or women, character rather than gender being the relevant 
factor in this. According to Williams, S.J. (2003), the gendered dynamics of care, 
whether formal or informal, raise a continuous series of dilemmas and debates 
about the role of emotions and embodiment in today’s “rationalizing” climate. 
Nonetheless, ‘any adequate analysis of the gender dynamic of emotion work and 
emotional labour should ... be alive to the pitfalls of perpetuating the ‘emotional
woman’/ ’unemotional man’ stereotype (Williams, S.J. 2003, pl98). In attempting 
to identify the putative codes-practice gap described in Chapter One is, therefore, 
also necessary to ask whether this (should it exist) is a gendered phenomenon.
Thirdly, I investigate whether ethical issues in the user-practitioner context require 
re-examining the truth of MacIntyre’s claim that when we think of those who 
suffer a disability, we are invited to ‘think of the disabled as them, as other than 
us, as a separate class, not as ourselves as we may have been, sometimes are now 
and may well be in the future’ (MacIntyre, 1999, p2). Levinas (cited in Williams, 
S.J., 2003) claims that ethics involves responsibility for other human beings and 
that it is the very alterity of the other which commands us as ethical subjects. 
‘Ethics, from this viewpoint emerge from facing the other, a radical alterity which 
disturbs the complacency of being through responsibility in proximity’ 
(Op.cit.pl99). Whether this dichotomy between them and us exists within caring 
relationships and, should this be the case, the effect which it has upon these is 
highly relevant to this work. User movements have made well-publicised claims 
that the adverse discrimination to which the mentally disordered as "other” are 
subject is the dominant topic in mental health today. For this reason, the 
experiences and attitudes of practitioners and users with regard to ethical issues, 
together with the question of whether gender influences these, are investigated in 
the field. The findings are subsequently subjected to qualitative and philosophical 
analysis.
Chapters One to Three constituted a detailed discussion, the themes of which can 
be summarised as follows:
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• The research questions, their context and rationale
• The need to relate applied sociology and philosophy in research into practical 
ethics
• Duty-based and deontological ethics; consequentialism, casuistry and virtue 
and care ethics
• A positing of a normative ethic combining neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and 
elements of care ethics in order to frame an ethic the end of which is 
flourishing in all aspects of patient-centred mental health practice
• Notions of caring in mental health practice as emotional labour, rather than a 
gender specific characteristic of women
However, relevant as this theorising is, more is required. A sociological empirical 
study is necessary because all interactions, “ethical” or otherwise, between 
practitioners and users, constitute social actions. In order to understand these we 
must engage with the relevant actors, observing, recording and interpreting their 
acts, experiences and opinions.
Planning, data collection and subsequent analysis of the fieldwork findings each 
had several phases. The methodology was informed by qualitative research 
grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) which maintains that theory should be 
inductive, continuously re-thought and reformed on the strength of observations 
based on the fieldwork and qualitative analysis of the incoming data, rather than 
imposed in advance. This stage was always intended to be overt, in order to avoid 
what might be considered the ethical dubiousness of covert research. This is of 
particular relevance to a study which is itself on ethics in the potentially highly 
sensitive area of mental health practice:
‘Sensitivity affects almost every stage of the research process from 
formulation, through design, to implementation, dissemination and 
application (Renzetti and Lee, 1993, p6).
A detailed description of the research methods and operalisation follows. This is 
intended to make the research replicable and sufficiently detailed as to be open to 
evaluation. Design choices, notably open-ended and semi- or unstructured, are 
now explained, prior to a general descriptive account of the study as a whole. The 
procedures used in data collection, coding and analysis are also explained and 
justified.
4.2. Reviewing the Situation: Literature, Websites and Media
Prior to the planning and execution of the research process per se, a reading list 
was composed, employing library resources such as OPAC and CD Rom sites, 
together with professional journal articles and reviews as a guide. This led (as 
Chapter 1.3. explained) to reading and linking literature on mental disorder and 
health, gender, ethics, social science methodology, and on relating philosophy to 
this. A detailed list of these sources is to be found in the References.
The World Wide Web (WWW) was also used to locate sites containing 
information pertinent to these themes and on mental health user and research 
organisations. Articles, on and off-line, from the popular press and professional 
journals in philosophy, sociology and mental health proved an invaluable source 
of topical information. Having accumulated a wide working knowledge of the 
ethical and sociological issues involved (although a study across three disciplines, 
requiring fieldwork, and to be completed within a limited time frame, could never 
hope to cover all of these as deeply as one based upon a single discipline might),
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the research framework and subsequent means of analysing this were 
consolidated. It was then possible to commence the active processes of planning, 
executing, coding, analysing, and finally writing-up, the research.
4.3. Current Codes of Practice in Professional Colleges -  Nursing, Social 
Work, Psychology, Psychiatry and Sociology
In order to prepare the ground for the fieldwork and subsequent analysis and 
interpretation of the data emerging from this, it was necessary to previously 
examine, analyse and compare those ethics and codes of good practice currently 
employed by the relevant professional colleges or organisations. Publications on 
professional conduct from the United Kingdom Care Council (UKCC, now the 
N&MW Council); the National Association of Social Workers (N.A.S.W.); the 
Royal College of Psychiatrists, (R.FC. Psych.); the British Psychological Society 
(B.P.S.) and the British Sociological Association (B.S.A.) as well as many other 
works on this subject, provided a working insight into the extent to which gender 
and class influence (or not) each particular college’s style of promoting and 
defending good practice amongst its members.
To summarise, this analysis revealed that the U.K.C.C., whose members are 
predominantly female and lowly paid (although many now have university 
degrees in nursing), tells its members that they must obey the sixteen rules laid 
down in their code of professional conduct. The UKCC regularly produced 
guidelines on good practice and ethics for its members, all of which could be 
described as “altruistic” insofar as they emphasise caring and the “nourishing” of 
the user, rather than the rights of the nurse. The N.A.S.W., on the other hand, 
merely suggests that its members should and may act according to the
requirements of their own codes of ethics. This body adopts a much less exigent 
tone and conveys the impression that its guidelines are designed to help the social 
worker as much as protect the public, which is the declared goal of the UKCC 
publications.
The Royal College of Psychiatrists, like the NASW, has produced several official 
“guidelines”, rather than codes on ethics for its members. In 1989, it published the 
College Position Statement on Confidentiality and in 2000, Good Psychiatric 
Practice and Good Psychiatric Practice: Confidentiality. These focus on 
providing practical guidance relevant to a variety of situations which could 
confront psychiatrists and other members of multi-disciplinary teams. Unlike 
nurses, neither social workers (a predominantly female profession) nor 
psychiatrists (still predominantly male) are apparently considered by their own 
professional bodies to need "rules”. Suggestions and guidelines as to how to 
behave in an ethical fashion in the exercise of their task is considered sufficient. 
Could the difference lie in the fact that the UKCC was, as analysis of their official 
organ, Register, reveals disproportionately staffed by male administrators, making 
rules for a mainly female profession, whereas the R.C.Psych, and the NASW are 
administered by bodies in which the sex ratio between workers and policy makers 
is more balanced?
It should be noted that in the case of psychiatrists, the corresponding disciplinary 
body is that of all registered medical doctors, the General Medical Council 
(G.M.C). Their web site speaks of ‘protecting patients and guiding doctors’. 
Fourteen key principles are stipulated, all of which, rather ironically, begin with
the injunction that: ‘as a doctor you must...' which sounds far more mandatory 
than the word guidance would imply. Why the G.M.C. considers that medical 
doctors need mandatory codes of practice, whilst the professional college of 
psychiatrists considers that they need no such rigid rules is an interesting question. 
Are psychiatric patients not considered to need as much protection as other users, 
or do psychiatrists belong to a discipline which is considered inherently “ethical” 
in its treatment of users? In reality, the reason for this apparent disparity lies in the 
fact that the GMC and the UKCC (now N&MW Council), are regulatory bodies, 
whilst the R.C.Psych, and the Royal College of Nursing (membership of which is 
not obligatory) resemble unions in their function, protecting the interests of their 
members whilst, leaving regulatory bodies to protect the public and the corporate 
image of the profession.
The British Psychological Society produces an eighty-two-page tome entitled 
"Code o f Conduct, Ethical Principles and Guidelines” (January, 2000), the first 
five pages of which constitute “A Code of Conduct for Psychologists”. This is 
divided into five sections, covering such relevant areas as competence, consent, 
confidentiality and personal conduct. All thirty-four of the points raised here begin 
with the phrase: ‘Psychologists (or they) shall...” (my italics). Apparently the 
B.P.S. considers that ethical behaviour can be commanded and rule-based. If this 
is so, then this thesis could prove superfluous.
The codes of the UKCC, the G.M.C. and the B.P.S. have in common lists of rules 
as to what healthcare workers must and must not, should and should not, do. 
However, if studies such as those of Watson (1999) and the statistics on
disciplinary hearings given in Chapter 1.5 are credible, the situation is less 
straightforward in mental health practice. The ethical dilemmas which arise in this 
context frequently fail to fit rigid rules, and contradictions constantly confront user 
and practitioner. Different practitioners may interpret different phrases such as 
'safeguard the interests and well-being of patients’ (UKCC Code of Professional 
Conduct, 1992) and ‘...inform clients to the extent possible’, (NASW Code of 
Ethics) in quite distinct and yet perhaps equally well-informed and well- 
intentioned ways. These instructions might, in turn, clash with other 
recommendations such as, for example, that to ‘foster independence’. In mental 
health practice, moral dilemmas abound and current codes apparently do little to 
resolve them.
The ‘Proposed New Statement of Ethical Practice’ for the B.S.A., originally 
examined because the research project is a combined sociological and 
philosophical study, rather than for its relevance to mental health ethics, adopts an 
entirely different and innovative approach to ethical “codes”. The very use of the 
word “statement”, rather than code or guidelines, implies the nature of the content. 
In this members are ‘encouraged’ to use the statement in order to ‘educate 
themselves and their colleagues to behave ethically’. It does not ‘provide a set of 
recipes for resolving ethical choices or dilemmas’, recognising that these will be 
made ‘on the basis of principles and values, and the (often conflicting) interests of 
those involved’ (B.S.A., March 2002). This statement reflects many of the 
sentiments which find voice in virtue ethics and for this reason the nature and 
composition of the BSA statement is further discussed in Chapters Seven and 
Eight.
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4.4. The Fieldwork Research Design
The empirical research investigates the previously mentioned dilemmas and the 
means by which they are resolved, asking whether this involves invoking 
professional codes or guidelines on ethics or good practice. Using qualitative, 
some quantitative, and philosophical analyses, I assess and interpret the answer to 
these questions, investigating how and why ethical attitudes are formed and 
whether there is, as feminist philosophers claim, a significant difference in those 
of male and female healthcare workers and users. Or is this difference a socially 
constructed myth, rather than an immovable social reality?
4.4.1. Context
It might be expected that, as a result of their common experiences as social actors, 
users’ and practitioners’ views would express not merely individual, but also 
shared ethical values, although variations based on personal and cultural 
characteristics must exist within these. As Weber (1947) says: ‘Sociology ... is a 
science which attempts the interpretative understanding of social action in order 
thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its cause and effects ... Action is social 
only in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting 
individual ... it takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby orientated 
in its course’ (p88). From Weber’s point of view, the interactions, ethical or 
otherwise, between healthcare practitioners and users would constitute ‘social 
actions’. These arc motivated by the meanings held by the individual and take 
account of others’ actions (Weber 1949, pp. 136-147). In order to understand those 
social actions related to ethical practice in mental health settings, it is necessary to
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not only record, but also interpret them. In the process of interpretation, given the 
cross-disciplinary nature of empirical ethics, after initial qualitative analysis, 
philosophical analysis and discussion are employed.
4.4.2. Validity, Reliability and Replicability
The criteria of validity, reliability and replicability must also be considered when
deciding between methodological options. Validity of measurement requires that
this genuinely does measure what it purports to. The process includes the accurate
and complete documentation of the social actions in their context, for example, the
exact recording of the words spoken at the interview, although:
‘There may or may not be the need ... to transcribe all of your taped 
materials, or indeed every paragraph or line of each interview or taped 
field note. The actual transcribing should be selective’ (their emphasis).
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990.p30)
According to Shipman (1997), in assessing the validity of the evidence gathered it
is necessary to ask:
• Does this reflect reality and reach the truth of the matter under 
investigation?
• Does it make a convincing case in the light of existing knowledge?
• Is it supported by other evidence?
• Does it explain current problems?
• Does it help to understand how and why the subjects under scrutiny act 
and react the way they do?
If, on these criteria, it is the researcher’s responsibility to ‘lay out the claim for 
review’, the reader’s responsibility is to ‘take up the offer’ (Shipman, 1997, pviii).
Reliability refers to the methods used and demands that ‘applying the procedure in 
the same way will always produce the same measure’ (King et al., 1994, p25). In 
research such as that described here, it must be stressed that test-retest reliability 
will not necessarily equate to the core concept of reliability, since each human
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situation has different characteristics, a factor particularly pertinent to the study of 
ethics in mental health practice. It implies that ‘the results from different occasions 
in a series of occasions of observation should confirm one another’ (Robertson, 
1998, p 133). Data collection is considered complete, this source claims, ‘when the 
rate at which new themes appear becomes very small’ (ibid.). Sufficient 
information for the reader to be able to distinguish clearly between evidence and 
opinion is also essential.
Shipman (1997) claims that: ‘Reliability and validity tend to be incompatible’,
particularly in research based on open-ended questions and qualitative accounts.
For this reason, great care had to be taken in ensuring that the questioning In
addition, in researching a sensitive subject, much thought has to be given to the
interaction between interviewer and respondent. In this respect, the training in
philosophical counselling proved extremely useful insofar as the techniques on
this are based on listening in a friendly, yet relatively “dead-pan” fashion and
asking questions which encourage the respondent to think about what s/he is
saying and elaborate on this. A simple example might be as follows:
Respondent: ‘So he was a real bad ‘un.’
Interviewer: ‘What do you mean by that?’
Respondent: ‘Well, he was always playing dirty tricks on you’
Interviewer: ‘Can you give me an example of a “dirty trick”?’
Respondent: ‘Well, like he’d have you up all night playing cards and that. 
Interviewer: ‘You told me you like playing cards. So why was that a dirty 
trick?’
Respondent: ‘He’d make you play for money - and take every last fuckin’ 
penny’. (Laughs).
interviewer: ‘Why did you agree to play if he was doing that?’
Respondent: ‘Well, bit of a laugh at the time, weren’t it? Made you feel, 
like, normal, I suppose. He was a nice bloke’.
Interviewer: ‘First you said he was a "real bad one” and now you’ve said 
he was a "nice bloke”. Was he both? Or one more than the other?’ ...
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Assuming that the questions asked and the responses given are understood by 
interviewer and respondent in the way that each of these intended, employing this 
type of questioning is both valid and reliable.
Having said this, ‘both intention and understanding can be affected by factors that 
may not even be appreciated by both parties’ (Shipman, 1997) and the importance 
of awareness of the interaction between interviewer and respondent is discussed in 
the section on "Reflexivity” below.
The research project is interpretative and could therefore be described as 
constructivist, in that it makes no firm predictive claims, but instead describes 
generating grounded theory from observations in the field. This subsequently 
revealed what was irrelevant and what was central to the project, changing the 
focus of the research and, by creating an accurate picture of ethical policy and 
practice in mental health settings, revealing that values arc inseparable from these.
4.4.3. Keflexivily
Ensuring that evidence obtained in the fieldwork interviews faithfully reflects the 
reality under investigation is vital. In interpretative research, the awareness of the 
subject and his or her interaction with the researcher means that ‘the appropriate 
metaphor is not of actors playing parts written for them, but of actors constructing 
their own roles in a drama that they helped to write’ (Shipman, p39). Both 
researcher and researched act reflexivcly.
At this juncture, a caveat is required in the interests of investigative responsibility. 
My experience as a psychiatric nurse, observing ethical practice in mental health 
settings at first-hand, almost certainly introduced an inescapable subjectivity in 
approaching the research. Fieldwork in an area as sensitive as mental health is 
experiential in a very significant way, insofar as it involves not only the 
researcher’s physical presence but also his/her emotions. Indeed, a certain 
awareness of becoming insidiously "attached” to the research process could be 
said to develop. Part of qualitative research is recognising this relationship, given 
that achieving a maximum of objectivity must be a central concern to all research, 
although that objectivity can ever be totally assured in research of this nature is 
questionable. Particular care was therefore taken to ensure that the study was at 
least as objective as possible.
Perhaps it is relevant here to posit a redefinition of objectivity -  the researcher 
could be said to be objective in recognising his/her own subjectivity (Coffey, 
1999). When research involves human beings, controversy is inevitable. Bias can, 
according to Shipman (1997) enter at any of the three stages of research -  the 
conceptual stage, the technical stage and finally, at the publication stage, when the 
findings might prove to be ‘loaded down with views not derived from the 
evidence itself’ (p i8). It has, therefore, been essential to heed the latter’s advice, 
attempting to go beyond merely technical issues to the assumptions behind the 
design of the research and the way in which the results arc presented. Using one’s 
own life experience in intellectual work may prove to a certain degree inevitable, 
for as Wright Mills says in The Sociological Imagination: ‘You arc personally 
involved in every intellectual product upon which you may work’ (1959, p!96).
My years of experience of mental health practice are undoubtedly one of the 
motivating forces behind this particular research project. Maintaining personal 
"bctes noires” under check during the interviews and the later interpretation of the 
fieldwork findings was possibly the most difficult part of the research.
Although Shipman (1997) recognises that ‘...from start to finish, an open mind is 
impossible. All researchers have preconceptions that affect what they see and how 
they interpret it’ (p42). That I was at least reasonably successful at keeping an 
open mind is perhaps illustrated by two things. The first, the fact that the initial 
interview findings surprised me to the extent that it was necessary to confirm them 
by means of a subsequent questionnaire survey. The second, that the subject of 
values eventually became central to answering the research question, although 
until analysing the fieldwork findings it had been of little relevance. Both 
represented a radical rethinking of the original research design -  and an increased 
workload. Nonetheless, ‘it is impossible to confirm objectivity ... when the 
research is about humans, there is always controversy.’ (Shipman, 1977, p 18). As 
this author says, most researchers accept that we construct our own knowledge of 
the world around us and realise that there is ‘no detached position for neutral 
observation’ (ibid).
4.5. Obtaining Information
Although structured questionnaires arc commonly employed in the ethical and 
psychosocial evaluation of aspects of medicine, the validity of these is relatively 
poor in studies such as this in which the phenomenon in question is ill-understood 
and what is being measured ill-defined (Robertson, 1998). Questionnaire methods
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fail to describe the context of the phenomenon under investigation and the 
conclusions drawn from the respondents’ self-reporting. On the other hand, their 
reliability and replicability are reputedly high.
Semi-structured, interviews enjoy the advantage of allowing a balance of pre-set 
questions and more spontaneous contributions. Unstructured interviews are 
inevitably more spontaneous than these and data is frequently more valid insofar 
as respondents can clarify their definitions and comments. However, reliability is 
higher for semi-structured interviews than for those which are unstructured. 
Replicability is difficult in both cases, insofar as each interview is unique and, 
given the mental instability of some of the people interviewed, potentially 
unrepeatable.
Focus groups were not considered viable, since in these it sometimes occurs that 
one or two participants attempt to dominate the group, possibly suppressing or 
manipulating the views of the other participants. This could well have been the 
case in a mixed sex focus group of people suffering from mental disorder, given 
the evidence of the ‘Women’s Psychiatry Group’1 to the effect that some female 
users feel threatened by the presence of male users (see Chap.3). In addition, the 
validity and replicability of focus group findings are notoriously poor. 
Consequently these may serve to supplement, but not replace other survey 
methods.
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In order to obtain spontaneous information, questioning needed to be as open- 
ended as possible. This would encourage “unforced” answers which could, in turn, 
inform and possibly modify the content of later conversations with other users and 
practitioners. This technique was intended to encourage respondents to 
communicate their underlying attitudes, beliefs and values free of excessive 
inhibitions, possibly as short narratives, rather than providing glib, easy answers, 
or saying what they felt the researcher wanted to hear and thus giving “public” 
accounts, rather than the “private” genuinely personal accounts and opinions 
sought. An orientative protocol was prepared to be employed, if necessary, to 
open and assist the flow of conversation (see Appendix 1). However, excessive 
standardisation of questions was avoided since inherent to this is a lack of 
flexibility to explore unenvisaged territory, although the pilot interviews would 
make patent the importance of attempting to adhere to issues relevant to the 
research.
Given the situated identity of the researcher, previously acknowledged, keeping an 
open mind from start to completion of the study was not easy and awareness of the 
possible effects of this potential lack of objectivity upon outcomes had to be 
maintained. Consequently, the method of interviewing users and care workers was 
based on the notion that theory should be grounded, that is continuously re­
thought and re-formed on the strength of interpretation of the interviews, rather 
than imposed on this in advance. What might be described as a process of 
oscillation took place, ideas and research questions moving into much sharper 
focus as the process developed. Initial concepts were constantly amended.
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theories adapted to the new situation and the research modified in terms of the 
evidence gathered during the fieldwork. Grounded theory maintains that:
‘the usual canons of “good science” should be retained, but require 
definition in order to fit the reality of qualitative research and the 
complexities of social phenomena that we seek to understand’
(however) ‘every mode of discovery develops its own standards -  and 
procedures for achieving them ... What is important is that all of these 
are made explicit.’
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p250)
4.5.1. Pilot Interviews
Prior to the pilot interviews, during the first year of the doctoral programme, 1 
undertook a course in philosophical counselling techniques, run by the Society of 
Consultant Philosophers. Since my previous professional experience had involved 
interviewing users in a psychiatric practice, this was intended to ensure that 
neither the philosophical aspect of the interview process was lost from view, nor 
that the interviews themselves should slip into something more closely resembling 
a therapeutic intervention than sociological fieldwork'.
The pilot study mentioned in the previous paragraph was considered necessary in 
order to test the interviewing technique in advance of the fieldwork itself. This 
would identify possible problems for respondent and researcher, a novice to 
sociological fieldwork. Two pilot interviews with users, one male and one female, 
were undertaken. It was neither difficult to recruit, nor interview these. The first 
pilot respondent, a middle-aged, working-class man with a long history of 
depression and suicidal attempts, was introduced by a patient advocate. The 
second, a middle-aged, middle-class woman, was diagnosed as suffering from 
depression. Her mother had committed suicide after many years in psychiatric
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treatment. A professional acquaintance, she participated at her own request as a 
result of a long-standing personal interest in ethics.
In addition to testing and improving interview techniques, the pilot interviews 
were intended to gather basic information about the field, before selecting the 
exact methods to be used. The nature of topics to be raised at later interviews and 
how to approach these was also determined as a result of the successes, failures 
and faux pas ( ‘You’re not supposed to put the answers in my mouth’) of the pilot 
interviews.
The "questioning”, in both ‘pilot’ cases, was open-ended and although much 
information was obtained, the respondents also took the opportunity to address 
their personal interests and grievances, rather than yielding information relevant to 
answering the research questions. As a result, the interview was made more 
structured and an orientativc protocol drawn up, in order to prevent the interview 
degenerating into little more than a “soapbox”, from which the respondent 
denounced his/her problems with the mental health services. Whilst spontaneity 
was important if the atmosphere was to be relaxed enough to promote the 
uninhibited talk necessary to obtaining the sensitive information central to the 
study, the relevance of the material was of the essence.
The first pilot respondent, for example, illustrates this. He gleefully recounted an 
anecdote which revealed that he apparently considered it acceptable for him to 
publicly breach confidentiality in relation to other users, but that it was totally 2
2 Somewhat paradoxically, philosophical counsellors studiously avoid counselling, hut instead 
encourage analytical thinking and the employment of philosophical t<x>ls in resolving dilemmas
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unacceptable for practitioners to do so in professional settings. Whether the 
subject of his anecdote would have been happy in the knowledge that this 
respondent was telling people in their home town that she had been ‘on the funny 
farm’ with him is an interesting question, as is if and how this kind of situation 
could be avoided. The respondent, subsequently readmitted to hospital, was 
apparently gratifyingly "empowered” as a result of his interview, informing his 
care workers that they “better be careful what you do to me” due to the fact that he 
was “helping people at Warwick University with their research”.
The second respondent described the ease with which some mental healthcare 
practitioners assume that a family history of depression predisposes one to this 
condition, without considering a differential diagnosis -  and in spite of the user’s 
protests. This particular user was initially misdiagnosed, another doctor 
subsequently recognising her condition as hepatitis upon observing her ‘yellow 
eyes’. The first doctor, who had given her depressed mother ‘repeat prescriptions 
of “Valium” for over twenty years’, failed to apologise for his diagnostic error, 
something interesting from an ethical point of view, since a later respondent 
comments that it is gratifying to note that mental health care workers ‘are 
beginning to admit that they do not have all the answ ers'\ Such relevant issues 
would have been unlikely to emerge had a more structured interview technique 
been employed.
An important factor in later listening to the interview tapes, prior to transcribing 
them, was ensuring that, in spite of a conscious effort to create a ‘natural’ 
situation, (mis)leading questions had not been asked and/or expected responses 1
1 See Chapter 5, p. for an example of a doctor doing exactly this.
elicited, albeit unconsciously, by means of either “loaded” questions or subtle 
hints or innuendo. The ‘vulnerable can easily be led to answers in questionnaire 
and interview’ (Shipman, p87) - particularly at the hands of an inexperienced 
fieldworker.
Following discussion of the pilot interviews and subsequent reflection, the 
interview technique was modified. It was decided that these should continue to be 
generally non-structured, but that lists of questions which related specifically to 
the subject of the research should be prepared (see Appendices 1 for the user 
questions and 2 for those employed with practitioners). These would be employed 
if the interview appeared to be deviating (as the pilot interviews had) excessively 
from the research questions. A previous list of topics had been prepared, but 
experienced researchers4 considered this to be couched in excessively 
philosophical terms, not immediately accessible to the layman. Consequently 
expressions which might lead to confusion were changed, “flourishing” (the 
standard English translation of the Greek word eudemonia), for example, was 
replaced by “well-being” (a lesser used, but more prosaic translation). The final 
list of questions was successfully employed in subsequent interviews which were, 
as a result, richer in reflections upon ethical matters.
4.6. Research Ethics
Over recent years, the ethical and legal aspects of research have become 
important. Concern for individual human rights, including those of the research 
participant, as well as for those groups which could be affected by the research is
4 Many thanks arc due to both Dr. Gill Bendelow and to Dr. Tony Colombo for their useful 
comments on this
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growing (Renzetti and Lee, 1993). In thinking about the ethics of this research 
process, therefore, various factors had to be considered. What were the risks? How 
could they be balanced against the benefits of the research, in order to determine 
what was ethically justifiable? Could the requirements of informed consent be met 
in research involving the mentally disordered, and so on? Ignoring the ethical 
issues in sensitive research of this nature would have been professionally and 
morally irresponsible. On the other hand, to paraphrase Sieber and Stanley (1988), 
to shy away from controversial issues, simply because they are controversial, is 
also an avoidance of responsibility (p55).
Issues related to ethical risk involved matters such as informed consent. This was 
obtained from all those interviewed, each of whom appeared perfectly capable of 
giving consent, in spite of the fact that some respondents were taking large 
amounts of anti-psychotic medication and four told me that they were ‘under 
section’. A detailed consent form was explained and signed prior to the interview. 
(Following the pilot interviews, a first, short version of this was modified and 
lengthened, to give the respondent more information about the researcher, the 
recording, storing and intended use of the interview material, and of the 
respondent’s rights with regard to this. See Appendix 3). Another vital 
consideration was that of confidentiality, for whilst research participants can 
generally expect a right to privacy, anonymity and confidentiality, maintaining 
this scrupulously in the case of sensitive, intimate or possibly incriminating data, 
such as that collected during this research, is of particular importance. For this 
reason, all respondents were given three-letter “codcnamcs” which consisted in the 
letter "U” (user) or “P” (practitioner); a second letter designating the place of
interview: Oxford (O); London (L); Northampton (N) and so on, and a third letter, 
the first o f the respondent’s name (or three letters in the case of respondents with 
the same initial letter, from the same place). All interviews and charts for analysis 
were marked with these, rather than with the respondent’s full name and address.
4.7. Access lo the Research Settings
Another ethical issue was the rights of not only the individual, but also of the 
institutions involved. A certain wariness on the part of the latter was not only 
likely, but also understandable in view of the possible repercussions of the 
research in terms of damaging disclosures. Johnson (1976) stresses the need for a 
multi-stage ‘progressive entrée’ and this was practised in the case of those 
institutions approached.
Illustrative of the “wariness” previously described is the fact that it had originally 
been intended to carry out the research in an overt ethnographic study, involving 
participant observation, within a psychiatric hospital ward. With this in mind, I 
made an application to "bank” nurse at a local N.H.S. Trust’s psychiatric unit. The 
interview was conducted by two deputy ward managers who seemed immensely 
wary of my interest in research into ethics. Despite my years of practice 
experience with mentally disordered patients and current registration with the 
UKCC5, the application was refused on the grounds that're-training’ would be 
necessary. Given this experience of what might be described as the ‘defensive 
capabilities’ (Cassell, 1988, p54) of the institution in question, the idea of an 
ethnographic study was abandoned. Not only would it apparently prove difficult to
enter a hospital for this purpose, hut the research itself was potentially vitiated and 
lacking in objectivity as a result of this experience.
The potential sensitivity of the topic, at least as far as some professional carers are 
concerned, was evidenced by this event and by another incident in which a senior 
male nurse agreed to arrange interviews with his colleagues. After several 
telephone calls to finalise the details, he cancelled these only hours beforehand on 
the grounds of his own ill-health. Having promised to reconvene them ‘in the near 
future’, he failed to do so or to explain the reasons for this.
Renzetli and Lee (1993) give a ‘preliminary definition’ of a sensitive topic as:
‘... one that potentially poses for those involved a substantial threat, the 
emergence of which renders problematic for the researcher and/or the 
researched the collection, holding and/or dissemination of research data’ 
(p5)
They continue, saying that those areas of research most likely to be perceived as 
threatening are, amongst others, those which enter into ‘... some deeply personal 
experience’, arc ‘concerned with social control’ and impinge on ‘the exercise of 
coercion or domination’ (p6). These were, effectively areas upon which the project 
could have touched and this may explain why these particular “gatekeepers” were 
reticent in allowing access to their particular "houses” .
All this resulted in a radical rethinking of the research strategy which, in turn, 
avoided the need for ‘negotiating up’ (ibid.) with a Research Ethics committee. 
This was possibly an advantage, since the demands imposed by ethical committees 
prior to research fieldwork in this particularly sensitive area could involve
'  I'hc United Kingdom Care Council, which keeps a record of registered nurses, ensuring that their 
practice skills are up to date and that they have not been suspended from the register, either 
temporarily or permanently.
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modifications of a kind which have been known to result in the abandonment of a
project altogether, due to an inability to meet the exigencies of the committee 
within the stringent time limits of the research project. Restrictions are 
occasionally so numerous that it can become ‘impractical or impossible to conduct 
valid evaluative research’ (Bradbum, 1982 cited in Sieber, 1982, p94).
Another reason for not being discouraged by the prospect of abandoning the 
intended ethnographic study was that several accounts confirm that the reliability 
and validity of ethnographic research now trouble researchers (Burgess, 1984), the 
main concern being that of the impact of this upon the researcher, rather than on 
those being researched. Given the nature of the project and the results obtained, a 
study of this type proved neither necessary, nor in retrospect perhaps even 
desirable, since the final sample includes a wider cross-section of users and care 
workers in terms of geographic location, age, class, education, diagnosis and 
gender, than would have been possible in an ethnographic study.
However, detailed negotiations with team managers, research nurses and so on 
were, in some cases, still necessary. This typically involved an introductory letter, 
a subsequent telephone contact, followed by the submission of an outline of the 
project and a list of the topics to be discussed, before an interview could be 
arranged. In the case of the Survivor’s Centre, after an initial written contact with 
the Manager, informal visits intended to gain the users’ confidence took place 
before any interviews were requested or, later, questionnaires distributed. In the 
case of some practitioners too, the first respondent would arrange interviews with 
his/her colleagues, in a process of “snowballing”. Two inner-city, out-patient
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services contacted refused to participate on the grounds that they were already 
involved in research projects and, in the interests of their users, did not wish to 
participate, for the time being, in yet another.
On occasion, opportunities presented themselves. At congresses in London and 
Wales, through contacts in the Department of Sociology itself, and at a 
“Survivors’ Fair” in Oxford, it was possible to discuss the research with and 
‘recruit’ an interesting and highly eclectic sample of respondents for both 
interviews and the completion of the questionnaire. In consequence, interviews 
eventually took place with, and questionnaires were distributed amongst a wide 
cross-section of users and mental health practitioners over a geographical area 
which included London, Oxford, Coventry, Birmingham, Kendal, 
Wolverhampton, Derby and Northampton.
This research, apparently seen as threatening by some groups was, as Renzetti and 
Lee (1993) claim is frequently the case, thought innocuous by another. There was 
virtually no need for ‘negotiating down’ with user groups. ‘Recruits’ abounded 
and seemed enthusiastic and pleased to express their views and participate in a 
research project. In spite of initial reserves as to whether the few spontaneous 
"volunteers” were not perhaps typical of the groups involved, but rather people 
with a particular axe to grind, or merely the desire for (brief) recognition, it was 
decided that it is de facto almost impossible to speak of ‘typicality’ in dealing with 
mental disorder and they were included. However, one such “volunteer” dropped 
out upon discovering that he would not be remunerated for the interview. ‘Some 
other researchers’ from London were offering fifteen pounds an hour for each
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user’s time. Since his experience as a user was his only “capital”, it was not 
difficult to sympathise with his claim that “user time” was in no way less valuable 
than “researcher time”, something he assumed to be paid.
Anyone reluctant to participate at the ‘formal’ interview was encouraged to go 
away and think about it before making a decision. Only one possible user 
respondent dropped out as a result. The origins, aetiology and narratives of the 
final sample were most varied and the fact that some users were “volunteers”, in 
the sense of having directly asked to participate, did not invalidate their 
contribution to this study.
To paraphrase Burgess (1986), leads were followed, others dropped, new key 
informants adopted and others neglected. Such switches had, as Burgess says, to 
be anticipated, even welcomed, although at times the volume of information 
offered was overwhelming and transcribing the interviews within the research 
period frequently appeared to be a task worthy of Sisyphus.
4.8. The Sample
Since there arc no strict rules to follow in clearly defining the target population, it 
was necessary to rely on logic, judgement and contacts. Due to the sensitive nature 
of the research, it would have been inappropriate to seek the respondent sample 
amongst the local community, as this could have implied seeing or hearing of 
people known to me professionally, or socially, who might prefer to conceal their 
mental disorder. It was also important to avoid speaking only to those respondents, 
practitioners or users, “selected” by the gatekeepers and therefore potentially
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presenting an excessively “rosy” picture of mental health practice. Ideally, the 
sample had to be as “uncontaminated” and, in view of its relatively small size, as 
varied in terms of location and condition as possible, if it was to be in any way 
representative of the larger community. Consequently, the participants were 
identified by means of:
• Contacting user groups, either personally, or through an introductory letter 
from a friend who works with them
• Personal contacts through mutual friends and acquaintances, all either care 
workers, or users, or both.
• An advertisement in the professional press asking for collaboration. (This 
provoked no response whatsoever).
• Through web sites dedicated to research into mental disorder and development 
in treatment, or user groups.
• Participation at a congress on the Mental Health Act and in a Survivors’ Fair, 
at which both users and practitioners were approached directly and either 
directly invited to take part, or informed of the need for respondents.
• The media. (A healthcare worker and a user who had featured in articles in the 
popular press were, in two cases, contacted and agreed to be interviewed
• Letters and phone calls to National Health Trust Mental Health Services 
Given the limitations described, a sample of thirty respondents (see Tables 4. 1 
and 4.2.), seven female and eight mule mental health practitioners and fifteen 
users, seven female and eight male, of as many different social groups and 
locations as possible was considered realistic. Interestingly, although this had not 
been specifically planned, approximately half the user sample was university 
graduates, whilst the remaining eight had received a minimum of formal 
education. This did not limit the latter’s loquacity nor, apparently, their 
understanding of the matters under consideration. In order to avoid problems 
concerning the age of informed consent, the respondents were all over eighteen 
years old. There was no upper age limit.
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The mental health practitioners had a minimum of five years clinical experience 
(including training), and the users had first-hand experience of the clinical 
treatment of mental disorder on at least two separate occasions, over a five-year 
period. This ensured that both groups had sound first-hand knowledge of ethical 
dilemmas and practice in psychiatric settings.
Table 4.1. Grouns included in the study
Interviews Questionnaires
15 Users 30 Users
7 female/8 male Anonymous
15 Care Workers 30 Care Workers
7 female/8 male Anonymous
USA Accounts Media accounts
9 users 32 users/users’ families
4 female/5 male 16 female/16 male
47 practitioners
33 male/14 female
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T a b l e  4 .2 .  P r a c t i t i o n e r  R e s p o n d e n ts
P rofessional
D iscipline
T o ta l M ale Fem ale
Nursing 4 2 2
Psychiatry 3 2 i
Social W ork 2 i i
C om m unity 
Psychiatric Nurse
i i
Psychologist i i
Psychoanalyst i i
Patient A dvocate i i
Survivors' Centre 
M anager
i i
Mental H ealth 
Foundation Executive
i i
4.9. The Interviews, Setting and Procedures
The interviews were carried out by me. usually alone with the respondent, or, in 
the ease of users, sometimes in the presence of an advocate, friend or family 
member. Some reserves had been expressed by colleagues as to the possible 
"danger” inherent in being alone with someone suffering from a mental disorder, 
but demonstrating trust and confidence would, particularly in the case of the user 
respondents, subsequently be reflected in the 'openness' of the interview. 
Interviews look place at different venues: a survivors' centre, at coffee bars, over 
lunch at my own Hat, or at the respondent’s workplace. This depended entirely 
upon the latter's expressed preference. The only criterion was that it should be 
conducive to creating a space in which to talk freely and where neither respondent, 
nor researcher, would feel inhibited or over-impressed by the ambience.
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Interviews at the respondent’s own home were considered inappropriate, both in 
the interests of discretion and of possible legal and insurance complications should 
an untoward incident occur.
Every effort was made to create an atmosphere as informal as possible. In the case 
of most of the users, this involved meeting for lunch, or coffee, for an informal 
chat before subsequently recording the interview. This was intended to create a 
sufficiently relaxed atmosphere in which to discuss potentially sensitive and 
disturbing issues. Practitioners were usually, though not always, interviewed in 
their professional setting. This meant that interviews tended, at least initially, to be 
rather more ‘formal’, although establishing rapport rarely proved difficult. In this 
type of research the interviewer becomes a research "tool" insofar as the quality of 
the data obtained is inevitably related to the degree of rapport established. Having 
said this, over-involvement was also avoided given the difficulties inherent in 
becoming, to employ Nodding’s term, “engrossed” with the respondent and 
consequently losing the distance necessary to objectively analyse and judge the 
data gathered.
The purpose of the study was explained at length before commencing each 
interview. The fact that participation was entirely voluntary and that the 
respondent could withdraw without giving reasons for this, and have his/her own 
material destroyed at any stage during, or after, the interview were also pointed 
out. A consent form was signed prior to this and again once the transcript had been 
read and approved by the respondent. The interviews were recorded on 
audiocasscttc and the transcript of the interview and the recording given to the 
respondent, or destroyed at the end of the research period. Should any respondent
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have objected to the conversation being recorded, this would instead have been 
hand-written. As this could have limited the flow and spontaneity of the 
conversation, this option was never specifically previously mentioned prior to the 
interviews, the duration of which was approximately forty minutes to an hour. (In 
retrospect, it would have been interesting, and possibly useful for future fieldwork, 
to offer this option and, had the offer been taken up, compare the content in terms 
of the “frankness” of the observations and opinions made).
Interviews tended to commence by asking the respondents to clarify what they 
considered "good" practice in mental health settings, although occasionally some 
other topic from the protocol arose. Further use of this depended entirely upon the 
loquacity of the respondent and the relevance of the content of the discussion to 
the study. Any theme which was repeated, occurring in several interviews, such 
as, for example, discrimination, was ‘investigated’ in subsequent interviews by 
means of gentle ‘probing’. There was minimal direction of the respondent, even if 
this was limited to the researcher’s nods and affirmative mutterings. However, it 
was important to ensure that respondents felt free to define their own experiences 
of the topics discussed, so revealing an excess of interest in particular aspects of 
the conversation was carefully avoided, a reasonably detached, but friendly 
composure being maintained. There was frequently spontaneous shared laughter 
during the interviews. The nature of this in itself would have been interesting to 
research, had the word limitations of this type of study not made this impractical.
Particularly in the context of the Survivors’ Centre, the respondents seemed 
genuinely gratified by the interest shown in their concerns and conversations were 
usually fluid and relaxed. Only in two cases were there moments of tension. In the
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first of these, a female respondent became very angry upon considering that she 
was not receiving full attention, when asked to clarify a point. She responded by 
shouting: ‘I’ve already told you that! Why aren’t you listening? You’re supposed 
to be interviewing me! You listen!’ I apologised for not (in her opinion) so doing 
and the interview continued.
The second was a male user who took exception to the use of the word ‘disorder’, 
claiming that it was ‘value-laden’ and should, therefore, be replaced by the term 
‘condition’. Had this not been one of the final interviews, this term would have 
been adopted immediately for he made a very good point.
Upon conclusion of the recorded interview, conversation often continued in terms 
of asking the respondent if he or she was happy with this, with the way in which it 
had been conducted, and so on. Reassurance as to his/her right to correct the 
transcript and eventually dispose of the audiotape was also given at this time.
4.10. Secondary Sources
As Wright Mills (1959) says, whatever the hypothesis being studied, it is always 
useful to compare material insofar as the search for this can serve to open new 
perspectives, as well as confirm the information already obtained. One element of 
the so-called "sociological imagination” is the capacity to shift from one 
perspective to another. In this way, an enriched view of the group under study is 
constructed. To this end, other methods of investigation were also used to support 
and enrich the comparing, contrasting and analysis of the fieldwork interviews
which are the nucleus of this work. These are now described.
The finding from the interviews that there did not appear to be a significant 
difference in attitudes to care between male and female practitioners is contrary to 
much social stereotyping, described in Chapter Three, which considers men ill- 
equipped for caring roles. In view of the willingness of most user groups and 
mental healthcare workers to co-operate, it was therefore decided that in order to 
confirm this finding a questionnaire, based on the major topics to have emerged, 
should be carried out. Questionnaires reduce bias insofar as the researcher’s own 
opinions do not influence the respondent’s answers and there are no verbal or 
visual clues to influence the respondent. A disadvantage is the inability to probe 
responses, but this was partially overcome by the fact that many respondents later 
wrote spontaneous comments on the questionnaires and in some cases these 
provided insights which might otherwise have been lost.
Separate questionnaires for users and mental health care workers (see Appendices 
4 and 5) were drawn up and distributed, until thirty of each had been completed 
and returned. The questionnaires were anonymous as those with no identifying 
information arc more likely to produce honest responses and respondents were 
asked to complete them at their leisure, returning them to the researcher in the 
stamped self-addressed envelope provided. Some users completed the form 
immediately and relumed it within minutes of having received it. Mental health 
care workers, on the other hand, were slow to respond to interview requests and 
questionnaires. Once they did, their responses were frequently far more detailed 
than the form itself demanded and often remarkably frank, particularly in the case 
of the questionnaires. This was presumably the result of the fact that the latter 
were anonymous. The findings of the questionnaires, in terms of confirming those 
of the interviews, arc discussed in Chapters Five and Six.
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As was said previously, a search on the World Wide Web revealed nine first-hand 
accounts of the experiences of North American users of both sexes who have 
suffered from schizophrenia over several years. Their accounts were compared 
and contrasted with those of the English respondents and these comparisons are 
also discussed and illustrated in Chapters Five and Six.
Two of the interviews had been the direct result of monitoring the press, 
throughout the research process, for recent developments in mental health practice 
and legislation. This, together with the questionnaires and the North American 
accounts, became another useful tool in confirming the findings of the interviews. 
An analysis of over fifty press articles, containing seventy-nine personal accounts 
(see Bibliography) of mental health practice and/or experiences of this was made 
by means of a cross-referenced wall chart (see below).
Table 4.3. Illustrative Example of a Section of the Wall Chart Employed in 
Analysing the Qualitative Data Obtained from the Fieldwork
Respondent's Initials: UOA UGI) UOD
Topic identified
Dishonesty in 
communication ■ 
practitioner-user
Psychiatrists feign 
friendship and concern
1 wouldn't trust 
h e r, it would have 
been part of her 
jo b  to tell the 
o thers
No-one's honest 
with you
Dishonesty in 
communication -  
user/practitioner
You just tell them what 
they want to hear
1 withheld 
inform ation
Abuse of power — 
practitioner on user
Patients who misbehave 
usually end up being 
punished
O nce you’re 
sectioned no-one 
listens to you
The doctor said 
he’d call the 
security guard 
if 1 d idn 't 
behave myself
Abuse of power -  user 
on pructitioner
Some wards are controlled 
by bullying putients
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4 .1 1 . C o d i n g  a n d  M e a s u r i n g
These processes return to the issues of validity, reliability and replicability 
described earlier. Data collection and analysis necessarily overlap and as they 
were replayed and semi-transcribed, a superficial preliminary analysis, qualitative 
and philosophical, was made of the interviews. This helped to identify those 
themes or patterns which recurred, initially in order to facilitate closer 
examination of these in future interviews and later, in collating data for analysis. 
Important in this process was detecting and drawing out what Shipman (1997) 
calls ‘the private meanings’ of those interviewed, something he considers the ‘skill 
of the interpretive researcher’ (p44). This was not always easy, but the greater the 
variety of meaning observed, the more informative the research. The attempt to 
draw out private meanings revealed not only how mental health ethics are 
perceived and lived from a wide variety of viewpoints, but also ultimately 
indicated that in thinking of ethical practice in mental health the values inherent in 
attitudes to, and consequent management of mental disorder, must be considered 
from the perspectives of user and care worker. Field notes provided an 
(admittedly erratic) ‘historical record’ and a source of insight for writing up and 
further fieldwork.
Extract from the fieldwork diary, following a visit to the Survivors’ Centre,
‘J. lay on the sofa all day again. K. suggested that for Xmas they set the 
tables properly for lunch, as it's the only celebration most of them will 
have. J. said that it was too much trouble, they’ll eat it off their laps as they 
always do. (Power???? Laziness???? Or is she just mean?). Whatever, it 
upset K., not the most mild-mannered of people at best. She’d been 
looking forward to something special. She said she would make a better 
manager than J., in spite of being sectioned (unlike J., who is paid to “look 
after” them all). Did the fact that 1 was there make any difference? J. seems 
virtually oblivious to my presence, but K. might have wanted to impress 
me.’ (10,h December, 2001).
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Data, regardless of the form it takes, eventually has to be rendered meaningful. 
Grounded theory, which starts when the researcher embarks upon his/her task in 
full awareness of the situations most likely to be relevant to this, is, according to 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) the most influential strategy for this analysis. In the 
process of oscillation described earlier, the researcher defines and relates these 
situations by further observation and comparison, and as the work progresses, 
theory increasingly guides observation. Later, the researcher produces hypotheses 
which link the different categories. These hypotheses are then reduced, related and 
ranked ‘into a simplified model of the complex reality of decision-making’ 
(Shipman, p45).
The advantage of a grounding in specific data is that it cannot later be refuted by 
more data, or a sounder theory, because it is valid in relation to the cases upon 
which it is based. The disadvantage is that it is often very difficult to decide which 
data is theoretically important. Because of this, Hammcsley (1984) recommends 
‘dredging data’ in order to collect the maximum number of viewpoints possible. 
This recommendation was taken up not only in the continuous reviewing, 
comparing and contrasting of the interviews as they were transcribed, but also 
previously in the literature, media and ‘‘Web’’ searches and in the transcription and 
comparison of and with the interviews found on user sites there. The 
questionnaires were employed after the interviews, to confirm the findings of 
these. The analysis of media articles and the "Web” accounts served the same end.
This involved a previous analysis, from the perspectives of dcontological, 
consequentialist, neo-Aristotelian and care ethics, of the key concepts such as 
“care”, “goodness/the good”, “rights”, “obligations”, "responsibility”.
1 5 5
flourishing”, “duty”, “autonomy” and so on, employed in moral philosophy and 
ethics. With this information in hand, the answers given by respondents could be 
examined in order to assess whether a clearly “Kantian”, “neo-Aristotelian”, 
“virtue”, “Utilitarian” or “Care Ethic” approach prevailed, or whether these were 
mixed and/or possibly indistinguishable. The answers given by males and females 
were also analysed to see if the claimed gender difference in attitudes to caring in 
fact exists. Ethical dilemmas in mental health practice were identified and listed 
(See Table 6.1). In assessing attitudes as “Kantian”, “utilitarian”, “caring”, and so 
on, the following criteria were borne in mind.
The “Kantian type” ethical thinker adopts a deontological stance by suggesting 
that we rest our moral and ethical judgements on reasons that can be generalisable 
for all others who are similarly situated, be these users or practitioners. Moral 
criticism can, s/he would claim, only be based on this generalisable moral 
obligation. Any act not based on this, no matter how ostensibly praiseworthy, 
would, on this view, lack moral worth. What matters, to this type of ethicist is the 
act, not the agent. In strict Kantian terms, lying, for example, cannot be 
universalised as a norm of conduct without contradiction. Any practitioner or user 
who favoured this ethic would never lie, regardless of the consequences of this 
refusal to do so, and anyone else’s lying would be judged unequivocally “wrong”, 
regardless of his/her reasons for doing so.
A Consequcntialist (see Chapter 2.2.2.), on the other hand, would say that actions 
are right, or wrong, only in the balance of their good and bad consequences, a 
belief, which many would consider perfectly reasonable and fair. The right act, in
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any circumstance whatsoever, is always that which produces the best overall result 
-  the greatest happiness of the greatest number -  as determined from an 
impersonal perspective that gives equal weight to the interests of each affected 
party. It accepts only one basic principle of ethics, that of utility and it could be 
said, therefore, that being a consequentialist is apparently very simple. From a 
utilitarian point of view, shutting up a person diagnosed as suffering a 
psychopathic personality disorder, for example, in order to avoid the possibility of 
his/her perpetrating a murder would be perfectly justifiable in terms of the greatest 
potential happiness (and safety) of the greatest number.
As the previous chapters indicated, many feminist philosophers posit an ethic of 
care, in which only caring, protecting, and even loving one another is ultimately 
“ethical” (and, they claim "natural” to women). Certainly, the notion of caring, as 
such, is echoed in users' and many practitioners' views of what constitutes good 
practice and provokes flourishing. The "care ethicist”, whilst sharing the 
Aristotelian view on compassion, would insist on working relationships involving 
caring for, as well as about the user. This involves responsibility, trust, fidelity and 
empathic sensitivity to the extent of what Noddings (1984) terms 'engrossment', 
so stress on these factors would indicate a preference for an ethic of care in 
practice, as would manifestations of a "matemalistic" approach to caring.
The neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist would suggest that the agent and the 
excellence of his or her character are more important than the act, and that right 
motives and good practical intelligence (phronesis) reveal far more about the 
moral worth of a person than do right actions. The health care practitioner who
1 5 7
embraced this type of ethic would believe that in a dilemma two virtuous agents 
could reach different solutions and yet both be “right”, the differences lying in the 
prioritisation of values. Virtue ethicists consider the role model essential to ethical 
formation, and the reinsertion of the user back into the community as the ultimate 
end of good caring. As Beauchamp and Childress point out: ‘...rather than using 
rules and government regulations, to protect subjects ... some claim that the most 
reliable protection is the presence of an informed, conscientious, compassionate, 
responsible researcher ... virtues should be inculcated over time through 
educational interactions, role models, and the like’ (1994, p65).
An ethic, the end of which is nourishing, combining neo-Aristotelian virtue and 
care ethics, would require that ethics be agent-based, that this agent should be a 
virtuous person and that he or she should be an informed, highly responsible, 
caring (but not to the point of engrossment) practitioner, who cares for and about 
the user. The only professional aim of such an agent is to provoke both the user’s 
and his/her own ‘flourishing’ in the terms described in Chapters One and Two. 
Doing whatever is necessary to attain this flourishing is, of course, also the aim of 
the virtuous user.
Expressions of all these ethics are sought in the philosophical analysis (Chapter 
Six), which follows the sociological qualitative and quantitative analyses (Chapter 
Five). In Chapter Seven, what the findings reveal as actually occurring in, and 
necessary to, ethics in practice is interpreted and discussed in the light of what, 
according to professional regulatory bodies, should be occurring and through the 
grid of existing knowledge, or what Bourdicu refers to as ‘cultural capital’
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(Fowler, 1997). However, ‘the success of a research project is ultimately judged 
upon its product’ (Strauss and Corbin, p252). Conclusions, summing up the 
research, its findings and the recommendations which can be based on these are to
be found in Chapter Eight.
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Chapter Five: Sociological Analysis of the Fieldwork Findings
5.1. Introduction
To paraphrase Wright Mills (1959), so we discovered and described. This chapter 
now presents the detailed results of the fieldwork research, users’ and 
practitioners’ views and a qualitative and quantitative analysis of these. It focuses 
initially upon users’ opinions, desires and attitudes in relation to the research 
question, and subsequently on those of practitioners, in an attempt to answer the 
questions:
• What is the attitude of both users and mental healthcare practitioners with 
reference to care, professional ethics and codes of good practice and were the 
latter reflected in the clinical setting?
• Do males' and females’ acts and functions (ergons' ) differ in mental health 
care and in ethical practice, the former applying a rational approach, as 
compared to women’s more emotional response? Is there a characteristic 
gendered way of engaging with ethical dilemmas in practice? Or does the 
fieldwork reveal similar attitudes and reactions, feelings and emotions, 
independent of gender?
• Is caring somehow instinctive to women in an essentialist form and can men 
be “instinctive” carers? Is caring a form of emotional labour and do 
practitioners themselves perceive it as such?
• What nature of ethical dilemmas arise in mental health practice?
• What do practitioners and users understand by “flourishing” (eudemonia) in 
mental health settings? How do they discern non-flourishing?
The answers inform later discussion on the ethic most suited to mental health 
practice and the importance of establishing a system of and education in values 
prior to the formulation of any ethic for this.
5.2. The Sociological Findings
Immediately they had taken place, and before making complete transcripts, 
interviews were replayed several times, the incidence of key concepts noted and a 
"spider" graph drawn of the main issues raised. (See Fig.5.1). Emerging patterns
Er$on » deed, function, product or result. See Chapter 3.
and trends in attitudes and ethical issues were thus identified, to be coded,
recorded and explored in greater depth at subsequent interviews. This process 
facilitated extracting the ‘essentials’ with increasing certainty and relating these 
by making links such as those shown above. The consistency of the interview 
findings was remarkable, although they differed in some respects from the 
accounts given by users from the USA.
FIG 5.1. Reducing Topics to Essentials (an example)
5.3. Users’ and User Groups’ Opinions and those of Users from the 
Secondary Sources -  a preliminary overview
Two thirds (10) of the users interviewed considered the attitudes and behaviour of 
mental health practitioners acceptable, although community care is better 
considered than hospital care, in spite of Frank Dobson’s comment to the effect 
that ‘Care in the community has failed...it has left many vulnerable patients trying 
to cope on their own (cited in Rogers and Pilgrim, 2001, p!76).
There was no significant difference in users’ opinions of the attitudes of members 
of the different healthcare disciplines, a finding which initially seemed surprising. 
Further examination of the results revealed that whilst one third (5) of user 
interview respondents did consider one particular group to have a more positive 
attitude than the others, there was no common agreement as to which group held 
the positive or negative attitudes described. When the findings of the user 
questionnaire, which gave an identical result (ten out of thirty questionnaire 
respondents considered one group of practitioners to have a more positive attitude 
to users than the others) were added to those of the interviews, these balanced one 
another out. A larger interview sample may have revealed significant differences, 
but on the whole, the user interview respondents (and this also applied to the 
practitioners interviewed) did not reveal any particular interest in this area. 
However, the findings did reflect a view widely held by user respondents to the 
effect that attitudes depend more upon the individual character of the practitioner 
than upon his/her professional discipline per se.
Equally interesting is the fact that, against the views of Noddings (1984), Gilligan 
(1982) and a large body of feminist moral philosophers and psychologists, (see 
Chap. 1.3.1.) users generally concur that there is no significant gender difference 
in approaches to ethics and good practice, both considered by the latter to depend 
more on the individual practitioner’s1 character and users' personal preferences 
than upon gender. Thirty-three users (73%) across questionnaires and interview 
respondents indicate that although malpractice is not unknown in mental health 
clinical settings, the majority of practitioners are caring and do their best in 
circumstances universally recognised as difficult. In spite of this, perhaps because,
as was said in Chapter One, mental disorders are widely considered moral 
disorders, in-hospital care is often perceived by users, inspectors and (and the 
media) as punitive rather than therapeutic:
‘The acute ward is at best non-therapeutic, at worst, damaging, degrading 
and dangerous. Disastrously understaffed, over-stretched and lacking basic 
amenities, many provide little more than medication and containment.
(A. Faulkner, Guardian Society, 2.10.01. pl04)
To summarise, before progressing to more detailed analysis, the major ethical
issues and areas of contention from the points of view of users, survivors and
representatives of users’ associations are:
• Major dissatisfaction with hospital in-patient care and wide dissatisfaction 
with care in the community, particularly where this is based on hospital 
out-patient clinics and poorly resourced survivors’ centres.
• In both settings, dissatisfaction is predominantly attributed to lack of 
resources rather than of concern on the part of practitioners2 3 who are 
considered generally caring by 73% of user respondents. (Practitioners 
cared for and about me -  33%. Practitioners cared for me -  33%. 
Practitioners cared about me -  7%. Practitioners cared neither for nor 
about me -  27%).
• Adverse discrimination, stigmatisation and ‘labelling’ as a result of the 
diagnosis of mental disorder, resulting in a severely deteriorated quality of 
life. 79% of user respondents claim to have experienced issues such as 
disregard for their own culture and ideology.
• Disempowerment and loss of autonomy4, including sectioning (compulsory 
admission to hospital); compulsory psycho-pharmacological treatment and 
the side-effects of this and informed consent and E.C.T. (Electro­
convulsive therapy).
• Lack of communication, formal or informal, with qualified practitioners, 
as opposed to domestic staff and students (The 45 users completing 
questionnaires and interviewed answered as follows: Students, domestic 
assistants and others spent most time talking to me -  50%. Nurses spent 
most time talking to me -  30%. Social workers spent most time talking to 
me -  20%.). This lack of communication is claimed to cause mistrust and
2 Both these findings support the view that a virtue ethic, stressing character, rather than act, is that 
most appropriate to mental health practice
3 This finding is echoed in Melba Wilson’s study "Ethnicity and Mental Health" in which over 
half the users from ethnic minority groups who responded to her questionnaire, regarded their 
relationship with the key practitioner as favourable and 'those who did not ... suggested their 
workload was too heavy.
4 According to Griffiths, M. (2002) in the context of mental health this term means 'much the same 
as independence. Both terms routinely apply to the self-rule of individuals ... "Autonomy" has the 
advantage that it is not so obviously related to dependence' (p49)
resentment. This finding reflects the anxiety expressed by a student nurse 
who says: ‘I do love it when you have time for the patients. I get frustrated 
when there isn’t time to ... chat ... but the other trained staff always make 
me feel as if I should be doing other things (Smith, 1992, p89).
Many, though not all of these concerns were echoed in the nine user accounts
from the USA described in Chapter Four. Unlike all British user and practitioners,
none of these considered hospital care, in spite of the incidents of malpractice
which they describe, worse than care in the community care. There have during
the last Five years been many harrowing accounts of ill-treatment at hospitals in
the United States of America3, so the fact that the degree of general satisfaction
with hospital care expressed by the (admittedly small) USA sample is so much
higher might be considered puzzling. It could, therefore be the case that these nine
user accounts are not altogether representative, but written in response to accounts
of ill-treatment.
Like the fieldwork respondents, more than half of whom consider that they are not 
allowed sufficient participation, North American users describe being excluded 
from care plan decision-making, as arc their families5 6, as a focus of distress and 
frustration. In British mental health practitioners are increasingly aware of this 
problem and the emphasis in some successful community care centres is on both 
listening to users and, in a process of caring both for and about, including them as
5 The American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois published, in April 1997, an expert report 
prepared by psychiatrists and psychologists from Yale University on the treatment of the mentally 
disordered in state institutions in Illinois, accusing them of offences from intimidating and 
sexually abusing users to isolating patients fur days on end without access to fluids or toilets; The 
Chaote Mental Health Centre, the Chicago Read Mental Health Center, the Elgin Mental Health 
Center and the Zeller Mental Health Centre have all also recently been the subject of similar 
reports (see Website list).
‘ ’...the carers of people with mental health problems were especially critical of how little they 
were consulted about care plans for service users...’ (NSF VI -  Mental Health. p70).
essential players in policy-making and, in some cases, the therapeutic team7. The 
U.S.A. accounts all confirm the evidence relating to the lack of time spent by 
qualified practitioners, as opposed to domestic staff and students, in talking to 
users.
British media accounts support the fieldwork respondents’ views that (depending 
upon the catchment area in which you reside) out-patient care is better than the 
‘Cinderella’ services offered by hospitals. This source also reports extensively on 
new projects in the community which empower the user and reduce the need for 
medication and incidence of suicide and self-harm, Communication has 
apparently been better than either practitioners or users recognise, for many of the 
features of care which the latter describe as desirable (the so-called “talk” 
therapies, aroma therapy and even “Reiki”) have been successfully incorporated 
into new projects8.
All groups of users share the view that nurses and social workers should be better 
informed regarding the more “scientific” aspects of their task, an interesting 
finding in an age in which technology is popularly supposed to be “taking over”.
Although its importance is always stressed in professional codes of good practice, 
North American users, in common with many interview respondents, make no 
mention of breaches of confidentiality appearing, as some of the quotes given *
7 Bradford Home Treatment Service, which employs an ex-user to help the team develop a genuine 
user-sensitive culture.
* There ure also now several projects underway throughout the UK which promote 
communication. An example of this is "Northumberland User Voice" whose stated aim is to 
support “menial health service users and their families ... to express their views and to influence 
the mental health services that they receive"
later indicate, to assume that these are almost inherent to mental health practice. 
The result, as will be seen, can be a failure to disclose more sensitive (and 
potentially highly relevant) information. Like the latter, this group also describes 
instances of discrimination and labelling resulting from their condition.
A striking difference to emerge is in attitude to medication. That of the USA users 
is relatively positive, particularly insofar as new treatments are concerned, whilst 
that of the fieldwork respondents is generally negative. They are particularly 
aware -  together with some practitioners -  of the risk of adverse side-effects 
reducing quality of life. It is possible to speculate that this difference in attitudes 
is directly related to the fact that the USA users commonly describe their 
condition (schizophrenia) as a physical disorder and uphold the so-called “medical 
model” of mental illness, unlike their British counterparts, generally more 
convinced by social and psychological models, who often talk of “condition” 
rather than illness or disorder.
Little mention was made of E.C.T. in spite of very active anti-ECT movements in 
the U.S.A. Some interview respondents discuss this, but none was currently 
undergoing E.C.T. and those who had done so in the past hoped not to in the 
future. These all felt that they had not been sufficiently informed as to its side- 
effects before consenting to treatment.
‘No-one in their right mind would sign up for that. The doctors
want to try it themselves if they think it's so good for us’ (UOBre)
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5.4 Mental Health Practitioners’ Opinions and those of
Practitioners/Policy Makers from the Secondary Sources -  a 
preliminary overview.
Practitioners’ concerns concurred, in many respects, with those of users. The 
issues consistently raised by this group included:
• Professional dissatisfaction and demoralisation.
Sixty percent of the practitioners interviewed and responding to questionnaires 
were dissatisfied with their working conditions. This is particularly aggravated in 
hospital staff, due to short-staffing, excessive bureaucracy, under-funding, lack of 
resources and time to dedicate to their perceived professional task of caring for 
and communicating with users. When bureaucratic work is excessively
demanding, the physical and emotional labour of caring relegated to untrained 
staff. Practitioners working in the community report less frustrations and consider 
attitudes to be changing, particularly in terms of increased user involvement. They 
describe this as both therapeutic and empowering for the user, and helpful in 
practical terms in that it can reduce the practitioners’ own workloads.
• Fear of user and users’ families aggression.
This is particularly evident in hospital settings, but also in community contexts. 
The consequence appears to be the excessive (and potentially litigious) 
employment of physical and psychopharmacological restraints and isolation.
• Discriminatory attitudes towards and stigmatisation of the mentally 
disordered and the mental health services generally, which, in the opinion 
of many practitioners, extends to those working in this area.
This is reflected in the media where mental hospital care generally is frequently 
described as the “Cinderella" of the health services and those who work in this 
depicted as "inferior" to practitioners in other branches of healthcare, hospitals
sharing ‘the stigma which they attach indelibly to their patients’ (Guardian 
Society, p2. 28.03.01). Many practitioners fear that the admission of potential 
offenders under the proposed new Mental Health Act will serve to reinforce this 
image.
• Disempowerment of the user as a result of present systems of care.
These encourage dependence, rather than the autonomy and increased 
independence essential to flourishing.
• Inappropriate admissions
These consist of people who are socially dysfunctional, substance abusers, or 
those suffering organic disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease. This results in a 
lack of places for acute admissions and “real” cases.
• Lack of professional educational and training resources and research 
possibilities.
This is in spite of the fact that proof of continuing education and training are 
necessary to re-registration.
The questionnaires and media articles confirm the practitioners’ opinions. When 
describing poor hospital conditions, including unprofessional staff attitudes, they 
also refer to a lack of user and family involvement in care planning in both in­
patient and community settings. They highlight the problems of adverse 
discrimination, poor communication and stigmatisation, labelling and 
disempowerment as perpetuated by stereotypical depictions of madness. Both 
mention human rights issues relevant to ‘sectioning’ and the ethics of employing 
this to prevent a hypothetical crime. They discuss the ethics of ‘covert’ 
medication and the side-effects of both “old” pharmaceutical treatments and the
newer SSRIs9 in negative terms, as sometimes reducing quality of life long after 
treatment has been discontinued.
5.5. A Comparison of Practitioners’ and Users’ Views
Although, due perhaps to the diverse sample of health care professionals 
interviewed, the fieldwork findings do not fully support this view, Spurgeon 
(2001) claims that the gap between practitioners’10 and patients’ perceptions of 
the quality of care is widening. However, his view that users are increasingly 
knowledgeable about treatment options is evident from this study. It became clear 
during the interviews that things have changed very greatly since Parsons (1951) 
spoke of the patient’s ‘technical incompetence in medical matters’. Thanks to 
increased press coverage and access to the “Internet” users today are often very 
well informed of the “scientific”, “psychological” and “alternative” therapies 
available for the treatment of psychiatric disorder. Several users mentioned the 
possibility of obtaining treatments currently either difficult to obtain 
(psychotherapy and psychoanalysis) or not an option (aromatherapy, reflexology, 
hypnosis) in most National Health Trusts. Three respondents suggested the 
introduction of a system of vouchers which would enhance user autonomy and 
satisfaction by allowing them to undergo the treatment of their choice, in centres 
endorsed by the appropriate healthcare authority. One user believed that the 
benefit of alternative treatments lay not so much in the treatment itself, as in 
enjoying the therapist's undivided and apparently caring attention for a fixed 
period of time, something he considers an unattainable “luxury” in mental health
,  Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors. Drugs known to cause adaptive changes in several CNS 
receptor systems provoking, amongst other things, the inhibition of serotonin (%HT) uptake 
(Price, L.H. 1990).
10 In this particular article, doctors.
practice today. Indeed, according to Langewitz et. al, (2002) ‘The average patient 
visiting a doctor in the United States today gets 22 seconds for his initial 
statement, then the doctor takes the lead’ (p682-683).
Many practitioners (60%) too, particularly those in hospital practice, consider 
quality of care to be deteriorating. They report increasing workloads and 
bureaucratic responsibilities and this is recognised as a major problem by users 
themselves. The majority of practitioners (66%) also describe short-staffing, 
excessive bureaucracy and overwork as resulting in a lack of time to perform 
those professional tasks as they would wish. Sixty-nine percent of practitioners 
stress that this is particularly the case insofar as hospital care is concerned. This 
finding is reflected in the fact that in one Mental Health Trust alone in 1997, the 
majority of the 325 ‘official’ complaints from users against practitioners 
concerned in-patient facilities. There is no lack of complaints against mental 
health care overall, but rather than against individual practitioners these are 
directed towards either the care team as a whole, or to the poor conditions 
prevalent in some psychiatric hospitals today. In the case of out-patient or 
community care, attitudes vary depending upon the NHS Trust concerned. A user 
from Gloucester (UGJ) had ‘no complaints whatsoever about hospital care’ 
(although she later went on to complain about the male consultants who had 
treated her as if she were ‘stupid’). No-one from the neighbouring Oxford, on the 
other hand, considered hospital care entirely satisfactory.
Users' complaints are intimately related to those issues which mental health 
practitioners raise as contentious. Where users indicate that mental health care 
practitioners do not dedicate time to speaking to them, the latter unanimously
complain of a lack of time to do so. Where users suggest that nurses should spend 
less time in the nursing station and more interacting with bored, inactive patients, 
nurses bemoan excessive time spent on bureaucratic functions unrelated to their 
professional skills and of problems caused by a lack of activities for users. Both 
discuss discrimination, labelling and stigmatisation and the demoralising effects 
of these on practice. (One hundred percent of hospital practitioners consider those 
who have been diagnosed as mentally disordered to suffer adverse discrimination 
and stigmatisation as a result of this).
Understaffing, administrative overload, demoralisation and under-funding are 
considered almost unanimously by users and carers, regardless of their discipline 
or sex, to impede efficient, humane mental health care today. These are not all, 
strictly speaking, ethical issues but since they inevitably affect good practice and 
morale, may coherently be regarded as such. The ethical dilemmas which such 
problems indirectly provoke in mental health practice are now discussed in detail.
5.5.1. Communication and information-sharing with the user and his/her 
family
The importance of good communication to ethical practice lies in the fact that 
users feel disempowered and humiliated when their narratives and opinions are 
not apparently worth hearing, or relevant to the resolution of their disorders. A 
common complaint against practitioners is that they fail to dedicate sufficient 
time to listening (as opposed to talking) to users and their families. Psychiatrists, 
in particular, are described as regularly arriving late, or not at all, for pre­
programmed visits. This offence is compounded by the fact that they neither 
explain the reasons, nor apologise for wasting the user’s time although the latter
may have foregone other activities to await the promised interview, frequently
considered the highlight of the user’s week. Particularly when no real therapeutic
programme is available due to lack of staff and resources.
‘I would fire my first hospital psychiatrist. He was usually late, his 
appointments were short ... He met with me once a week -  if he showed 
up -  for only ten or fifteen minutes' (USA 21)
‘My wife came to see me every day and never got to see the psychiatrist. 
He was never available. I don’t think she saw him once’ (UOBri).
‘I just spent my time smoking alone or talking to the other patients. We 
were supposed to do things but they kept getting cancelled because there 
wasn’t enough staff. The doctor’s visits were the only interesting thing, 
but he didn’t always turn up for those. You’d hang around waiting for 
hour and he just wouldn’t show up and nobody ever said why’ (UOBre)
There are exceptions to this:
I was lucky, I had psychiatrists who were prepared to spend time with me.
At least once a week, for an hour. (UCR)
Lack of communication is a problem recognised by the practitioners themselves. 
A recent conversation analysis (Langewitz et al.2002) ‘of thirty-two consultations 
between psychiatrists and patients suffering schizophrenia or schizoaffective 
disorder’ reveals that whilst ‘patients actively attempted to talk about the content 
of their psychotic symptoms in consultations by asking direct questions’, doctors 
responded by asking a question rather than giving an answer and ‘smiled or 
laughed (when informal carers were present) indicating that they were reluctant to 
engage with patients’ concerns about their psychotic symptoms’. This was, 
according to this study, ‘a source of noticeable interact ional tension and 
difficulty’.
Female psychiatrists are considered more empathic and better listeners by 15% of 
users, but a female psychiatrist said:
‘...more than the gender of the psychiatrist, it depends upon his or her 
philosophical or psycho-therapeutic orientation. Women should be better 
listeners, in theory, but I don’t know if this is true or not. Are they really 
more empathetic? Some are but some men are even more so. I suspect it 
depends more, as I said, on their orientation and their reasons for doing 
psychiatry’. (PLC)
When discussing communication, users frequently refer to conversations with
domestic assistants, student nurses, other professionals such as physiotherapists,
and their fellow-users, all of whom were considered to be the prime sources of a
friendly and often helpful ear. Nurses, of both sexes, were praised, although some
interview and questionnaire respondents felt that they spent too long in the
nursing station, interacting too little with users:
‘The nurses should come out of the nursing station more and ... do more 
with the patients...’ (USA15)
‘The nurses never took a pro-active approach to get people to talk to 
them.’ (ULD)
‘The nurses are lazy. They just sit on their arses all day’ (UOK).
Male user respondents tend to regard female nurses as more caring and 
‘friendlier’, but made no complaint against male nurses, frequently praised as 
‘caring’ by female users:
'. . .  the male nurse would talk to you about your feelings, recommend a 
good, helpful book. He cared enough to get me a copy of the book ... 
that’s not the sort of thing you’d expect a psychiatrist to do, they 
certainly don’t’ (UGJ)
This might be explained by the fact that, as a male practitioner says:
‘Men generally find it easier talking to women about their problems' 
(POJ)
Female healthcare practitioners can, against Noddings, apparently sometimes be 
highly unfeeling. This echoes Baier’s opinion that the fact of having suffered
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discrimination as a result of being a women does not necessarily imply that
women are any more caring than men:
they mocked us, they wouldn’t care, there was no warmth. It was just a 
job to them and they would try to maintain their distance. I really hated it.
I really did not feel that I could trust the nurses.’ (USA 14)
Social workers are variously described as efficient and caring, or not, regardless 
of gender: Users were approximately evenly divided in their opinions of their 
work:
‘If it wasn’t for my father sending me a ticket, (when the social workers 
failed to find the price of a fare home) I wouldn’t be here today’ (USA16)
‘They just weren’t reasonable, too interfering’ (UOK)
‘...always on my side’ (UOD)
These comments reflect the importance of the emotional component of nursing to 
users. They greatly resent it when practitioners are “inaccessible” and perceived 
as maintaining a distance between “them” and “us”. The emotional needs of the 
user are best met when carers create “feeling rules” which value the user’s 
individuality, good social relations and emotions as part of the work of caring. 
However, this is not without its risks since, as Smith, P. (1992) points out, raising 
the profile of emotional care may put the nurse at risk of ‘... increasing her (sic) 
anxiety by removing the protection provided by task-orientated care’ (plO).
In this context it may not be the loss of protection, but of power, which creates
anxiety. As Nick Fox (2000) points out:
‘The construction and strengthening of disciplinary markers of knowledge 
shift the balance of power away from clients and patients towards health 
professionals ... and achieve a distinctive ‘care-as-discipline’ p337).
He then goes on to compare this ‘disciplinary vigil of care’ with ‘the gift of care’ 
which draws on the work of the feminist H.Cixous, who contrasts ‘feminine’ gift 
relationships with ‘the masculine realm of the proper: of property, propriety, 
possession, identity and dominance’ (ibid). As Fox suggests, ‘The characteristics 
of gift relationships would seem particularly apposite for relations entailing care 
and might include generosity, trust ... commitment...” (ibid). All the latter, in 
turn, could be considered virtues. Such a ‘gift relationship’ might, therefore, be 
considered an example of an ethic of flourishing in practice, but, as the Fieldwork 
Findings show, the feminine/masculine divide posited by Cixous, does not 
apparently exist to any marked degree in mental health settings.
Although there was no signiFicant gender difference in the interview Findings, in 
the user questionnaires, male social workers emerge as significantly better 
considered than their female colleagues whilst, contra stereotypical concepts of 
the social worker as female, none of the respondents speciFically described female 
social workers as having treated them better than males. In 15% of the 
questionnaires, users and practitioners describe male social workers as more 
empathetic or better listeners than their female counterparts:
T got on well with the blokes. There are things you don’t want to talk 
about with women’ (UOD).
This Finding counterbalances that on psychiatrists which indicates that 15% of 
users and practitioners consider female psychiatrists to treat users better than do 
their male counterparts.
The lack of communication described by the majority of respondents is supported
by the findings of the Maudsley Hospital study, (Pitarka-Circana, 2000). In this,
most complaints refer to the ‘perceived failure of mental health practitioners to
explain treatment or diagnosis adequately’ to either patients or their next-of-kin.
‘I would have liked someone to explain X’s illness to me. I always 
worried about doing the right thing. I asked our G.P. and he said he 
couldn’t discuss it with me. And though he did lend me some 
books on depressive illnesses everything was in medical language, 
so that didn’t help. I needed something understandable’ (FLL).
In total, 50% of the user interview and questionnaire respondents and, more 
surprisingly, 60% of practitioners (“No” = 60%, “Sometimes” = 17%, “Yes” = 
23%) considered that families were not allowed sufficient participation in care 
planning. Both British and U.S.A. users describe the lack of information given on 
treatment and diagnosis" as confusing and disempowering. On the subject of 
information-sharing, informed consent in clinical trials and prior to ECT is also 
contentious:
‘... there is never really informed consent. The full facts about E.C.T. are 
never made clear. There’s inevitably a bias in favour of shock treatment 
and you can only know how horrible it is by undergoing it’. (UOR)
According to Baughman (2000), the legal obligation under informed consent is to 
provide the patient with all the information relevant to decision-making -  not just 
about the treatment in question, but also about their condition. He claims that 
many psychiatric patients are never told that their alleged disease may be 
metaphorical and is theoretical, in spite of the fact that to say or imply that 
someone has a biologic disease when there is no proof (as in all psychiatric 
disease) is conscious deception and abrogates informed consent. That this has 1
11 Some psychiatrists no longer use traditional diagnoses as they consider that there is nothing to 
be gained by labelling as. for example, suffering from schizophrenia
become the standard of practice in psychiatry does not excuse it. The abrogation
of informed consent is, de facto, medical malpractice ("cited in Breeding, 2000).
As Bridson et. al (2003, pi 159) indicate:
‘To make consent properly patient centred, clinicians need to ask 
patients what they want from treatment before they discuss treatment 
strategies’.
These authors go on to say that the British Medical Association’s view that 
clinicians should be more familiar with the guidance on consent may be right, but 
their ‘experience suggests that even full compliance with current guidance may 
not prevent unnecessary procedures in some patients’.
Even at its scientific best, medicine is inevitably a social act in which ‘... the most 
evidence crazed doctors have to translate their perception of “bio statistical truths” 
into accounts that make sense to others’ (Elwyn and Gwyn, 1999). The concepts 
of doctor-centredness and patient-centredness have, these authors claim, had a 
profound effect upon professional practice. They have led to studies on the effect 
of communication styles on user satisfaction and clinical outcome which reveal 
the importance of listening to users’ stories. This seems particularly relevant in 
treating mental disorder but communicating in depth with users is something 
many practitioners lack time to do.
When they do talk, misunderstandings can arise and the user’s account not be 
given due weight by the practitioner. Such instances have occasionally had tragic 
consequences. The murders committed by Michael Stone* 12, the attack on the 
“Beatle” George Harrison13, and the suicide of Colin Williamson14 prove this. In
12 See Noguera (2000) p 158-168
12 Psychiatrists refused to believe both him and his mother that he had mental health problems. See
The Guardian. 24.10.0l,pl4
this age of patient-centred medicine, conventional studies of the practitioner-user
consultation still tend to focus on structure, rather than content, regardless of the
fact that: ‘not understanding the language and rules is all very frightening’ (Elwyn
and Gwyn, 1999), a sentiment expressed in almost identical terms by a user:
‘Not understanding what’s going on, not understanding the language and 
rules, it’s all very frightening’ (ULD)
Not that reacting to a user’s narrative is necessarily easy for even the most
compassionate carer. A doctor records:
‘I hadn’t expected this: three deaths and a request to withdraw from 
antidepressants during a routine repeat prescription. Would that be all 
right? To participate in a shared decision about the end of grief, about a 
symbolic farewell to a son killed five years ago. I attempted to give her 
autonomy over her decision... But it wasn’t enough. How could I tell her 
that I didn’t know. That if I had lost a son I can’t imagine surviving at all, 
never mind coming off tablets” (Op.cit.).
Users would prefer more honesty in this respect:
‘The key element that’s missing is honesty, to put it simply, you’re spun a 
line ...It’s the insidiousness that has got me. I’ve been suckered, if you 
like, into believing that they know best.’ (UOA)
Honesty is an issue more important than might initially appear. A disturbing
finding concerning communication is that 77% of users claim to have withheld
information or lied to practitioners. The reasons for this vary:
I’ve become distrustful. There was only one nurse that I could talk to, but I 
wouldn’t trust her. It would have been part of her job to go and tell the 
others...’ (UGD)
‘I could fake the answers quite easily, which I had done before. I didn’t 
want to stay in hospital any more. I was able to fake it and I got a ticket 
out of hospital’. (USA20)
‘... it’s easy to deceive them, you just tell them what they want to hear’ 
(UOA). 14
14 Repeatedly complained of hearing voices telling him to kill himself, but in spite of a family 
history of schizophrenia psychiatrists ruled this diagnosis out. He committed suicide. See Private 
Eye, 6.11.01
The predominant reasons for deceit were or fear of the consequences of telling the 
truth, in terms of sectioning or prolonged stays in hospital (42%), lack of trust in 
the practitioner’s judgement (25%), to maintain control of the situation (15%), 
reasons of privacy or confidentiality (12%) or to be discharged from hospital 
(6%). The fact that over 70% of practitioners also recognise that users frequently 
deceive them by withholding information, or deliberately lying, is a particular 
cause for concern, given that no-one appears to have seriously addressed the lack 
of trust implicit in such a situation.
One reason for this is that users generally, and many health care practitioners, do 
not consider that confidentiality to be protected to an adequate degree. The phrase 
previously cited: ‘it would have been part of her job to go and tell the others’ 
summarises many users’ and carers attitudes to maintaining confidentiality. Users 
are aware that the ‘need to know policy’ can be interpreted as ‘just about anyone 
who asks’ or can access the computer files, in the mental health setting, as long as 
this ‘anyone’ is a member of the profession. It is paradoxically far more difficult 
for close relatives to obtain information and 63% of practitioners admit to having 
withheld information from both users and their families.
When referring to the protection of confidential information, all the codes of good 
practice of disciplines connected to mental health practice suggest (or command) 
that information on clients must be treated as confidential and used only for the 
purposes for which it was obtained. They then indicate that given the 
impracticality of obtaining consent every time this information needs to be shared, 
practitioners should ensure that the user understands that that it may be made
available to other members of the care team. This, in the opinion of most users, 
provides carte blanche for breaches of confidentiality.
Practitioners also recognise that they cannot always respect confidentiality,
although a strictly deontological (Kantian) code would demand just this. One in
three mental health professionals admits to having breached confidentiality in
practice at some time. In such settings there may be situations in which this is
justified in the public interest (to protect someone from harm) or required by a
court of law. A male psychiatrist says:
‘Yes, I would have no hesitation in breaching confidentiality if a risk is 
present’ (POK)
The mistrust and fear of the practitioner’s power described in the previous 
paragraph are not conducive to a therapeutic relationship. Empowerment of the 
user, 81% of whom see themselves as disempowered, is therefore an issue in need 
of urgent consideration.
Many mental health practitioners (75%) share this view, considering that rather 
than fostering the autonomy necessary to flourishing of the user, treatment 
currently often creates reliance upon an already over-worked system. A female 
nurse says:
‘... I do feel that we create a lot of dependency with patients instead of 
empowering them to take control of their lives’ (PCS).
In mental health care, given its unique power to “section”, there is a potential for 
that which should be positive and empowering to become a possessive and 
controlling discourse. The user may well trust the therapist, ‘reciprocating an 
investment on the part of the therapist to enable the patient to take control of
his/her situation’ (Fox, N. 2000, p335). These may enable the latter to liberate 
him/herself from the constraints of suffering and dependency, but ‘if these 
investments become codified within discourses of professionalism, or as is 
sometimes the case in caring settings, within a repetition of a parent-child 
dependency ... then what was an empowering relationship becomes 
disempowerment, what might have enabled such a growth becomes more to do 
with power and control’ (ibid).
Users also wish to be more deeply involved in care plans, either personally, or in 
consultation with their families. More than 50% claim that neither they nor their 
families are sufficiently consulted, or involved in these, a belief shared by more 
than half the health care practitioners interviewed and responding to 
questionnaires, and confirmed by the media articles.
Some users describe what appears to be a virtual disregard for their opinions and 
desires from both psychiatrists and, to a lesser degree, nurses and social workers:
‘The complaint that we made about the Social Services, it took two and a 
half years ... I was discouraged all the way along the line not to carry on. 
Nobody would listen because I’d been sectioned. Although at the time I 
was complaining of her ... because I am a man who will stand up in court 
and say my piece. Whether the people believe it doesn’t bother me as long 
as I can get somebody to listen...’1 . (UGD)
Even the most caring practitioners often fail in this, for some users believe that a 
certain “inauthenticity” exists in mental health practitioners’ indifference or 
feigned interest in users: 15
15 This was a complaint made about the manageress of a Day Centre attended by this respondent. 
He complained to the authorities responsible for the centre about her irregular financial dealings 
with the clients for many months before an 'audit', resulting in a trial and conviction, was made.
‘Psychiatrists often feign friendship and concern. When I said: “I no 
longer want to see you”, he appealed to our friendship, but it was 
insidious’ (UOA)
'... as consultants, so I’ve only had seven minutes with them. No-one has 
ever asked me about my actual experience or feelings. There was no 
human interest. As an in-patient, you’d see a whole team who would ask 
you bloody stupid questions. You felt that your skills were somehow 
meaningless -  there was no reference to your past’ (UGJ)
Whilst a male psychiatrist, in a chilling example of what Crossley (2000) 
describes as ‘the narrowly instrumental sphere’ of, in this case, medical 
rationality says:
‘Psychiatrists no longer think of understanding the whole person, but are 
there to realign our patient’s neuro-transmitter, no matter what its 
configuration’(PLP)
He may not be typical, although his female colleague, speaking of psychiatrists 
says:
‘... you would think that there are very few of the male ones who consider 
themselves anything but neuroscientists, wielding medications and not 
talking or listening to their patients at all’. (PGC)
In order to accurately assess whether this (ultra) medical model of treating mental
disorder prevails amongst psychiatrists, it would have been necessary to interview
a far larger sample of these16. However, taking the practitioner sample as a whole
indicates that it does not.
Alternatively, it could simply be that this kind of emotion work is not always 
recognised as such, but taken for granted as integral to the caring for which 
practitioners are assumed to be naturally endowed. Smith, P. (1992) claims, for 
example, that many nursing students ‘experienced anxiety and stress because 
their emotional labour went largely unrecognised and undervalued’ (pl39). 
Significantly, neither was it ‘incorporated into the theoretical and practical
16 One of the disadvantages of a cross-disciplinary sample o f only fifteen practitioner respondents 
is that it is impossible to claim that the small sample from each discipline is necessarily typical of 
that particular discipline as a whole.
organisation of their training’ (ibid), which would imply that educators have until 
recently considered emotion management irrelevant to good nursing care. 
However, it may be that Smith (1992) is inexact in her application of the 
Hochschild’s term, confusing the caring aspect of nursing work with 
Hochschild’s ‘emotional labour’, which the latter considers to be an expanding 
part of labour in the “for profit” service industry. This is indicated in James 
(1989) when, in describing the nurse-patient relationship, she explains that the 
‘expression of emotions is a negotiated process involving mutual sounding out of 
what is acceptable’ (p21). This is closer to Hochschild’s (1979, 1983) ‘equal 
emotional exchange’ which permits the management of emotion to be enacted 
according to social ‘rules’, rather than organisational “prescription”.
5.5.2. Adverse Discrimination and Stigmatisation
Although this analysis began by discussing communication difficulties, these are
inseparable from the major ethical issue discernible from user and practitioner
interviews and questionnaires, from media articles, and from the previous section:
that of adverse discrimination and stigmatisation. Eighty-five percent of users feel
labelled and dehumanised as a result of a diagnosis of mental disorder. They
believe that practitioners, friends and family consider them “inferior”, “different”,
“degenerate" and even morally defective following this:
‘Discrimination is rapidly apparent and tangible and long-lasting. It may 
lead to disempowerment ... The big problem is that psychiatric treatment 
is like a net which is impossible to get out of once in. It’s not just the 
stigma. It changes your whole life’ (ULD)
‘Even to this day in our family we don’t discuss the word ‘schizophrenia’. 
I use the words ‘depression’ and anxiety to describe my condition to my 
friends or relatives’ (USA 17)
‘People with mental disorder are among the most socially and 
economically alienated, with heavy psychological toll’ (L.Vileneau, 
Sainsbury Centre).
All the practitioner respondents shared this view and, statistically speaking, 
appear to be as aware of it as the users themselves. What causes suffering is not 
only the mental condition or ‘emotional pain’ as such, but the social 
discrimination or stigma, (words which appear in all the interviews and most of 
the press articles) associated with this.
Users describe the damage that suffering mental disorder wreaks on both job and 
social prospects. Of the seven graduate users interviewed, all mature people with 
previous work experience, only one had a full-time job and this within a mental 
health ambience. Two were studying, hoping to obtain work within this same 
milieu, convinced not only that their prospects of not suffering discrimination in 
other areas were slim, if not non-existent, but also of the fact that the best people 
to assist the mentally disordered are those who have themselves suffered in the 
same way17. The remaining user respondents were unemployed and living on state 
benefits, including all but one of the long-term disordered users spoken to during 
the visits to a Survivors’ Centre18. The one exception worked as a driver for a day 
centre.
17 Two users suggested that instead of psychiatric hospitals, there should be crisis centres run by 
users for users. At the Survivors' Centre, the users' ability to tolerate and resolve situations which 
in a hospital setting might have demanded crisis intervention was certainly remarkable
"  Which makes the £450 registration fee demanded for a recent meeting on changes in mental 
health policy and practice, organised by the Sainsbury Centre and sponsored by the "Guardian" 
newspaper, which was officially open to users, seem insensitive, if not ironic, and highly 
discriminatory, since, in effect, this exorbitant fee served to make the meeting inaccessible to most 
users and researchers, but open to government-funded employees in the form of policy-makers and 
N.H.S executives
User movements prioritise combating this stigma, so negative is its effect upon 
the quality of users’ lives. Mental health care practitioners also complain of 
suffering similar stereotyping and discrimination. As Charles Kaye, once chief 
executive of the former special hospitals says:
‘... staff also share the fear and anxiety: their vulnerability, personal and 
professional is very real -  and largely discounted. What they can do is not 
generally valued and what they are unable to achieve is written in 
headlines. Unfortunately, it is now impossible for the hospitals to operate 
out of sight, since they are established as a rich reservoir of material; they 
share the stigma that they attach indelibly to their patients’ (Kaye,2002, 
PP2-3).
Hardcastle (2002) also describes staff in psychiatric units as ‘victims in their own 
way’. Statements such as this are reminiscent of the views of Barthes, Foucault, 
Maclntrye on the construction of ideological concepts, used by the dominant to 
oppress the weak and vulnerable. They a draw a despondent picture of the value 
systems inherent in the treatment of and society’s approach to mental disorder.
Although the issue of disempowerment as a consequence of suffering mental
disorder is recognised by the majority of users interviewed, it is generally
perceived as secondary to discrimination:
‘Disempowering starts with the diagnosis. It’s subjective and generally 
applied retrospectively. You don’t go into a psychiatric ward and find 
hundreds of people clamouring to be empowered. The notion of 
empowerment in isolation is not something of huge relevance. The 
notion of discrimination is more interesting. Discrimination is rapidly 
apparent and tangible and long-lasting. It may lead to disempowerment, 
but as an individual, while you’re there, it’s meaningless’ (PLD)
Indeed, disempowerment is not always totally rejected by users, 78% of whom 
consider that in a crisis such disempowerment, in the form of involuntary 
admission (sectioning) is sometimes necessary. However, none felt that it was
admissible simply because the psychiatrist or social worker considered this to be 
the case.
“Free to kill -  lunatics left to roam the streets butcher 90 people a year” (News o f
the World); “Mentally ill man detained for killing teenage sunbather” (The
Guardian, 11.12.01) and “Beatles’s attacker was kicked out of psychiatric unit”
(The Guardian, 24.10.01) are just three examples of how mentally-disordered
people are frequently represented in the popular press. It is, therefore, perhaps not
surprising that several users comment that having been diagnosed as suffering a
mental disorder is inseparable from being labelled “dangerous”:
You goes to the pub, or somewhere like that, they keeps away from you. 
They thinks you’ll ‘urt 'em ’ (UOD)
‘They handled me with kid gloves, it was as if they were afraid of me’
(The Observer Magazine, 21.10.01.,p57).
Such ignorance does not, fortunately extend to most
‘Mental health practitioners (who) are far more aware of patients’ relative 
inoffensiveness than the public at large, and of the fact that the number of 
homicides committed by the mentally disturbed would, contrary to popular 
opinion, appear to be decreasing’ (Noguera, 2000, p 163)
Not that the issue of dangerousness is irrelevant. Many practitioners describe the
possibility of experiencing violence from a user and/or his/her family as a major
fear. Some, unfortunately, also equate madness with moral degeneracy and
consider their role to involve exercising power over the bad and mad:
‘They (the carers) saw these people as actually evil. They thought they 
were doing these things to staff personally, to get at them, or hurt 
them’(Guardian Society, 11.04.01. p 10)
For this reason, these particular nurses were ‘swearing at patients, manhandling 
them, feeding them on the toilet and punishing them by locking them out in a 
veranda area without adequate clothing or blankets’. These were practices at the
former Garlands Hospital in Carlisle until November, 2000. However, it is
important to note that such extreme situations are unusual. No respondent
described similar incidents in recent times, although they were not uncommon in
the past. There is, nonetheless, no room for complacency. More than one third of
the practitioners included in the study claims to have observed ‘unprofessional’
conduct at first hand. This may take the form of a more subtle abuse of power:
‘When I started to argue with the doctor, he got nasty. Said he’s call the 
security guard if I didn’t behave myself. I think I was behavin’. Not the 
way he wanted, perhaps, but behavin’ ... I reckon they get scared ... I 
wouldn’t hurt a fly ...’ (UOD)
‘I can tell you from experience that patients who misbehave usually end up 
being punished by one means or another. When they are deemed to have 
learned their lesson, privileges are restored’. (UOA)
The problem of discriminatory practices and attitudes towards those suffering
chronic mental disorder relates to the “s e lf  -  “other” dichotomy, referred to in
discussing gender in Chapter Three. Users’ own perceptions of themselves in
terms of dangerousness are unlike those of large sectors of society informed by
the sensationalist treatment accorded by some media to violent acts committed by
mentally disordered people. It is possible to speculate that some such acts are the
result of a self-fulfilling prophecy in which health care practitioners’, family’s and
friends’ expectations of and watchfulness for violence provoke a frustration which
terminates in just that. Eighty percent of users report that their families’ attitudes
towards them have changed for the worse, post-diagnosis. Friends appear to be
more tolerant, only 53% of these being reported as behaving differently. To return
to MacIntyre (1999), it seems that, as a society, we clearly still think of the
mentally disordered as “them" and other than "us".
Williams. S.J. (1987) points out that ‘labelling’ and ‘symbolic assignment’ of this
kind can degrade its victim to the extent that ‘the individual’s stigma can come to
dominate both ego and alter’s perceptions’ (pl37). This view is verified by users’
own descriptions of themselves as in some way deviant or sinful:
‘I feel like I’m responsible for who I am ... you have to take 
responsibility... I don’t blame myself for the illness, but I blame the 
choices that I make such as when I choose not to be productive ... is it 
really because of the illness or ... myself? Am I a lazy person to begin 
with or am I losing motivation because of the illness...? (UCO)
‘Some faiths attribute mental illness to spiritual sickness’ (NC, Ordained 
priest)
‘... it’s a common belief in our society that good people don’t have things 
happen to them’ (UKL)
This illustrates Simon William’s point that those who are stigmatised ‘adhere to 
the same normative beliefs about identity’ and have the ‘same sense of being 
‘normal’ human beings’ (pl40). Awareness of the shame of the ‘stigma’ of being 
labelled ‘mad’ causes them to become obsessed with the idea of ‘acceptance’ by 
‘sane’ others. But what is stigmatisation, but the imposing of one ideology or 
dominant discourse as the ‘norm’ and all others as deviant, ergo threatening the 
fabric of society? Mental disorder is still considered in some sectors to be the 
product of a form of moral deviance and psychiatric hospitals little more than 
repositories for the “mad". In the same process of self-fulfilling prophecy 
described earlier, users treated by society as deviant and in need of “putting away” 
behind what are frequently locked doors, in a more or less agreeable “jail" come, 
in some cases, to accept the treatment they are given as their just “desserts" -  and
may be encouraged to do so.
The fact that carers described as treating users like children are considered “kind”, 
implies that these users have come to conform to this image of the person who 
suffers a mental disorder as, at best, less than adult. Policy makers have 
compounded this adverse discrimination by treating mental health as the 
“Cinderella” of the NHS, and by implication mentally disordered people as 
unworthy of the same standard of treatment and facilities as those who suffer 
diabetes, for example19.
The discussion on adverse discrimination, and some of the conclusions which 
follow, centre on this notion of a diagnosis of madness resulting from deviating 
from society’s value ‘status quo’ and the concept of “normality” imposed by the 
dominant socio-cultural ideology. It is apparent that there is not a single ‘truth’ 
out there concerning the nature of ‘normality’-, ‘rationality’ and indeed 
flourishing. Their nature is a contested space in both psychiatry and society, in 
which socio-cultural, medical and psychological discourses often collide. Just as 
the mind is not a fixed entity, neither are mental health or illness. What ‘normal’ 
society might see as pathological deviations in cognition and feeling are often 
described by user respondents as a heightening of sensitivity to colours, sounds 
and so on, a quasi spiritual experience, even perhaps a form of self-realisation, 
which is lost as a result of ‘cure’.
‘Lithium is our sorceress’s green liquid, the stinging nettle of our modem 
reality. My mother takes it each day and complains. Her hand tremors: she 
cannot fasten her ... skirts or stay up all night and never get tired’ 
(J.Lyden, 1999)
To be honest, everything’s a lot better when you’re high.’ (UBR)
19 The implementation of NSF VII appears to be beginning to narrow the gap in certain areas, but 
it is too recent for this to be evaluated accurately.
5.5.3. Gender and Class Differences
The “fact”20 that more women than men suffer mental disorders was discussed in 
Chapters One and Three. Perhaps as a result of this, and because caring roles have 
traditionally been perceived as pertaining to the female domain, only recently 
have male and females been cared for in mixed wards by health care practitioners 
of both sexes. Whilst many women users and most practitioners have described 
allocating male and female users to the same ward as frequently distressing for the 
latter, analysis of the fieldwork reveals a highly positive attitude on the part of 
both users and carers to mixed sex staffing. Eighty-seven percent of users feel that 
there is no difference in the way male and female carers interact with them, and 
users and practitioners believe that in the ward setting some users find it easier to 
relate and talk to carers of the opposite sex.
Due to the word limit imposed upon a work of this nature, ascertaining the reason 
for this is beyond the remit of this dissertation, but the finding indicates that 
regardless of the speculations voiced in Chapter Three, no clear-cut picture of 
gender differences in values or attitudes towards caring is revealed, nor, contra 
radical feminist orthodoxy (and Dominelli and Gollins), do male carers 
demonstrate a significantly greater desire to exercise ‘power over’ politics in their 
practice than females.
No marked differences in terms of gender and caring emerge, at least at the level 
of quotidian care in the ward and community setting. Users and practitioners 
believe that a caring attitude is a question of character, not gender. This finding
20 This, as Chapter 3 indicated, is a hotly debated issue around social causation, social 
construction and biology, hence the inverted commas around the word "fact"
favours the combination of an ethic of care and virtue ethics insofar as if men are
equally adept at and inclined to care as women, then their ethical practices can - 
and apparently do -  reflect this.
Male users are slightly more inclined to complain about treatment than women. 
(A finding echoed in Pitarka-Carcani et al„ 2000). None of the male user 
respondents was entirely satisfied with the treatment received, whereas two 
female respondents were. Women held a more favourable view of mental health 
care generally. This could result from the fact that, particularly in the case of older 
women, they consider it ‘normal’ to suffer and tend not to express resentment in 
interviews.
Rarely having enjoyed ‘power’ would arguably make the issue of
disempowerment, real or perceived, less important to females. There is slight
evidence of gendered hierarchal differences, insofar as male psychiatrists are
characterised in two interviews as arrogant, uncaring and ill-mannered.
‘(in hospital) the male psychiatrist would ask how you felt and then 
interrupt, saying: “marks out of ten for how you’re feeling today”. I never 
did understand the question. I did find the attitude of the male 
psychiatrists, by and large, patronising. One person stood out, a female 
registrar. She was absolutely wonderful. She made you feel cared for, 
human’. (UGJ)
There are exceptions to this21:
T came upon a male psychiatrist, but he was outside NHS practice. He 
sticks in my mind as very good to talk to. (UOJ)
A female consultant psychiatrist finds in favour of gender equality, but implies a
public/private divide in terms of quality of treatment when she says of her male
colleagues:
21 The admirable Pat Bracken, for example, is well-known for his pioneering work in Bradford on 
behalf of the user's rights, und for encouraging user-participation in therapy.
‘ I suspect they listen much more in private practice’ (PGC)
Another hierarchy (and discrimination) related issue arises insofar as several users 
suggest that being middle-class, well-educated and white implied receiving better 
treatment, or being better able to “work the system” than other less privileged 
users:
‘If you’re middle-class, it’s easier to get out of hospital’ (UOA)
‘If you’re white, male, middle-class, and a graduate, it takes an awful lot 
of deviance to get yourself sectioned’ (PLD).
Inequalities in the prevalence and the influence of both class (Mental Health
Needs Assessment, 200122) and race (Wilson 1997, Nazroo 1997, Sproston and
Nazroo 2002) on diagnosis, length of stay in hospital have been well-documented.
5.5.4. Racial Discrimination
The statement above recognises one of the most common ethical problems in 
mental health practice in the U.K., that of racial discrimination. Associations 
between ethnicity and health status have been recorded since the beginning of 
qualitative data collection (Davey, Smith et al. 2000, p375) and mental health has 
not been immune to this since male adults from certain ethnic minorities are 
grossly over-represented in psychiatric practice. If it is very difficult for a white, 
middle-class male to find himself “sectioned”, this is remarkably easy for a black 
man23. Indeed, as both users and practitioners pointed out, it is easier for a black 
person to get into hospital than out of it again. The principle reason (Wilson, 
1997, Nazroo, 1997, Sproston and Nazroo, 2002) for this discrimination is a lack *21
22 www.nelpct.nhs.uk/whatsncw/docs/oublicutiQns/PublicHeulth/AnRcD2001/chaptcr3,pdf, 
accessed 24.11.03. at 20.00h.
21 Nazroo (1997) found on the basis of 5,196 interviews with Caribbean or Asian people and 2,867 
white people, that rates of psychosis for the former and the latter are upprox. one in a hundred but 
that the former are more likely to be admitted to hospital. Kates of psychosis for women is, 
amongst Caribbean women, nearly double that of while women. Those people least likely to 
display symptoms o f mental illness were Asians.
of cultural education on the part of the practitioners. Wilson, M. suggests a need 
for public education in racist attitudes, stereotyping and personal prejudice, and 
also draws attention to the malign influence of many media stories. Over 25% of 
users in her study believed that mental health professionals had treated them 
differently because they were black: “Black people are treated as if they are not 
intelligent”, “Being mixed race and in hospital meant that I was ignored, so I used 
to do mad things to gain attention’, ‘They ignore us as hopeless cases, as if we are 
more crazy’, (Wilson, p3). Fifty-two percent felt that their own culture had not 
been considered at all. Unfortunately, none of the fifteen users interviewed was 
black, although two were from other non Anglo-Saxon ethnic groups, as was one 
of the practitioners. However, both user and practitioner respondents considered 
racism inherent to mental health practice, both in hospital and community. If 
madness is stigmatising, the combination of ‘blackness’ and madness is doubly
This type of discrimination supports the views of Foucault and MacIntyre on how
local cultural beliefs become considered universal, to the detriment of ethical
practice. Wilson's respondents claimed that care staff ignored the users’ own
cultures and were apparently unaware that ‘what may be considered mad in one
culture may not in another’ (ibid). A ‘moral blame’ element of the type described
earlier also results from such attitudes on the part of carers:
‘... differences were seen as negative; felt I had to disown my own culture 
and “act white" and felt guilty for making professionals feel 
uncomfortable or awkward for not understanding my culture’ (ibid).
Not that racism is something to which only users are subject. Practitioners, too,
can be subjected to this, both in and outside of the clinical setting (West, 2000)
and racial discrimination in the National Health Service has recently been the 
subject of extensive media coverage. However, none of the practitioners spoke 
this during the interviews.
Western psychiatry also frequentlyy excludes the spiritual dimension of care, overlooking 
the significance of religion in many users' lives. Where users do not have sufficient 
command of English to explain their religious beliefs and customs to staff, they 
frequently fear being ‘labelled psychotic, compulsorily detained and forced to take 
medicine’ (Guardian Society, 21.2.01, pl20). One of the users interviewed commented 
that her own desire to fast during Ramadan had been construed as non-cooperation, rather 
than respected as religious practice.
5.5.5. Discriminatory Practices in (Un)Employment
In spite of the class, gender and racial issues previously discussed, job prospects 
were equally poor for everyone:
‘Shortly after that, my employer found out that I had schizophrenia and I 
lost my job. (UOD)
‘Everybody knows that owning up to a mental health issue is like the kiss 
of death to your job prospects... my boss kept telling me to be grateful that 
they were so kind and understanding as to have me back.’
(The Observer Magazine, 21.10.01. p.57)
Related to the notion of mental disorder as a moral defect is another problem,
which hangs over almost every user unable to obtain employment - the potential
diagnosis of malingering. The user finds him/herself in the obligation of having to
prove that the condition is not contrived and express a wish to get well. One man
whose companion was told by a male psychiatrist that he was a “malingerer”
illustrates the point:
‘I would have complained strongly, yeah, because it’s the one thing I am 
not, a malingerer’ (UGD)
Not long after the interview, this particular “malingerer” was admitted to hospital, 
having attempted suicide. Another user explained that he had only one set of 
somewhat dishevelled clothes, having no money to buy more, and could see little 
point in going to a job interview in such shabby attire. The homeless mentally- 
disordered who are unable to offer a permanent address find themselves in the 
same plight.
5.6. Emotional Labour
Complaints about practitioners were almost invariably tempered by positive 
comments implying that, overall, users consider carers’ attitudes to be improving. 
This may relate to the fact that there exists a growing awareness of caring for the 
mentally disordered as emotional labour. Mental health practitioners, of both 
sexes, no longer expected to be completely detached (or devoted) at all times, are 
allowed to acknowledge feelings, both positive and negative, towards users, 
which do not necessarily conform to conventional and documented expectations 
of carers’ feelings. Indeed, BAITS (behavioural analysis and intervention training 
and support), a new programme, has recently been introduced. In what appears to 
be a combination of emotional labour and training in virtue and care, this 
programme aims to improve health care practitioners’ understanding of users 
whose disorders involve challenging behaviour, disruption, violence and extreme 
withdrawal. Instead of regarding these as in some way “evil” and reacting in 
consequence, practitioners are encouraged to discuss and analyse their own 
attitudes and think of means of improving these users’ lives in order to diminish 
such behaviour by caring, rather than controlling. Whilst this does not imply that 
emotional labour is a virtue, it is arguably a good example of critical reflexivity 
and the consequent exercise of the virtue of phronesis, applied to caring in
practice -  a “training” in becoming a virtuous agent, for as was said in Chapter
2.5. according to the Nichomachean Ethics, ‘our task is to become good men’.
This training does not demand that reasoning or rationality is employed to 
“control” the emotions, but rather recognises that ‘some emotional states are, to 
all intents and purposes, rational’ (Crossley, 2002, p49) and that rationality and 
emotion can and do inform one another. Emotions are not perhaps something we 
are able to simply ‘step out of’ (Crossley, 2000), but there is no reason to suppose 
that practitioners cannot learn to recognise that even in mental health care 
settings, there is a place for the notion of ‘rational emotion’ (Op.cit.pl42). This is 
also recognised by Goffman (1967) when he speaks of the ‘traffic rules of 
interaction’ which ensure that actors constantly monitor their own acts and those 
of others in order to sustain the ‘predictability’ of quotidian social interactions.
A form of emotional labour, based on an understanding of the notion of ‘rational 
emotion’ is important in the training of students and staff. Both Smith P. (1992) 
and Robertson (1998) claim that although students admire technical competency 
and medical knowledge, they also see their superiors as key in setting the 
emotional climate in the clinical setting. Questionnaire data cited by Smith shows 
that ‘hierarchical and unfriendly staff relations were ... a major source of anxiety 
and stress for students because of the feelings they generated’ (p69). An 
emotionally caring climate makes students feel cared for and therefore better able 
to care for others (Op.cit.p76).
Chapter Two described Nodding’s ‘ethic of care’, echoing Gilligan (1982), as 
conceding a central role in ethical decision-making to feelings, situational 
conditions and a sense of personal ideal. On the strength of the research findings, 
whether these really are the nuclei around which ethical decisions are made 
appears debatable. In this age of evidence-based medicine, equal importance is 
given by many users, as well as practitioners, to technical expertise. Whilst the 
research findings reveal a predominance of interpersonal complaints, a desire for 
improvement in technical knowledge is also evident. As far as an awareness of 
and respect for the user’s own desires and feelings:
There’s a move away from detachment. A relationship staff-patient is no 
longer considered a bad thing ... The human rights dimension is more 
widely discussed. Training now involves hearing the user...’ (PLD)
‘You’re not bom with a hostility towards mental health professionals, 
sectioning (the first time you don’t even know what it is), being woken at 
six or seven, being told to make your bed, obliged to eat awful food, the 
lack of explanations, all generate this’ (ULD)
Users, increasingly well-versed in the latest developments in diagnosis and 
treatment, not merely psychopharmacological but also in areas as sophisticated as 
eye-movement desensitisation and reprocessing (ESRD), expect greater technical 
expertise in their carers and sometimes value the former more than the latter. This 
is particularly relevant when the respondent in. question adheres to the “medical 
model" of mental disorder. Users expect practitioners to be aware not only of the 
latest pharmacological treatments such as SSRI, but equally to recognise and 
discuss the well-publicised, often severe side-effects and long term consequences 
of these24, respecting the user’s right to refuse such medications. Some users wish
“  See www.soeilaudit.oru.uk for testimonies from about 500 people who suffered distressing side 
effects and were usually not believed by doctors because of the absence of any warning from the 
manufacturer.
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to partake in neither alternative, talk, not pharmaceutical therapies: ‘They leave 
me alone and that’s what I want’ (UOS). In this case, practitioners apparently 
agreed to respect the user’s autonomy, as long as he did not ‘cause any problems’. 
An interesting question here is whether the practitioners “co-operation” was 
normal practice? To what extent does the user’s attitude condition that of the 
carer? If the answer to this is, as the fieldwork appears to show, “in almost every 
case” this indicates that practitioners, particularly nurses, may be exercising a 
sensitivity which ‘just is the virtue’ (McDowell,1979), not simply caring.
It also raises the question of just how beneficial practising an ethic of care which 
allowed emotion a primary role in action and decision-making in mental health 
would be in practical therapeutic terms. The ‘new age’ nurse of the type described 
by Webb (1966), whilst undoubtedly caring and engrossed with the user, would 
not necessarily meet all his or her real needs, if these user respondents are typical 
of users generally. As Fulford (1996) argues, what is required for genuinely 
patient-centred mental health care is a model which, informed by the lived 
experience of the disorder and scientific knowledge of this, incorporates not only 
facts, but values (and emotions).
User awareness of technical and psycho-pharmacological advances, in mental 
health practice is constantly increasing:
‘...part of the problem is that you are so much better educated than they
are. You know more about mental illness, too.’ (UOA).
Many users, and some practitioners, claim that the side-effects of medication are 
worse than the disorder itself. They claim to have been helped by, or to employ, 
not only “talking therapies” but also alternative therapies and treatments such as
massage, aromatherapy, reflexology and so on. A new ethos in mental health 
practice which rejects the medical model of mental disorder, such as that of Pat 
Bracken’s Bradford Home Treatment Service, which describes itself as 
“questioning traditional psychiatric approaches”, rejects the medical model of 
treatment as excessively simplistic and adopts a holistic approach to care25. This 
has resulted in great reductions in the quantities of medication prescribed and in 
incidents of suicide, self-harm and violence26.
5.7. Malpractice
Only 60% of users consider current codes of practice to be respected. Although 
today the roles of doctors, nurses, social workers and other practitioners are more 
closely interwoven, this does not prevent potential ‘whistleblowers’ from 
believing that, should they criticise their fellow practitioners for not adhering to 
such codes, they ‘will be treated unfairly, particularly when they challenge the 
professional practice of someone who holds the position of authority’ (Crossley 
and Abedin, 2000). A complaint against a fellow practitioner, at least in the case 
of one nurse reporting another, must take the form of a ‘statutory declaration’. 
This itself might seem sufficient to deter many from drawing attention to 
malpractice. However, many nurses do overcome their reticence for ‘The nursing 
profession has successfully maintained self regulation. The protection of the 
public is central to the process, as is evident when nurses who are subjected to 
disciplinary hearings by the UKCC are removed from the register, but doctors
25 Although holistic approaches have themselves been open to much criticism, particularly as a 
new means of surveillance and control (Armstrong, 1986)
2,1 Bradford HTS reports using five times less medication, only treats users in their own homes, on 
a daily visit basis, and practices a user-professional partnership. Anem Cara, a highly successful 
project in Birmingham also adopts a holistic approach, reports that no violent incidents have taken 
place there
disciplined in similar incidents are reprimanded and left to practice’ (Crossley and 
Abedin, 2000).
In spite of those cases which cause brief sensations in the media, whilst many 
practitioners claim to have observed malpractice at firsthand, the analysis of 
users’ accounts reveals relatively little evidence of this and a practitioner says:
‘I think they just try to defuse things as quickly as they can. Each situation 
is different. You can’t say “they always do it like this. They think on their 
feet, really and, of course, (laughs) dealing with a violent fifteen stone 
man is not the same as dealing with a six stone girl!’ (PNA)
Practitioners are more frank about malpractice and ignoring ethical codes in the
anonymous questionnaires than in the interviews. Although they claim to
personally obey the codes, their descriptions reveal that, in fact, they resolve most
moral dilemmas by means of an immediate evaluation of the situation and the
subsequent application of common-sense, informed by experience (or,
occasionally, survival instinct) than by consideration of the codes of good
practice.
They also disagree amongst themselves upon the best line of action in some cases. 
The “Prozac sandwich” in which medication refused by the user is concealed, is a 
good example of such disagreement as to what constitutes good practice. Older 
nurses considered such measures “contingent”, younger nurses “deceit”. Other 
practitioners, with the exception of the female psychiatrist and the female social 
worker, considered such practices ‘common’ and, whilst not desirable, sometimes 
necessary. The Nursing and Midwives’ Council (N&MC) is currently preparing 
guidelines on ‘covert medication’ which will apparently condone it in certain 
circumstances.
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Opinions on matters such as sectioning, informed consent and E.C.T. (electro­
convulsive therapy), although briefly mentioned here, would require a separate 
study given the diversity of views on this subject. But, as far as informed consent 
is concerned, several examples of more or less subtle forms of malpractice and of 
discrimination amongst practitioners of all groups can be observed.
A recent study claims that: ‘By far the most common complaint that patients make
about physicians is that they were ‘unspeakably rude’ in the course of providing
treatment’ (Spurgeon, 2001; 323:771). This perceived ‘rudeness’ is occasionally
reported by both practitioners and users. The complaints concern all disciplines of
healthcare practice to a greater or lesser degree. Although practitioners were
variously described as ‘too busy to speak’, and of ‘rudeness’, ‘dishonesty’ and
‘inefficiency’, tending to ‘treat people like little kids’, ‘always shut in the nursing
station, instead of mixing with the patients’ and so on, many also merit the
description of ‘caring’ and ‘kind’. However, they are not, as a group, seen as
identifying with the user as an ethic of care would demand insofar as their:
‘...ultimate responsibility is to management so the relationship is 
necessarily limited -  the patient can’t come first. The power balance and 
legislation is all wrong’ (ULD).
Practitioners themselves, whilst expressing frustration at not being able to care as 
they would wish, see their principle problems as a lack of time due to chronic staff 
shortages and an excess of bureaucracy. This links to Hochschild’s (1979, 1983) 
notion of ‘equal emotional exchange’, insofar as there are occasions upon which 
nurses and other practitioners are not free to negotiate their own rate of 
‘exchange’. Their position in the hierarchy of the division of labour may influence 
how nurses practice what James (1993) terms ‘emotion management’ given that
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their work schedules may allow little or no time in which to negotiate a caring 
relationship with users (James, 1992). In this case, emotion management is no 
longer a ‘gift’ but rather part of the process of work and carried out under 
organisational and professional “feeling rules”.
Nursing Practitioners in particular fear physical aggression, their own reactions to 
this and the professional consequences of over-reacting. Both their personal and 
professional vulnerability are evident and yet largely discounted. As one nurse 
says: ‘Current codes of practice say far too little about protecting the practitioner’ 
(PNA). The quality of life in clinical settings and the nature of practitioners’ 
interventions in situations of violence are as important in preventing this as 
specific intervention strategies27. The cost o f practising effective emotional labour 
when confronted by a potentially violent patient can be high and may result in 
spurious “illness” on the part of a practitioner who has not been trained in dealing 
with aggression and feels that having exhausted his/her resources for caring, s/he 
is no longer able to cope.
In the Maudsley study (Pitarka-Carcani, 2001) evidence was sought for the 
content of the users’ complaints and the health care practitioners’ response that 
psychotic symptoms were the basis for these. In only four cases out of fifty-six 
was there evidence that the complaints related to psychotic symptoms. The 
remainder were ‘considered to be unrelated to delusional beliefs’ (Op.cit.p372). 
This was also evident in the fieldwork interviews. The fact that in the Maudsley 
study psychotic symptoms were ‘blamed’ for complaints, even hypothetically, 1
11 See T he recognition, prevention and therapeutic management of violence in mental health care, 
a summary' UKCC, Spring 2002.
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implies arrogance and negative discrimination on the part of practitioners. The 
awareness of suffering discrimination, in many forms, which emerges from the 
research findings as the major ethical issue is not, therefore, necessarily a 
manifestation of paranoia, although it is easy for this diagnosis to be made in the 
psychiatric context23.
Not that users fail to understand how difficult it is to be a mental health 
practitioner:
‘I’m not sure it’s a good role. You can’t divorce the individual from the 
institution and the system. The best possible nurse can’t make a difference 
if it comes to choosing between the job and the patient’s interests. The key 
relationship is that between practitioner and employer’ (PLD)
The necessary question here is why the practitioner should have to choose
between 'the patient's interests' and 'the job', when the latter, in theory, implies
defending the former -  and both should lead to mutual flourishing.
28 One of the users referred to the Bradford Home Care Service was a female diagnosed as 
suffering from schizophrenia and delusions o f being attacked. The team's practitioners, upon 
visiting her home discovered that her husband was regularly beating her up.
Chapter Six: Philosophical Analysis of the Findings
6.1. Introduction
Following sociological analysis of the fieldwork, this chapter evaluates the current 
situation with regard to ethics in mental health practice. Chapter Five confirmed 
the claims made in Chapter One, that hospital care is generally considered far 
more negatively than care in the community. The relationship between user and 
practitioner in the context of the former is far more complex and practitioners’ 
attitudes toward users can be paternalistic, even moralistic. The latter is revealed 
by a greater tendency for hospital practitioners, particularly nurses, to think of 
users as interacting with them in a negative fashion. This became manifest in the 
employment of vocabulary with negative value connotations. Practitioners’ use 
terms such as “misbehave”, “difficult”, “naughty”, “poor old Fred”, ‘Trouble” 
and so on, whilst in some cases (presumably) intended as a form of affection, 
clearly implies that some of them continue to see mental disorder as a moral, as 
well psychological condition. Community practitioners, arguably less 
institutionalised, did not employ this vocabulary and it can be speculated that the 
“them” (users) and “us" (practitioners) attitude predominant in hospitals is less 
prevalent in community contexts. In hospitals it fomented, in staff and users of 
both sexes, interpersonal relationships and interactions reminiscent of those 
described by Goffman (1964) in Asylums, in which some users were “favoured” 
and others not
In order to evaluate these situations within the ethical parameters of the research, 
it is necessary to answer the questions originally posed in Chapter 2.4. Prior to 
this, the interview transcripts, questionnaires, media and WWW articles were
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coded by type of ethical framework which they illustrated as shown in Tables 6.1 
and 6.2. which follow:
Fig 6.1. Sample from the coding frame for ethical analysis
COD
E
ETHICAL
APPROACH
EXAMPLE
DEO
N
DEONTOLOGICAL
‘Users who don’t take or accept the 
treatment or the medicine they’ve been 
prescribed should be asked to leave, 
otherwise they cause problems’
You either do as 1 say, or I’ll section you
CON
S
CONSEQUENTIAL^
T
‘Public safety is more important than an 
individual user’s rights’
‘If a user is causing trouble on the ward, 
the best thing is to sedate them so that they 
don’t upset the other patients’
CAS CASUISTRY
‘As long as we all agree that the patient 
needs to be admitted, the different agendas 
behind this reasoning don’t really matter’.
c CARE
‘Covert medication is sometimes the 
kindest way to treat a distraught patient 
who won’t take a tranquilliser. I know 
that’s what I’d want in their situation.
‘First the patient, second the patient third 
the patient, that’s what caring really 
means’.
‘I’d like to think they liked me, not just 
looked after me.’
VIR VIRTUE ‘The aim of community care should be to 
help people towards leading full and 
independent lives, not to contain and 
control them.’
‘Before admitting someone to hospital, 
fairness demands that you consider every 
other possibility, as well as the well-being 
of everyone concerned.’
‘I want to be treated as an equal and have 
my own views listened to and respected by 
the ward staff, eve if they disagree.'
DIS DISCRIMINATION Adverse discrimination is described
COM COMMUNICATION Poor communication is described
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F ig  6 .2  E th ic a l F r a m e w o rk s  in P ra c tic e , th e  F ie ld w o rk  F in d in g s
Responden t D E O N C O N S C A S c V I R N O N E O IS C O M
UO K (F) X X X X X
UO A  (M) X X X X
U L D (M ) X X X X X X “ x
UO B (M) X X X X X X
U O B ie (F ) X X X X X
U B R (F ) X X X X X
U O R (M ) X X X X X
UGJ (F) X X X X
U O D (M ) X X X X X
U G D (M ) X X X X X X
U K L (F ) X X X
UBS (M ) X X X X X
UOJ (M ) X X X
U C O (F) X X X
UN S(F) X X X X
PLS X X X X
P BT (M ) X X X X
PLC  (F) X X X X
P LD (M ) X X X X X
PN A (F ) X X X X X
P B A (M ) X X X X X
PLN (F) X X X X X
POJ (M ) X X X X X
P O K (M ) X X X X X X
PLS (M ) X X X X X X X
P LP (M ) X X X X X
PBH (F) X X X X X X
PCJ(F ) X X X
POBJ (F) X X X
PLPH (M) X X X X X
Key: Dis: Discrimination. Comm: Poor Communication. (M) Male (F) Female
Respondent: 1st letter = User (U) of Practitioner (P)
2nd letter = Place of origin (O = Oxford, L = London, B = Birmingham, G = 
Gloucester, K = Kendal, N = Northampton).
3rd letter = Initial of first name, e.g. C = Carole
PLC = Practitioner, working in London, named Carole.
Coding of interviews, in terms of the type of ethic manifested in practice, and in 
practitioners’ and users’ opinions on ethics and good practice ensued. Once
completed, the following questions could be reconsidered:
• Are there any significant differences in the approaches to ethics of male 
and female mental practitioners?
• What kind of framework prevails in dealing with ethical dilemmas -  
deontological, consequentialist, casuistry, care or virtue ethic? Or is none 
clearly discernible?
2 0 5
What are the behavioural and attitudinal characteristics of carers in
resolving ethical dilemmas?
• Do current codes of professional ethics or good practice influence carers’ 
approach to and resolution of ethical issues?
• Could they be said to “lack the virtues” or exercise them?
• On the strength of the findings, which type of ethic would be best suited to 
the exigencies of mental health practice?
• Are virtue and care ethics less, more or equally relevant to mental health 
practice and the flourishing (eudemonia) of mental health practitioners and 
users?
• What are the character traits (virtues) considered necessary to carers?
6.2 Gender Differences in Ethical Attitudes to Practice
‘The question of which attitudes should be encouraged is itself an ethical issue’ 
(Dickenson and Fulford, 2000, p22). Practitioners: ‘should be non-judgemental 
and patient-centred in their work’, such a view representing ‘a liberal ethic which 
requires respect for other people’s values’ (ibid). Can and do both males and 
females practice this? Chapter 1.4.2. pointed out that male and female roles in 
mental health practice are reputed to reflect different values and ethical positions, 
deontological, principle-based or consequentialist in the former, and an ethic of 
care in the latter. The fieldwork reveals that, to judge by those actions observed 
and described by interview respondents, this is not the case, although there may 
be differences in the reasoning processes involved.
The majority of male and female practitioners consider themselves, and are 
described as, concerned and caring for and about the user. Some were familiar
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with the ethic of care and considered it particularly relevant to practice. In 
addition, practitioners of both sexes consider that lack of resources and staffing, 
and excessive bureaucracy, handicap good communication and good practice as 
they understand it. They also unanimously endorse the finding that discrimination 
is the major problem facing users and many practitioners in mental health today.
6.2.1. Malpractice and Gender
Complaints referring to malpractice are made equally against practitioners of both 
sexes, the difference being that, conforming to gender stereotypical concepts, 
users express greater surprise when describing lack of caring in a female 
practitioner: “She was a right bitch, you’d never have believed it!” (UOK).
Although, as explained in Chapter 3.1., there are proportionally more disciplinary 
hearings against male than female practitioners, this disparity in conduct was not 
reflected in the fieldwork owing, perhaps, to the slight predominance of males 
amongst the sample, and the fact that only two serious offences were described, 
one committed by a male, the other by a female.
Staff of both sexes were reported to have committed acts of minor malpractice, 
recounted by the users as rueful anecdotes, rather than complaints. One male user 
gave an account of male night staff playing cards for money with sedated users 
who could not sleep, whilst female staffs’ “infringements” involved such acts as 
getting female users to do the formers’ personal laundry, something with which 
bored, inactive users were reasonably happy to comply. Only the female 
manageress of a day centre was accused of a major criminal act by one male user
and was, after not a little prevarication, duly prosecuted. Other examples of 
malpractice described a lack of emotional control in some carers of both sexes, 
manifested by shouting, never apologising, impolite terms of address and “team” 
efforts to “punish” by means of isolation, increased medication and deprivation. 
At times, caring was remarkable for its absence in respondents’ accounts of 
practice, as was the ‘goodness’ inherent to the term ‘good practice’.
An example of this is the disturbing -  and to the best of my knowledge previously 
unreported1 - finding, that of the coercive behaviour of some “dominant” users, 
who knew how to ‘work the system’ to their own advantage, towards cowed (or 
indifferent) staff and other passive, or collaborating, users. This phenomenon, 
described further in Chapter Eight, reveals that, in some instances, ill-equipped 
and understaffed mental health workers are apparently, to use the colloquial 
expression, as much “sinned against”, as “sinning”, powerless as empowered -  
regardless of gender.
Another gender-related form of malpractice is the sexual abuse of male and 
female users in the hospital settings, something well-documented throughout the 
world, although male upon female rape is statistically more frequent. The 
President of the Citizen’s Commission on Human Rights claims that she has 
'personally documented and exposed thousand o f cases o f such abuse’ 
(Eastgate, J., 2002, p2). A recent review by the Scottish Executive of the Mental 
Health (Scotland) Act of 1984 reads:
‘Protection from sexual exploitation and abuse
1 Unreported in the context of mental hospitals. It is apparently commonly found in prisons.
125. The current provisions in the 1984 Act concerning the sexual 
exploitation of those who are vulnerable by reason of mental disorder are 
not satisfactory ... They should be replaced by two new offences: sexual 
abuse of a mentally disordered adult, and sexual abuse by staff and formal 
carers.’
This indicates that even in this age of improved “whistle blowing” (see Chapter 
5.7), this problem is sufficiently grave for legislation (as well as ethical guidance) 
to be needed. One female user respondent spoke of having, many years earlier, 
been sexually abused by a male carer, subsequently dismissed. Whilst no female 
carers were described as participating in acts of this nature, a young male user 
respondent complained of continual harassment by a female user during his own 
stay on a mixed ward. Upon noting his discomfort, the nurses merely asked if he 
wished them to do anything, rather than actively intervening. This might imply a 
failure in their duty of care, for his negative, together with their non-intervention, 
could have exposed the woman in question to sexual exploitation, in addition to 
prolonging the male user’s discomfort. Whilst it could be argued that user 
autonomy was respected, in both cases, the practitioners’ non-solution is redolent 
of indifference, rather than care, insofar as it implies that sexual harassment, 
something conventionally considered intolerable, is treated as relatively ‘normal’ 
in the ‘abnormal’ setting of the mental hospital ward. This attitude is in itself 
discriminatory and contrary to the N&MC Code o f Professional Conduct (June 
2002) which states that nurses are:
‘...personally accountable for ensuring that you promote and protect the 
interests and dignity of patients and clients, irrespective of gender, age, 
race, sexuality... (2.2.pp3-4)
If males and females do not function differently when working as caregivers, what 
does emerge from the fieldwork findings is that amongst practitioners of both 
sexes there are examples of virtuous and non-virtuous agents who care for and
about, or fail to do either. The relevant factor in their attitudes and acts is that of
the agent’s character and is not gender-related. To claim, therefore, as Noddings 
(1984) does, that females are ‘essentially’ carers, whilst men are not is, at best, 
over-simplistic. Neither does there appear to be any real difference in attitudes to 
power. Although this is something which traditionally men seek to exercise, most 
users perceived little difference in treatment received from male and female 
healthcare workers of all disciplines. However, women are possibly more subtle 
in their exercise of power, in terms, for example, of being more prepared to use 
covert means of medicating the user than engage in direct confrontation with 
him/her.
Although Noddings (1984) and Gilligan (1982) consider the search for universal 
principles to be a male preoccupation, the research findings do not support this 
view. Male and female practitioners gave reasons for their acts in some ethical 
dilemmas, whilst in others -  the majority -  they pointed ‘to feelings, situational 
conditions and their sense of personal ideal’. Sometimes they act on principles, at 
others on intuition, but rarely it would seem, with professional codes of good 
practice at the forefront of their decision-making and acts.
Communication skills, as the previous chapter indicated, are central to good 
practice. Ease of communication and trust have been shown to depend more upon 
the practitioner’s character, amongst other things, than his/her gender. Therefore, 
whilst Gilligan may be right that women speak “in a different voice”, this neither 
renders all men incapable of listening to and understanding women’s narratives, 
nor vice versa. There can, therefore, be no legitimation of gender stereotyping in 
caring from the point of view of communication for men, on the whole, appear
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capable of practising caring and emotional labour in this with no less skill than 
women.
It appears that Noddings’ views were not informed by a previous empirical study 
but by social stereotypes when she says:
‘An ethic built on caring is characteristically and essentially feminine -  
which is not to say that it cannot be shared by men, any more than 
traditional moral systems cannot be embraced by women ... But an ethic 
of care arises out of our experience as women’ (1984,p8).
There may be differences in the way in which men and women communicate and
reason in ethical dilemmas, but caring per se is, the research findings show, not
significantly influenced by gender. 75% (6) of the male practitioner interview
respondents appear to be “natural” (innate) carers, whilst 28.5% (2) of their
female counterparts are evidently not: 'It’s just a job like any other’ (POBJ). Over
70% of all practitioner respondents (in questionnaires and interviews) see caring,
whether natural, or the product of emotional labour, as an important component of
good practice.
Even if this were not so, after analysing the fieldwork findings, the definition of 
“caring” itself must be questioned. These show that Noddings’ definition is 
excessively narrow in that it embraces only traditional “feminine” aspects of 
caring. In the right context simply changing a light bulb (traditionally a male task) 
can be construed as equally as caring as, for example, feeding. Unqualified 
support workers of both sexes now play crucial roles in assisting people suffering 
mental disorder in the process of their re-incorporation into community life. What
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has been described as the ‘ordinary humanity’2 of these volunteers makes them 
aware of and prepared to help with simple daily tasks often overlooked by 
professional community practitioners more concerned with controlling 
medication, or unable to perform such acts due to health and safety regulations. 
Users greatly value the ‘whole person, whole life’ approach adopted by support 
workers who can be flexible in their means of promoting flourishing. In many 
respects, by caring both for and about these users in this way, these volunteers do 
more for the formers’ flourishing simply by treating them as equals, than 
professional practitioners with their medical knowledge and psychological 
“expertise”.
6.3. Ethical frameworks and the attitudinal and behavioural characteristics 
of practitioners in mental health settings
From Fig. 6.2. and what has so far been said, it is evident that there are instances 
in mental health practice in which all the ethical frameworks described in 
Chapters Two and Chapter Four are employed. In order to create a clearer picture 
of the situation as revealed by the Fieldwork, examples of each will now be 
discussed, compared and contrasted.
The prima facie principles behind ethical reasoning are autonomy, beneficence, 
non-maleficence and justice. In a principles-based ethic, these are weighed against 
one another in moral decision-making, although this balancing is relative, 
depending upon the importance which the decision-maker gives to each. Whilst 
such an approach is an excellent means of evaluating the pros and cons of each 
case, it may be considered excessively ngid to be of use alone in resolving 1
1 Society Guardian 17.04.02 -  Society Guardian.co.uk/story/0,7843,685237,OOhttp
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“irrational” dilemmas inherent to the daily reality of mental health practice3.
Under deontological codes (and under the law), practitioners are considered to
have duties, such as a responsibility to “section” a potentially suicidal psychotic
user in terms of the user’s right to protection:
‘No-one can give consent on behalf of an incompetent patient. However, 
you may still treat such a patient if the treatment would be in their best 
interests. (These) go wider than best medical interests, to include such 
factors as the wishes and beliefs of the patient when competent... their 
general well-being and their spiritual and religious welfare...’ (12 key 
points on consent: the law in England -  Department of Health, 23618 l,p 
250k, March 2001).
Such is the ethical framework behind, for example, the stringent rules requiring 
that some (questionably) mentally disordered people be incarcerated in secure 
hospitals for indefinite periods. These are outlined in a draft mental health bill 
published by the Department of Health in June, 20024. Under them, users living in 
the community who refuse to take prescribed medication could be forcibly 
detained and taken to hospital for prolonged treatment.
To take ‘sectioning’ or involuntary admission for hospital treatment, as an 
example, both deontological and consequentialist approaches are appropriate to 
this. The Mental Health Act (1983) requires the person to have a mental disorder 
‘of a nature or degree’ that makes hospital treatment appropriate in terms of the 
user’s health and safety or for the safety and protection of others. It could be 
argued that the notion of dangerousness pervades this framework and the rights of 
the user questionably respected in a situation in which detention (effectively what 
it is) does not follow a judicial process, but an application by a trained social 
worker, or the user’s relatives, supported by a medical practitioner.
3 For example, is a religious experience involving a message from God '‘real" or "delusional”?
4 And subsequently temporarily “shelved" by Parliament
Beauchamp and Childress (1994) claim that the principles of autonomy (the user’s 
wishes) and beneficence (his/her best interest, all things considered) are those to 
weigh against one another in this situation. Whilst the lack of rationality which is 
a necessary condition to some psychiatric diagnoses impairs the ability to make 
autonomous choices, these authors consider that beneficence can and should take
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precedence over autonomy and that sectioning ‘in the patient’s best interest’ may 
be justified.
The problem here is that declaring someone “irrational” is a subjective value 
judgement and sometimes very hard to justify. Pat Bracken describes a case which 
proves this point:
‘One woman was referred with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and delusions 
of being attacked. The team’s workers discovered that her husband was 
regularly beating her up’. (Guardian Society, 26.01.00).
Most qualified practitioners (93% overall) consider themselves sometimes better 
able to judge what is in the user’s (and possibly public’s) “best interest” than the 
user him/herself and that involuntary admission is permissible “to avoid greater 
harm”. However, whilst 78% of users agree that sectioning sometimes is 
necessary, the phrase ‘best interest’ frequently has little to do with their needs or 
values, much less rights. The fact that although 93% of their colleagues believe 
that involuntary admission to hospital is permissible “to avoid greater harm” , 7% 
of practitioners consider it to be never “morally permissible” may reflect this 
view.
The latter claim that involuntary admission is more closely related to protecting 
the interests of the family or society than those of the user. When sectioning does
occur against the user’s wishes but is, in view of his/her condition, considered in 
the best interest of all concerned, what could be said to prevail are: the principle 
of beneficence; the consequentialist greatest happiness of the greatest number; 
caring and, arguably, the virtues o f  phronesis and charity. Clearly, the boundaries 
between one type of ethic and another can, as philosophers such as Hursthouse 
(1999) and Foot (2001) insist, be remarkably tenuous in practice.
To refer back to the quote which opened Chapter 6.2., although practitioners may
take what they consider the right action, regardless of the ethical framework, in
practice such choice must be tempered by the knowledge that their acts are
patient-centred, in the truest sense of this word, rather than overbearing or
designed to avoid possible litigation or disciplinary action (Noguera, 2000). This
is far from easy. The examples which follow illustrate the nature of the dilemma
which confronts practitioners when sectioning:
‘Nearly two years ago, after a suicide attempt, I was sectioned and locked 
in a secure unit, the justification for this being that I was not taking my 
medication. This was a conscious decision on my part. I had already taken 
a number of different medication, which I believe contributed to my 
suicide attempt. I considered this to be my right. The psychiatrists 
demurred and locked me up. This is a terrifying and traumatic experience 
in which without ever seeing a court of law, you are taken from your 
home ...locked in what is, to all intents and purposes, a prison. Your 
distress at this experience is then cited as... a further justification for 
keeping you locked up. I was lucky, being white, middle-class and with a 
lot of supportive friends. With their help. I persuaded a tribunal to release 
me and have since lived .. .without recourse to suicide. But if I needed the 
help of the psychiatric services, I could not possibly go near them for fear 
of ... sectioning again. This is a fear that the Government’s proposals will 
make common.’(Anonymous, The Guardian letters page, 27.06.02).
‘...we believe (Christopher) Clunis did have a right to be detained and 
treated, having had contact with 43 different psychiatrists in a five-year 
period and having ultimately lost his liberty for a very long time ... we 
also believe that compelling him to take his medication might have ... 
allowed him to continue to live the dignified life he was clearly capable 
of... It seems we should allow people to deteriorate in the community to
the point where they become psychotic before intervention, because to 
intervene would be an infringement of their rights...’ (Michael Howlett, 
Director, The Zito Trust, The Guardian letters page, 28.06.02.)
and finally, an interview respondent:
‘I think you’ll agree with me that sectioning should have, and has to some 
extent, all sorts of safeguards against abuse, but also that there are times 
when it is necessary to deprive a mentally disturbed person of his liberty. 
Is confinement enough? If so, doctors and nurses should make that 
confinement as pleasant as possible’. (UOA).
The ethical justification for involuntary treatment is inevitably based on facts, but 
not, as the points of view above illustrate, facts per se but on their interpretation 
by the different agents involved. Interpretation is inseparable from the personal 
values of the practitioner and for this reason, these are discussed in Chapter 
Seven.
Although no strict adherence to particular ethics or codes of good practice 
emerged from analysis of respondents’ interviews, the behaviour which they 
describe did meet many of the ethical principles described in Chapter One. Most 
acts described by practitioners met the principle of rationality, insofar as they 
were supported by generally acceptable reasons. Not consciously based on ethical 
codes, or the notion of good practice per se, but on the subjective concept of the 
patient’s best interest, or flourishing. 'We do not deliberate about the ends, but 
about things that are conducive to ends’ (NEW, 1112bl 1-12). This can be 
understood as what the healthcare worker concerned considered this to be in 
keeping with the ‘duty of care’ cited in codes of professional conduct, rather than 
a commonly agreed ideal, and weighed the interests not only of the user, but of his
or her family, and society in general5. The individual was almost always 
considered in the context of the community, an authentically Aristotelian notion6 
and practitioners frequently spoke of ‘getting (the user) back to the fam ily’ as a 
desirable outcome. However, the earlier example of the “Prozac Sandwich” shows 
that meeting the requirements of the principle of rationality does not necessarily 
imply agreeing with fellow practitioners on the means to a mutually desirable end. 
As Aristotle pointed out, two virtuous agents can disagree as to the resolution to a 
dilemma, whilst being perfectly justified in continuing to consider one another 
virtuous.
Another principle, that of “least harm” or nonmaleficence (sometimes linked to 
that of beneficence) includes various aspects of not harming and of the virtues of 
compassion, mercy and gentleness. According to Frankena, (cited in Beauchamp 
and Childress p!90) nonmaleficence includes the obligation not to inflict harm, or 
that which is bad; the obligation to prevent harm; the obligation to remove evil or 
harm and finally the obligation to promote good. Inherent to the problem of 
defining “harm” is the difficulty in using the same work to describe harm to others 
and to self. Is it reasonable to describe self-neglect, in the form of refusing to eat, 
for example, as harm? There are also concerns about whether different concepts 
of harm should apply to the risk of the user harming him/herself or others. Harm,
s This involves the employment of what in the philosophy of values are known as 'counterfaetuals' 
explained in the following chapter.
0 'The student of ethics is unlikely to discover how a good man will act unless he has some 
knowledge of the general capacities and characteristics of human beings (see 1.13). It is 
anthropology ... which must provide that background knowledge and one of the most familiar 
utterances of Aristotelian anthropology is the truism that man is a 'political animal' I097b8-11; 
Politics I253a2): distinctively human activity is carried on in a social setting'. Barnes, J. (1976) 
p l  8).
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of whatever kind, is usually situation-specific in mental health practice and this 
makes determining risk extremely difficult.
All practitioner respondents agreed on the importance of the principal of non­
maleficence as an ideal for practice, whilst at the same time conscious of the fact 
that it is by no means currently all-prevailing. Modem writers on ethics have 
pointed out that it might be necessary to accept substantial risks to one’s own 
safety to ensure that of others. It could be that mental health practitioners, too, 
cannot properly perform their professional function without undertaking some risk 
such as exposing themselves to a violent user, in order to protect other users. The 
obligation not to inflict harm under such circumstances is difficult to respect, but 
nonetheless it appear that most health care workers exercise great constraint, at 
least insofar as physical harm is concerned. However, ‘subtle’ punishments and 
‘chemical coshes’ are arguably themselves intended to inflict at least some harm:
‘I'm not sure how many psychiatrists would claim to be disciples of 
Watson and Skinner, but I can tell you from personal experience that 
patients who misbehave usually end up being punished by one means or 
another. When they are deemed to have leamt their lesson, privileges are 
restored. Is it wrong to deprive people of their dignity and privacy? Yes, 
probably, but in a psychiatric ward it can be arranged very easily. More 
easily than beating up the patients, for instance’ (UOA).
It is more difficult to reconcile other principles, such as that of consistency with 
mental health practice, for moral actions in this clearly cannot be binding in the 
way which this principle demands. Even given the same relevant circumstances, 
the particular characteristics o f mental disorder make it impossible to 
categorically state that the moral actions undertaken in one situation, and the 
reasons which provoked these actions, can justifiably be binding in all similar 
situations. Practitioners are aware that every moral dilemma in mental health
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must be resolved on its unique merits and this casuistic framework is often also 
evident (see Fig.6.2.) upon analysing their descriptions of seeking a resolution to 
an ethical dilemma. To a certain extent, the casuistic approach is forced upon 
practitioners by the very fact that their professional codes offer no guidance on 
dealing with the "unusual” situations which arise in mental health practice.
The same can be said of the principle of impartiality, for in mental health practice
there will frequently be good reasons for treating people differently to one
another. This is not always adversely discriminatory, but rather a question of
professional discrimination, of endeavouring to give each user what he or she
requires in order to nourish. A practitioner says:
‘You do try to be impartial, but we’re only human’. (POBJ)
Whilst the General Medical Council states that:
‘In all these matters you must never discriminate unfairly against your 
patient and colleagues’ (G.M.C., London).
6.3.1. Casuistry
This has been described as a competitor to the four principles approach and 
indeed, the casuistic approach does, at first glance, appear well-suited to the 
idiosyncrasies of mental disorder. Mental health practitioners often resolve ethical 
dilemmas as a team, reaching common agreement on the best line of action 
without having specifically considered the route by which they did so. This is 
reflected in the incidence of casuistry found in the fieldwork analysis (see 
Fig.6.2.). But common agreement is not, as cases such as that involving covert
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medication (see p333) reveal, always achieved in the type of dilemma which 
arises in mental health practice. This inability to “agree to differ” in ethical 
decision-making is only resolved in virtue ethics.
Owing to its lack of structure (see Chapter 2.2.), casuistry cannot meet the
requirements of professional colleges for normative ethics or codes of practice. In
addition, given that all those parties involved in resolving an ethical problem
might embrace different values, reaching common agreement might prove
impossible. Anyone spending time with a group of people suffering mental
disorder will rapidly be made aware of how diverse, and yet equally legitimate,
their values can be. Decision-making based on casuistry would frequently imply
common values ultimately prevailing, everyone, for example, agreeing that
medication would be a desirable action. In the present state of mental health care,
the prevailing values are unlikely to be the user’s:
‘A psychiatric patient dying of cancer is being denied his wish not to be 
injected with powerful anti-psychotic medication. (He) has untreatable 
cancer in his abdomen and lower back muscles. He suffers such acute pain 
that he finds it difficult to walk... his family do not expect him to live 
longer than five months.... (he) has requested to be relieved of the Depixol 
injection ... He says that not only is it humiliating to have the compulsory 
injection into his wasted muscles, but it causes him additional pain... the 
powerful tranquilliser drains him of energy, preventing him from carrying 
out his one lifelong passion -  painting. (He) has offered to take the 
medication in tablet form but two nurses and a psychiatrist last week drove 
to his flat ... to inject him. He was told that if he did not accept the 
injection, he would be taken back to psychiatric hospital. The treatment 
has angered local mental health workers and (his)family...(his ) son, who 
has been caring for his father says: ‘Since the injection, my dad’s soul has 
been destroyed. He is hurt and depressed ... All I want is for my dad to 
spend his last few days with dignity’. (Guardian Society, 1.11.00.)
This kind of treatment might be qualified as based on a deontological framework, 
‘rational’ practitioners, insisting on conformity to the rules implicit in
“sectioning” and unilaterally deciding the best interest of the ‘irrational’ user. It 
might also be considered an insensitive, even cruel abuse of power. That is not to 
say that there are no legal safeguards and the acceptance of the European 
Declaration of Human Rights will serve not only to strengthen further legal 
challenges, but will influence the implementation of the proposed new Mental 
Health Act (see Chapter 1.5.). Casuistry alone is clearly not enough in dealing 
with the ‘bureaucratic knots’ inherent to such situations.
6.3.2.Consequentialism
Rights, as such, have little relevance to consequentialist theory. This requires a 
careful balancing of the pros and cons of the situation under consideration in 
terms of maximising happiness. Unfortunately, this can (and often does) lead to 
the imposition of the practitioner’s values and the public’s opinions on those of 
the individual user. The QUALYS7 system illustrates this point. This is based on 
the idea that ‘the only objective of the health services is health maximization’ 
(Beauchamp and Childress, p 3 11) and involves asking users to evaluate health 
problems in terms of quality of life. The problem with this is that it disadvantages 
vulnerable minorities, such as the mentally disordered, for it prioritises what the 
majority wants over the needs of minorities (Crisp, 1994).
In the case of mental health practice, consequentialist theory has resulted in 
community care receiving far more resources than the already grossly under­
resourced hospital practice (see Chapterl.5.1.) and many of the resources made 
available to the latter going, according to some practitioners, on acute beds for
7 Quality -  adjusted-life-years (QUALYS).
people who have been “sectioned”. The consequences of this a health problem
already viewed as morally dubious are that:
‘Many sufferers lack support. Many discover that family and friends, 
employers, are scared and not minimally sympathetic. It’s as if the illness 
was the patient’s fault. They fear taint by association and wish that he was 
suffering from diabetes or something they could talk about...’ (PBT)
They are also manifest in the descriptions of the Mental Health Services as the
“Cinderella” services and illustrated by user, practitioner and policy-maker
respondents’ views that these can be:
‘...at best non-therapeutic, at worst damaging, degrading and dangerous. 
Disastrously under-staffed, over- stretched and lacking basic amenities, 
many provide little more than medication and containment.’
(A. Faulkner, a user cited in Guardian Society, 24.10.01.pl04)
In the consequentialist quest for the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the
happiness of society could involve provoking the distress, but arguably best
interest, in terms of QUALYS, of the user. However, if the restriction of civil
liberties is considered necessary, this should, in the opinion of practitioners and
users, be matched by patient-centred healthcare services of a decent quality.
Neither prevention of harm, nor admission as “asylum” can justify detention for
treatment in the absence of adequate resources. Disregard for the user’s needs and
values sits uneasily with the notions of patient-centred medicine and human
rights.
On the subject of rights, Dickenson and Fulford (2000) point out that these can 
result in genuine care ‘becoming tied up in bureaucratic knots’ (p38) and there is a 
common-sense intuition amongst most practitioners that severely disordered 
people who could be helped by treatment should receive this. Chodoff (1976) 
argues that psychiatrists “succumb” to prevailing fashion if they consider
involuntary admission to hospital to be in the user’s best interest and do not seek 
to act in these interests. This may be the case, but users are increasingly aware of 
their rights, thanks to the efforts of user groups and lawyers. An ethic which 
equilibrates these with practitioners’ professional expertise (or what Perlin ,1991, 
refers to as their notion that there is a ‘higher morality’ to which mental health 
professionals ‘owe some sort of higher duty’8) is therefore essential.
6.3.3. Neo-Aristotelian Virtue ethics
Professional expertise combined with a “higher morality” might be thought to find 
a certain resonance in Aristotle’s belief that the virtuous agent could be identified 
by his/her possession of phronesis, or undivided excellence in reasoning. In 
N.E.VI.5, he describes the virtuous agent as being ‘able to deliberate nobly about 
what is good and expedient for himself, not in particular respects ... but about 
what conduces to living well as a whole’. Virtue ethics, in a case such as that 
described in the section on casuistry above, would require the agents concerned to 
participate in an exercise of practical wisdom (phronesis), in which all aspects of 
the dilemma and its effect upon user’s and practitioners’ flourishing would be 
considered before a “virtuous” decision was reached.
Aristotle’s virtuous agent is good at both choosing and doing, for in him/her 
desire and judgement agree. In acquiring the hexii or stable dispositions described 
in Chapter 2.4., the agent also acquires moral values (ethike arête). The actions of 
such a person lie in the golden mean -  a state in which the virtuous agent is 
‘neither excessively given to the various motivations prompting to action, nor
" Perlin describes this notion as 'empirically , an extraordinarily important one' which is 'strangely 
under discussed’ iPerlin, 1991). Research into such questions does appear to be lacking.
insufficiently sensitive to them, but responsive to the right extent, so as to choose 
each motivation to the right degree, on the right occasions, for the right 
reasons...’ (Honderich,p540). It could be argued that, given casuistry’s inability 
to frame a structured ethic, only virtue ethics is truly appropriate to patient- 
centred medicine insofar as it allows for respecting the user’s autonomy, 
something Morwenna Griffiths, speaking of the psychiatric context, describes as 
having:
‘...the advantage that it is not so obviously related to dependence ... It 
carries ...the overtones of ‘liberation’ and emancipation more obviously 
than independence does’(Griffiths, 2000, p47).
This is totally and, in the context of patient-centred medicine, unjustifiably
disregarded in the previous case. Whilst principles-based ethics presume to be
capable of judging what is in other people’s best interest and needs, virtue ethics
demands not only phronesis, but also prudence, humility and justice (amongst
other virtues) in the joint decision-making process. The virtuous agent would not
necessarily oppose involuntary admission, or covert medication but would
recognise that moral virtue cannot always be reduced to what is socially
approved. The virtuous practitioner would have the courage to take a decision that
the user, his/her family or even society itself might greet with reprobation if s/he
considered that it would lead to flourishing.
However, seeking knowledge of user’s and carers needs and values would be 
essential to virtue (and empirical) ethics for, as Campbell (1996) indicates, the 
values and priorities of the former and those of the practitioner could (as in the 
case described above) be totally opposed:
‘He thought I should continue with the medication and was convinced that 
I’d go back on it... but I felt that my quality of life would be so much 
better without the dreadful side-effects’. (ULD).
As Chapter 1.5.3. indicated, scientific knowledge and values can blind
practitioners to the user’s less tangible emotional needs and personal scale of
values. The virtuous practitioner, aware of this risk would endeavour to avoid
such abuse. The ethical justification for sectioning turns, ‘centrally, not on the
facts but how the facts were interpreted and understood’ (Dickenson and Fulford,
p39). How the dilemma as a whole is conceptualised is ‘ethically crucial’
(Op.cit.p40) and the interpretation and understanding necessary to this depend
upon practitioners’ characters and ability to employ critical reflexivity and
p krone sis.
Although virtue ethics can embrace principle such as benevolence, it depends 
more upon character virtues than upon these. However, as was argued in Chapter 
2.4.2., virtue ethics has sufficient in common with deontological ethics to be 
considered normative and therefore capable of informing codes or guidelines for 
good practice. ‘Properly motivated persons often do not merely follow the rules; 
they have a morally appropriate desire to act as they do’ (Beauchamp and 
Childress, 1994, p64). Actions are only virtuous if performed in the right state of 
mind for virtuous actions consist in right action and right motive. They must also 
involve experiencing the appropriate feelings. However, moral discernment and 
moral integrity, two very important virtues in mental health practice, given the 
vulnerability of the user, have no clear link to motives, or feelings per se. In them, 
‘behaviour and psychological properties are paramount’ (ibid) and the same could
be said of emotional labour and the ethic of care.
6 .3 .4 . T h e  F e m in i n e  E th i c  o f  C a r e
Campbell (1996) has pointed to the relevance of care and virtue ethics in the 
promotion of autonomy in healthcare generally. In biomedical ethics and care 
ethics, critical voices have described the principles-based approach of deontology 
and consequentialism to ethics as excessively limiting and inflexible in resolving 
ethical dilemmas. There is no provision in them for the analysis and consideration 
of important variants such as gender, culture and power and they disregard the 
context of the situation and values of the relevant players.
Practitioners of care ethics may appear more impetuous, or intuitive, in their 
decision-making, but this is no reason to doubt that their acts are informed by a 
prior process of rational reflection, particularly when the practitioner’s view is 
based on long experience of ward practice. Deliberation of one kind or another 
lies behind every moral decision, even those not reached by some form of explicit 
calculation, or reference to a deontological code. In Book II of the Ethics, 
Aristotle insists that moral decisions are always choices (proairesis) and 
consequently supported by deliberation, by which he means that they are always 
backed by reasons which constitute a deliberative argument in favour of the 
particular decision. Although he was not referring to women at the time, since in 
the context of ancient Athens "femaleness was symbolically associated with what 
reason had left behind" (Lloyd, 1984,p2), the same must apply to women’s 
reasoning today. Or not quite, for Noddings suggests that:
‘Women enter the moral realm through a different door ... although (they) 
can
construct hierarchies of principles and argue deductively, they are apt to
regard such displays of reasoning as besides the point. When it comes to
deciding whether to withhold further medical treatment from her dying
child, for example, a woman is not likely to approach this intensely 
personal decision as she would an extremely difficult math problem. ... 
She will need to consult her feelings, needs, impressions and sense of 
personal ideal’. (Noddings, 1984, pp3-4)
An analysis of the male respondents’ transcripts gives the impression that most of 
them would react in the same way in similar circumstances. Neither feeling, nor 
emotion are, the fieldwork analysis shows, the prerogative of women, nor is 
reason that of men.
6.4. Generational differences
The only noteworthy difference insofar as attitudes to ethical practice are 
concerned is inter-generational, rather than gendered. Young practitioners tend to 
be more idealistic, identify more with the users and appear more committed to 
them emotionally. Older ones, although concerned for the users’ well-being, are 
far more pragmatic about 'keeping a quiet ward' (POBJ) and ensuring that ’... the 
troublemakers don’t disturb the others' (PNA)9. When asked, for example, about 
handling a crisis, a young nurse considers that talking to the disturbed user should 
be enough, but would use pharmacological restraint if absolutely necessary, 
responding ‘(I) can’t answer that one, it depends on the situation’(PBA). 
However, an older colleague says:
‘If a patient is psychotic, talking is not always a viable option, but is 
usually tried first, although we have to protect ourselves. Nobody seems to 
think about us, our position in these situations. You've been talking about 
flourishing"’. It’s hard to see how anyone here could flourish if the nurses 
were all in hospital with broken bones! ’ (PNA). *10
’ A similar generational difference is reported between medical students and more experienced 
doctors in Robertson, 1998.
10 I had earlier asked what the person in question understood by the term ‘flourishing' or 'well- 
being' in the context of mental health practice
Aristotle claimed that the young, because they lack experience of the world, could 
not exercise moral wisdom (Ethics VI-1142a8). In view of these quotes, it could 
be argued that what mental health practitioners develop with experience is 
pragmatism, rather than wisdom. Perhaps in the context of the present lack of 
resources in mental health services, these are the same thing. Whatever the case, 
whilst context and value clearly do have a role to play in evaluating good practice 
and ethical codes, situations such as those described, involving the unpredictable 
and “irrational”, sit uneasily with rigid codes of any kind.
6.5. Do Current Codes Influence Good Practice?
Sixty percent of users considered current codes to be respected by practitioners. 
The latter also describe them as satisfactory and pay lip service to obeying them , 
but analysis of their comments reveals that the majority of carers interviewed tend 
to rely on intuitive common sense, rather than codes and rules, when confronting 
ethical dilemmas. Only two interview respondents - a male psychiatrist and a 
female nurse -  openly admitted that they were not always followed. Practitioners 
responding to the questionnaires had less inhibitions, nine (30%) of these 
describing current professional codes as unsatisfactory. Eighteen (60%) of these 
practitioners had also seen a colleague behave in a ‘cruel and unprofessional’ 
fashion towards a user. One left this question unanswered and eight (26.6%) 
replied that this had never been the case. This data, if reliable (and in the light of 
the fear of surveillance evidenced in accessing the sample, anonymity may have 
encouraged greater frankness) supports Pritchard’s opinion (2001) and the 
fieldwork finding, that in mental health practice current codes are widely ‘more 
honoured in the breach than in the practice’ (see Chapter One).
Whilst aware of their professional college’s codes of good practice, all
practitioners indicated that behaviour towards users could and should depend
more upon the contingencies of the situation than upon specific rules or
regulations. They considered these “guidelines” rather than mandatory, in spite of
their wording, and not particularly helpful:
‘We get told ...w e’re not allowed to inflict pain upon the patients 
... but if I feel my life’s at risk ... I’m going to do anything to get 
this man’ (PLN)
With regard to medication, too, two female carers felt that covert medication, in 
the form of concealing drugs in food (a “Prozac sandwich”) was justifiable, whilst 
male nurses were less convinced of this, regardless of the fact that new N&MC11 
guidelines condone this practice in certain situations. The males’ objections were 
based on the fact that (in a nice mixture of metaphors) they would not themselves 
wish to be treated with chemical “coshes” by staff who saw their role as 
“babysitters”, preferring to try reasoning with the user in such matters.
This example belies the stereotypical images, described in Chapter Three, of 
controlling males as natural "coshers” and women as caring, natural “talkers”. In 
this case, male practitioners reveal themselves as caring, empathic and virtuous 
agents, at least in terms of justice and honesty. They see no reason to deceive and 
chemically control users who are no threat to others. The female carers 
demonstrate a degree of maternal over-protectiveness characteristic of Noddings' 
"Feminine Ethic of Care” in wishing to sedate and “tranquillise”, as they might a 
fractious baby. Given that they are overriding user autonomy, a consequentialist 
(rule utilitarian) approach involving deceiving the user in the interest of the well­
being of the greatest number -  family, practitioners and eventually, perhaps, the 
user him/herself - is also manifest.
Such deceit would not have met with the approval of Kant, or the virtue ethicist, 
for neither deontologist, nor virtuous agent, would contemplate such deceit. 
There is, nonetheless, a distinction to be made between the refusal of medication 
and refusal to cooperate with psychotherapy or group activities. It is possible to 
enforce physical treatments, such as medication, and expect a positive outcome, 
whereas it would be impossible to force anyone to co-operate with psychotherapy 
and movement therapies. How to distinguish between the duty of care and 
coercion in such cases is a debatable point, as is whether covertly medicating a 
user, albeit in the name of treatment, is a form of “battery”.
6.6. An ethic for flourishing, combining neo-Aristotelian virtue and care 
ethics
Users’ and practitioners’ views on what constitutes good practice, such as those 
described in this and the previous chapter, should be taken into account in framing 
the codes which regulate this. Although it has been impossible to consider every 
aspect of these, what their views and the spontaneity with which, in many cases, 
they expressed them, undoubtedly reflect certain inherent truths about ethics and 
practice today. In addition, as the fieldwork shows, if professional codes or 
guidelines are drawn up independently of these views, they will ultimately be 
‘more honoured in the breach than in the practice’. Given the combination of the 
uniqueness of many of the ethical dilemmas encountered in mental health
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practice, the pragmatic approach adopted by many practitioners and growing 
awareness of human rights, compromise must be considered the goal, rather than a 
“second best” outcome in the formulation of professional college’s codes of good 
practice. These should be guidelines, not rules, for given the current state of play 
in mental health care rules will inevitably be “bent” if not ignored in practice. 
More confidence needs to be placed in the practitioner’s judgement as a virtuous, 
caring agent and education in ethic for mental health practice must be a means to 
this end.
Gregory Pence (cited in Beauchamp and Childress, 1994) also contends that a 
virtues framework is that most suited to health care insofar as ‘almost any health 
professional can successfully evade a system of rules’ (Op.cit.p65). Pence 
recommends creating a climate in which health professionals have no desire to 
abuse the system (or their patients). This is, as this chapter has shown, a very 
sound reason for incorporating virtue ethics into the creation of codes of good 
practice, but making these both user and woman “friendly”, as neo-Aristotelian 
ethics would wish to do, also requires incorporating aspects of the (not so) 
feminine ethic of care.
This is because an aspect of all ethical codes criticised by Noddings is the relative 
paucity of their valoration of caring. She believes that this is a natural feeling 
which impels us to help our fellow human beings because they are important to 
us, and we wish to be important to them. This caring is a human condition, a truly 
Aristotelian ‘good’ which we cultivate as we grow older if we are genuinely 
caring beings. Tong (1998) describes it as ‘the virtue without which true human
community, and, therefore, bona-fide moral relationships are impossible’ (pl68). 
If this is so, then it is not only possible, but also important, to ‘recover’ or ‘create’ 
a caring attitude in all practitioners of both sexes.
Alisa Carse specifies ‘true care’ as ‘highlighting concrete and nuanced perception
and understanding - including an atonement of the reality of other people and to
the actual relational contexts we find ourselves in’. She claims that care ethics
stresses ‘the importance of an active concern for the good of others’ (Carse, 1995,
plO). Carse, like Lawrence Blum, who considers it to be based on altruistic
emotions, believes care to be the very core of morality and this clearly applies to
medical ethics. Pro Aristotle, and against deontology and consequentialism, these
authors believe that it is ‘neither desirable nor feasible to separate the agent from
his or her action’ (Tong, 1998, p 162). To quote Aristotle:
‘...virtuous acts are not done in a just or temperate way merely 
because they have a certain quality, but only if the agent also acts 
in a certain state, viz: (1) if he knows what he is doing, (2) if he 
chooses it and chooses it for its own sake and (3) if he does it from 
a fixed and permanent disposition’. (Ethics, Book II, 1105a25-30).
Carse’s and Blum’s, like that of Nodding’s, are arguably emotional responses to
ethics and naturally lead to the question of the emotional aspect of the
respondents’ answers. Which practitioners displayed action and emotion and
which felt that only action, often in the form of emotional labour, was required of
them? Female practitioners, the fieldwork shows, do not hold a monopoly in
caring. Men are equally capable of this. It is also necessary to consider users’
preferences. Some preferred the attentions of the skilled technician who is an
emotionally detached carer. However, the majority described the ideal carer as
someone, of either sex, who performs the necessary clinical tasks, but also
demonstrates an emotional attachment to the person receiving these attentions, 
making him/her feel cared for and about, regardless of whether this caring is 
spontaneous or a form of emotional labour. Can users, in any case, detect the 
difference between one and another if the latter is sufficiently skilful? The 
fieldwork reveals no evidence of this.
It has been repeatedly stressed that in the context of patient-centred medicine 
ethical codes must prioritise users’ values, wishes and psychological and social 
circumstances. This notion, far removed from the requirements of a deontological 
code, conforms closely to an ethic of care and neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. 
Whilst it has been shown that the user’s values, wishes and flourishing are not 
unfailingly prioritised in practice, society’s own values and the discourse of the 
“medical model” often taking preference, the fieldwork does reveal that many 
health workers clearly do care and display the qualities required of a virtuous 
agent:
‘There’s freedom here, compassion, understanding. It’s different from
hospital, the staff will do anything within their power to make you happy’
(PBT)
These qualities are the same whether described by user or practitioner: 
compassion, justice, technical skills, kindness, love, patience and good humour. 
Far from totally lacking these virtues, what many mental health practitioners lack 
is far more fundamental: resources, time and morale. This causes a deterioration 
in user-practitioner-public communication, a major ethical issue since it can result 
in disempowerment, dehumanisation and discriminatory treatment of users and, to 
a lesser but nonetheless palpable degree, practitioners. The result is a moral 
“malaise” in mental health practice which current codes of good practice may
sometimes alleviate, but do little to cure. Caring and curing are required of an 
ethic for mental health practice, for such a combination will lead to the flourishing 
of demoralised carers, users and practices. These, in turn, are linked to values and 
value judgements, discussed in the following chapter.
PART 3
OUTCOMES:
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS
/ may disagree with what you have to say, but 1 shall defend to the death 
your right to say it 
(Voltaire, 1694-1778)
CHAPTER SEVEN: Discussion
7.1. Introduction
This dissertation has revealed that the possibility of practitioner and user 
flourishing may, paradoxically, be forestalled, rather than facilitated, by existing 
codes of ethics and good practice. Their inadequacies are various, but the prima 
facie widening gap between ethics or codes developed by professional bodies for 
their members, and the latter’s and users’ views of what constitutes “good” practice 
in the context of day-to-day clinical work is evident. If current ‘ethics may be bad 
for good practice (see Chapter One) the question which this thesis must answer is: 
What type of ethic is "good” for this?
Rules and laws do not always evolve in harmony with the society which they are 
supposed to protect and this is also true of codes of professional practice. Recent 
criticism of the predominant deontological codes suggests that whilst these provide 
an excellent means of evaluating the pros and cons of ethical dilemmas, they are 
excessively inflexible (see Chapter Three) to be of use alone in resolving the 
problems and “irrational”1 situations which compose the daily reality of mental 
health practice (Beauchamp and Childress, 1984; Barker and Baldwin, 1991; 
Camphell, 1998). Neither are they sufficiently adaptable to meet the exigencies of 
patient-centred medicine in terms of increased user participation in care plans.
' In terms of "rationality" as defined by medical psychiatry, although describing something as "rational”, 
except in terms of strict philosophical logic, is inevitably a value judgement.
Deontological and consequentialist codes often tend to favour absolute principles, 
to the detriment of humanity, good sense and compassion (Compte-Sponville, 
2003). They also ignore several topics which any ethic for mental health practice 
needs to address today. These are motives and moral character; moral education; 
moral wisdom or discernment (phronesis); friendship and family relationships; 
flourishing (eudemonia) in the sense of achieving the objectively desirable life 
described in Chapter One; the role of the emotions and, finally, the questions of 
what kind of person we should be and how we should live (Hursthouse, 1999). All 
these topics, as has been explained, are discussed in Aristotle’s Ethics, a work 
which has been shown to be particularly relevant to good practice in mental health 
care.
Another highly influential ethic in nursing is the feminine ethic of care. Tong 
(1998) describes caring as 'the virtue without which true human community and, 
therefore, bona-fide moral relationships are impossible’ (p 168). Influenced by this 
definition and the fieldwork findings, this study suggests that the combination of 
neo-Aristotelian virtue and care ethics - an ethic for flourishing -  could provide the 
ideal framework for moral guidance in mental health practice. Caring is, 
effectively, a virtue central to this but Nodding's person-centred approach and 
respect for user autonomy, whilst recognising the mutual dependence of human 
beings, overlooks something central to virtue ethics, the very fact of belonging to 
the 'true human community’ described by both Tong and Aristotle (see Chapter
One).
Noddings also forgets that genuine caring for a fellow human being requires great 
sensitivity, something considered by McDowell (Chapter Two) to itself be a virtue: 
'the sensitivity just is the virtue’. The empathy and sympathy implied in the term 
“engrossment”, whilst enabling recognition of another’s suffering, give no 
guidance on how to constructively respond to this. Indeed, such “engrossment” 
could cause practitioners to act in an irrational, excessively subjective fashion, 
ultimately causing more harm than good to the user. Given conditions such as 
these, the ethic of care per se must be rejected as inadequate to flourishing of the 
kind desired for mental health practice. However, the virtue of caring may form 
part of a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic for flourishing and, indeed, some feminist 
philosophers have already described the ethic of care as, in fact, a virtue ethic 
(Tong, 1998, Conly, 2001). As the previous chapter suggested, in view of the fact 
that practitioners of both sexes have been shown to be “carers” and users express a 
desire to be cared both “for” and "about”, the “care" element of Nodding’s ethic 
can he incorporated into a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic in which the hypothetical 
perils of "engrossment" are mitigated by the wisdom of phronesis, by virtues and 
by values additional to those inherent to mothering.
The fieldwork has revealed that as an evidently gender-neutral component of a 
virtue ethic, a care ethic does not guarantee any particular resolution to ethical 
dilemmas, but ensures that the interests of all involved parties are considered in 
terms of values, fairness and beneficial outcomes, rather than rights and duties. It 
emphasises both user autonomy2 and the practitioner’s role in including the former
As staled previously Ihe definition of autonomy employed here is that given by Morwenna Griffiths 
(2003), who takes autonomy to mean much the same us "independence” (p49).
as the primary agent in care plans, something which would make such an ethic 
particularly apt to patient-centred medicine and also amenable to user groups.
7.2. Gender, Caring and Communication
The sociological fieldwork analysis revealed that being a good carer depends on 
character, rather than sex, or obedience to rules or codes, although there exists amongst 
practitioners a palpable awareness of the duty of care. Some of these consciously 
assume the role of "professional carer”, treating their task as emotional as well as 
technological labour. Others care in a more matemalistic/patemalistic fashion, closer to 
the caring described by Noddings. Users clearly expect practitioners of both sexes to be 
well-trained and technically and culturally knowledgeable, but also seek from them a 
real interest in their personal flourishing. They wish to feel cared both for and about and 
whether this is “love” (see Chapter Two,) or a(n) (emotional) labour of love seems, like 
the sex of the carer, a matter of indifference as long as the source of this love is also 
clinically proficient.
A pre-requisite for caring “about” is good communication. This has an important role in 
patient-centred practice since various studies show that users’ perceptions of what 
happens within medical consultations are more valid than measurements based on 
coding structures (Elwin and Gwyn, 1999) and that finding common ground is a matter 
of perception rather than a quantifiable finding. However, achieving this requires 
excellent communication, so the relatively poor levels of this manifest in the research 
findings urgently need addressing if good practice is to be a reality, rather than an ideal. 
Evidence also suggests that the increased user participation in decision-making and care
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planning for which most respondents clamour would reduce health service costs, 
emphasising the critical but neglected part that the user-practitioner interaction plays in 
the efficient employment of the scarce resources of mental health practice (Rogers and 
Pilgrim, 2001).
The research findings reveal that a crucial element in communication “breakdown” is, 
according to seventy-one percent of practitioners, a lack of time to talk with users, 
something regarded as central to their professional commitment. Becoming experts in 
communication could facilitate a more constructive interpretation of users’ stories and 
the creation of a "democratic arrangement of voices” (Elwyn and Gwyn, 1999). Many 
patients consider telling their “stories” an integral part of treatment, which makes them 
feel respected and valued, factors essential in flourishing. However, listening takes time, 
a commodity practitioners of all disciplines lack. Understaffing and overwork are 
questions of policy, rather than ethics, but chronic under-resourcing (Rogers and 
Pilgrim, 2001) implies a discriminatory attitude on the part of policy-makers towards 
the "Cinderella” mental health services, which are evidently themselves (relatively) 
cared for, but not about.
When discussing communication, it must be remembered that no common language is 
necessarily available to all users and practitioners, whatever their gender and ethnicity. 
Often limited at best, communication with users from minority groups who do not 
necessarily speak the same language, or at least infer the same meanings, as their carers 
is especially difficult. This can result in the involuntary admission and excessively 
prolonged hospitalisation of users such as Afro-Caribbean males, whose use of Iritical
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or patois instead of English, which they regard as a “downpresser”3, may be interpreted 
as a hostile act, or manifestation of psychosis. Communication is a vital ethical issue, 
for it is inseparable from linguistic discrimination. This, in turn, causes other problems 
of malpractice, including loss of autonomy, disrespect for religious and cultural 
differences, disregard for the user’s views and, in some cases, treating the latter as 
stupid, or dangerous.
7.3. Discrimination and Stigmatisation
Considering respect for the ‘story’ or ideology of the mentally disordered “other” leads 
to another branch of philosophy not previously discussed. The fieldwork findings 
indicated that the major source of dissatisfaction in mental health practice is adverse 
discrimination, in all its forms. Users and practitioners frequently claim that the former 
are labelled as ‘different’, ‘lacking’ or ‘dangerous’ following diagnosis and 
subsequently treated as such. Due to this self-other dichotomy, (see Chapter One), 
regardless of their education and experience, once “labelled” mentally disordered, users 
describe their opinions and aspirations as no longer being accorded any serious worth. 
Previously respected teachers, lawyers, accountants and mechanics can, following 
diagnosis, be treated as principally belonging to the sub-category “mad” . From 
Aristotle’s point of view4, this would disqualify them from flourishing (see Chapter 
Two) and indeed, the loss of self-esteem initialed in the disorder is frequently 
compounded by stigmatisation, resulting from the changed attitudes of practitioners, 
family, employers and public servants, which cause users to feel ‘shame and disgrace’ 
(Williams, S. 1987, pl36). Stigma disrupts ‘the maintenance of a given, official self’
' Language of oppression 
Not shared by neo-Aristotelians.
(Lofland, 1980:41 cited in Williams, 1987, p 137), a self which user respondents have 
revealed as already in a parlous state following diagnosis.
Giddens’ theory of structuration claims that social life is more than random individual 
acts, but is not determined by social forces. He suggests that human agency and social 
structure are in a relationship with each other and it is the repetition of the acts of 
individual agents which reproduces the structure. This means that there is a social 
structure -  traditions, institutions, moral codes, and established ways of doing things - 
but these can be changed when people start to ignore, replace, or reproduce them 
differently. Goffman, too, '... notes that the attribution of a stigmatisation’ such as that 
described in Chapter Five, stems from the definitional workings of society, for ‘before a 
difference can matter much it must first be conceptualized by society as a whole’ 
(Williams,S.,1987, p 139). The research findings describe some sectors of society as 
considering mental disorder most undesirable. Avoiding this process of defining 
psychological or social difference as "alien” and deserving of stigmatisation, should 
therefore be a principal aim o f good practice and ethical formation. How can it be 
achieved?
Discrimination and stigmatisation are based on the application of an ideology, a scale of 
values. The problem with any ideology is that it represents only the views and 
interpretations of experience of the particular culture or group embracing it. For 
example, saving life, or killing are simply events until we label the former ‘good’ and 
the latter ‘bad’. To label anything in this way is to make a value judgement. By the 
same criteria if, for example, referring to a piece of music as ‘beautiful’, or a form of
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behaviour as ‘rational’ is to be justified, they must first be perceived as such. Values are 
not expressed by facts, but by judgements. Subjective participation and the conclusions 
drawn from this are essential. Since, as the fieldwork findings show, discrimination in 
mental health practice (and in society) appears to be founded upon popular, but ill- 
informed value judgements, it is essential for practitioners to be made aware of this 
factor of personal participation in the formation of these. It is, this dissertation has 
argued, value judgements, not ethics or codes of practice, which cause tensions in the 
user-practitioner relationship. It is therefore these which must first be addressed. Since 
owing to their personal values human beings are often unable to agree on significant 
issues for any length of time, it follows that no ideological code can provide a universal, 
much less permanent answer to moral dilemmas, including those inherent to mental 
disorder. Policy makers, practitioners and society generally need to recognise this.
Adopting a pragmatic point of view, if our views on what constitute ‘rational’ behaviour 
and good mental health are based, as has been said, on an ideology and dominant scale 
of values, it becomes necessary to consider the nature and characteristics of values, 
specifically moral values, in understanding the dynamics of moral attitudes and 
promoting the merits of an ethic for flourishing.
7.3.1. Values and Mental Health Practice
Two main issues arise insofar as the role of values in the context of good practice in 
mental health is concerned. The first, how to recognise relevant moral values. The 
second, how to distinguish between values and ethical norms. They can be resolved by 
exploring the following four questions:
- To what extent is a process of value change taking place in patient-centred mental 
health practice?
The fieldwork findings reveal that in community care there is a greater emphasis on 
user autonomy and the notion of the user as a “partner” in the therapeutic relationship, 
in spite of what Rogers and Pilgrim (2001) describe as a prevailing ‘professional 
inertia’. This emphasis is likely to increase under the National Service Framework 
guidelines, unless the proposed Mental Health Act becomes law, in which case users 
admitted as involuntary patients may experience less, rather than more autonomy. 
Accountability is also greater, causing a certain stress in those practitioners who feel 
"threatened” by what they see as over-interference with their task, but empowering 
users, who are less vulnerable as a result. However, the major change, is that due to the 
efforts of user movements (Crossley, N. 2000. p i33) and critical psychiatrists, patient- 
centred mental health care is gradually becoming, as the adjective implies, more aware 
of the needs, values and rights5 of the user.
What is the meaning, status and relevance of the value concept in changing 
perspectives on ethics and good practice in mental health?
There is growing awareness of and respect for users’ values, which means that 
expressions such as “must” and “shall" are becoming redundant in ethics and codes of 
good practice since the research findings show that, as a rule, decisions are made 
according to the context of the situation and the experience of the practitioner. For this 
reason, mandatory codes arc currently extensively disregarded, practitioners tending to 
employ intuition, empathy and common sense in resolving ethical dilemmas.
Hut sec Rogers and Pilgrim (2001), Chapter Five for a more pessimistic account of this.
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What distinct value orientations can be empirically documented? Are there 
indications of new ones? What are the social and gender antecedents of specific 
value orientations in practice?
Paternalism, although not unknown, is ceding to a more ‘democratic arrangement of 
voices’, whilst an equally disempowering “maternalism” is to be found amongst some 
female practitioners. There is evidence of a move towards greater respect for the user 
and a less “moralistic” attitude amongst practitioners and public, but this is far slower 
than users would wish. Many sectors of society still regard mental disorder as a “bad 
thing” in more than one sense.
What is the impact of notions of values and rights on policy and behaviour amongst 
users, practitioners and managers?
The Mental Health Services are grossly under-resourced by comparison with other 
branches of health care. This policy of relative neglect implies discrimination against 
both users and practitioners, perpetuated by the stigmatisation of mental disorder 
prevalent in many sectors of the popular media. However, this situation is increasingly 
recognised as untenable and very real steps are being taken to improve mental health 
care6
What arc the implications of these findings about values (and changes in these) for 
mental health practice today? Discussion of this ensues. It will conclude by claiming 
that in relating education on values and virtues to notions drawn from the ideals of love 
and care expressed in Noddings’ ethic of care, a middle way or neo-Aristotelian “golden
' See Dull (2001 ) Making il Happen: A Guide la Delivering Menial Health Promotion', National Service 
Framework for Mental Health; Mentality.net.uk.
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mean”7, can be achieved. This could cause practitioners and policy-makers to replace 
codes of good practice with more flexible ethical ‘statements’ or guidelines, which give 
expression to the values necessary to flourishing, caring and the “good” life for which 
practitioner and user must ultimately strive, helping to promote this in practice.
Scales of value are also relevant to the development and expression of emotion. Clarity 
of feeling is vital in this context given that both the lowest and the highest value are 
indefinable. Appreciating them, therefore, depends upon our sense of value. Feelings 
and emotions are clarified when we develop, through awareness of difference and 
detail, a wealth of differentiated feelings. Emotions can be very intense in mental health 
settings in which a single feeling such as joy, or anger, can completely overwhelm 
someone and consequently falsify and colour their thinking and acts. Value judgements 
often comment as to the "wondcrfulness” or “awfulness” of a situation, but if emotions 
are to generate knowledge it is necessary - in an exercise of emotional intelligence 
inseparable from effective emotional labour - to differentiate and discriminate these in 
a constructive fashion. Scales of value assist this process by increasing attention to 
detail and contradictions, thereby serving the simultaneous development of feelings and 
knowledge. In considering contradictions, it should be remembered that values normally 
develop from the common domain, but that the user, by virtue of his/her disorder is 
excluded from this commonality. This is a major problem since it can involve a process 
of reduction of the individual or the particular, to the universal - a form of 
discriminatory “pigeon-holing”, which fails to take account of such exclusion. An 
explanation of how an ethic for flourishing could remedy this situation follows.
In this. Aristotle describes the extremes of excess and delect (NEII 1104a-10-27)
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Because of the problems emerging from and associated with adverse discrimination, it 
is impossible to speak of ethics in isolation from values. Almost everything related to 
deliberate human behaviour has an ethical dimension. Consequently, it has been 
claimed that we should educate in freedom, for freedom, as a base for an ethical life. In 
the case of mental health practice, this would imply that it is not sufficient to know what 
professional and personal moral values are, but also necessary to incorporate them into 
carers’ and users’ lives, together with the awareness that they can be diverse, without 
those of the ‘other’, mentally disordered or not, being necessarily labelled ‘perverse’. 
As Voltaire (1694-1778) said: ‘1 may disagree with what you have to say, but 1 shall 
defend to the death your right to say it’.
A moral value is essentially the stable belief that something is good or bad, positive or 
negative. People are moral beings insofar as under normal circumstances they appear to 
possess an innate knowledge of the objective difference between good and bad. They 
are equally aware of the possibility of committing "good” or “bad” acts. The 
"goodness” or “badness” of these depends not upon their physical realisation, but upon 
the end sought and the way in which this is construed by the agent. This is why, in the 
disagreement over covert medication (see Chapter Six) it is impossible to claim that 
either opinion was definitively good, or bad. Both ends, although different were, given 
the situation, rationally justifiable and both sets of agents virtuous in their way. In the 
context of a virtue ethic disagreements are resolved by balancing such legitimately 
different perspectives. An act is simply “good” when its end is to promote nourishing or 
well-being and “bad” when it reduces or terminates this.
2 4 7
The list of things having value is endless. Many do so because of the special role they 
play in our lives. However, this should not be confused with a subjective theory of the 
nature of value. It is an objective truth that something that holds a special significance 
in someone’s life will have value for that person and this cannot be overlooked in 
decision-making. Many philosophers (Moore, Brentano and the previously mentioned 
Scheler), recognise a variety of things other than pleasure or satisfaction as having 
intrinsic value. This is why “flourishing” refers to a full, rather than happy life. In 
addition to certain kinds of pleasure, these philosophers count some, or all, of the 
following as intrinsically good: consciousness and the flourishing of life, knowledge 
and insight, moral virtue and virtuous actions, friendship and mutual affection, a just 
distribution of goods, and self-expression (Audi, p830). They are all things that 
virtuous, caring practitioners would wish to promote in the quest for flourishing.
7.3.2. Subjective or Objective? Mistaken or Divergent Gazes
On the other hand, although personal participation is required in the formation of 
values, they somewhat paradoxically refer to something objective. This is shown by the 
fact that in mental health practice - as in other walks of life -  judgements can and 
frequently are mistaken. A person may, for example, be clinically depressed, but those 
around him/her consider that s/he is simply lazy, a malingerer who should ‘pull himself 
together’, whilst s/he is painfully aware of a total inability to do this. It is the quality of 
a life which makes it ‘good’ (or flourishing), not the judgements of others as to the
factors which make it so.
Dangerousness, to give another example prevalent in mental health practice, does not lie 
only in the often prejudiced ‘gaze’ of the beholder, but in the object of this gaze, too. 
Value judgements about human behaviour, ‘abnormal’ or otherwise, can be right, in the 
sense of well-grounded, or wrong, that is, groundless. This shows that values possess a 
foundation which is independent of us. Both subjective and objective elements must be 
considered, for failing to achieve a balance between them could lead to unsatisfactory 
ethical practice.
Because of the subjective elements, as has been said, it is often erroneously claimed that 
values are purely subjective, therefore potentially different for each individual, a 
question of personal preference and inclination, which cannot be fruitfully discussed. 
This is true of one type of value, such as, for example, in the aesthetic evaluation of a 
controversial work of art, but implies a serious underestimation of human intelligence to 
extend this attitude to all values. This is particularly the case insofar as moral values are 
concerned, for to label a person, or his acts, ‘evil’, ‘dangerous’ or ‘mad’ is not a mere 
question of taste and most judgements in mental health practice are based on moral, 
rather than aesthetic evaluations, although these could form part of the problem since 
people are sometimes labelled ‘mad’ on the strength of their appearance.
Practitioners therefore need to understand that because of these objective elements, the 
embodiment of a value tends to be confused with the value itself, or at least as an 
integral part of this. Many people, for example, would still appear to believe (if 
biological psychiatry and the proposed new Mental Health Act arc anything to go by) 
that it is not only therapeutic to shut up -  either physically or pharmacologically -
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people who are potentially harmful to themselves or others, but that the very concept of 
therapy is thus being ‘shut up’. This particular representation becomes the embodiment 
of the value itself. Values do not exist independently, as do objects, but must be 
embodied. We cannot know ‘sanity’ or ‘dangerousness’ in the abstract, yet the research 
findings reveal that many inoffensive users are aware of being considered both insane 
and dangerous by others. Since these concepts have to be embodied, we often think of 
the embodiment, rather than the value per se. When saving someone from committing 
suicide, we think of that person, not of the virtues inherent in our act.
That such identification is wrong becomes clear when as, according to the research 
findings happens in practice, the significance of such a value becomes relevant only 
because opinions concerning one of its embodiments change. Those who identify 
therapy with the notion of physically or pharmacologically ‘shutting up’ the user allow 
the disappearance of this when this notion cedes to the intention to talk to, consult and 
collaborate with users, allowing them to have their say in care plans and ‘flourish’ in 
accordance with their own values, rather than those imposed upon them.
To value something is to consider it preferable to something else; one could for example 
prefer respect to riches. Value beliefs are never isolated, but organised in the psyche in 
such a way as to create scales of relative preference of this kind. Each person, 
practitioner or user, has his/her personal -  but not unmodifiable - scale of values and 
true values, those which most intimately guide people through life, are few. Some arc 
claimed to be universal, in that there is a group of intrinsic or basic values (friendship, 
self-esteem, equality, peace, etc.) which, like some emotions, arc common to most of
humankind. What makes moral attitudes and acts differ is not the value system per se, 
but the degree of intensity with which these values are lived out. For whilst it is true that 
our values reflect our personalities, it is also true, as both Foucault and MacIntyre have 
indicated (see Chapter Three), that they are influenced by the institutions in which we 
live, the culture in which we move and by prevailing social ideologies. This is why in 
some non-scientific cultures people experiencing hallucinations are revered as oracles, 
whilst in more “sophisticated” others labelled schizophrenic and despised.
7.3.3 Embodying Values in Practice and Ethical Codes
Ethics, in mental health practice, must be founded upon an awareness of both 
practitioner’s and user’s values. Decisions in this are constantly made as to what is more 
or less disagreeable, for example, the side-effects of medication or florid hallucinations. 
Many users appear to prefer the hallucinations to the side-effects, whilst practitioners 
might consider this preference itself a sign of ’madness’. What is better or worse, for 
example pharmacological restraint (sedation) or physical restraint (straps, or straight- 
jackets)? Several users claim to prefer the latter, for at least that way they retain the 
ability to think clearly, yet pharmacological restraints appear more acceptable to 
practitioners and families, perhaps for aesthetic and emotional reasons which reflect 
values distinct from those of users:
At least if you’re physically restrained you can still think, your mind is still 
your own’ (UOA)
’There’s not a lot of difference between medicating people and tying them to the 
bed. At least if you do it physically there’s an honesty that bio-chemical sedation 
lacks’ (ULD)
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In spite of such differences, decisions frequently have to be made as to what is right or 
wrong. Judging the value of things, events and actions is as unavoidable in practice as 
the attempt to discover causal connections in considering the aetiology of the disorder. 
With values ‘go a series of humanistically important elements of medicine -  meaning, 
significance, understanding, empathy, responsibility, intuition, subjectivity and an 
individual perspective’ (Fulford et al. 2002, p6). MacIntyre (1985 and 1999) indicated 
that individuals, communities and societies lacking value systems are insecure. Indeed, 
it has recently been widely suggested that not having a coherent value system upon 
which to establish their personality, particular modus vivendi and way of relating to this 
world is a source of great anxiety for young people The same could apply to those 
(mal)practitioners and stigmatised users discussed in this thesis, hence the importance 
of a priori education in values, if practitioners are to recognise and practice the virtues.
To facilitate this, it is necessary to examine the process of evaluation itself, considering 
the different types of value. This aids discernment and understanding of values 
important to mental health practice, as they are closely interconnected. Some general 
characteristics apply to all values. Regardless of whether these are ‘lower’, such as 
charm, or usefulness, or ‘higher’, such as goodness, or truth, values express the 
significance which someone ascribes to matters related to a particular experience or to 
their life in general. They provide guidance for that person’s behaviour. Values arc 
established by personal judgements, regardless of whether these arc of things, qualities, 
events, or actions. They therefore contain differentially related subjective and objective 
elements, according to kind of value involved. Things must be valuable to us, or not, 
otherwise, whilst we might know facts, we do not know values. Consequently, the way
in which practitioners "judge” the ethical dilemma with which they are confronted is 
something to which reflexive consideration is essential in both training and practice. It 
is the process of attributing values which must be addressed prior to the consideration of 
a code of any kind. Ethics and codes of good practice uninformed by an awareness of 
the values implicit in these may become rules to be bent, rather than guidelines to be 
respected.
We only develop awareness of the role of values when judging an act a posteriori, or a 
priori in choosing between treatment plans leading to future action. But the embodiment 
itself (the shutting up of the mentally disordered, the happiness of a life, the saving of 
the patient) far from being the value, does not form part of it. An embodiment has value 
and in order for this to be recognised, must be judged. Values arc canons of judgement 
through the application of which we become aware -  correctly or fallaciously -  of 
certain qualities in an action, object or person. These, in turn, produce in us an 
appreciation of the values they embody. Our power of appreciation may increase or 
decrease, or, and this frequently is the case, we may err.
But erring does not affect the value per se. The value of nursing is not diminished 
because a user encounters an abusive nurse, any more than the value of collaboration is 
diminished because in a care plan the user has not collaborated to the degree previously 
agreed. It is, therefore, important to distinguish values, as such, from their 
manifestations because, to refer back to Chapter Two: ‘Perhaps practice cannot be 
perfect, but we should nonetheless strive for perfection’.
7.3.4. Binary Opposites, Positive and Negative
In the case of values, the relevance of the negative is obvious. As has been shown, there 
are always binary opposites in values: mad and sane; rational and irrational; dangerous 
and harmless; useful and useless; intelligent and stupid; good and evil, and so on. All 
are equally ‘real’. The negative quality both indicates the absence of the positive one 
and its own presence. If you are not “sane”, you are “mad”, if not “rational”, then 
"irrational” and so on. It is very important to understand that any value is grasped by 
seeing both its negative and positive forms. We tend to apply both, or neither -  and in 
doing so often assume too much, such as that the mental health practitioner is “rational” 
and consequently sane, good and wise, whilst the user is “irrational” and consequently 
mad, sometimes dangerous, frequently foolish, and so on. Such generalisations are 
excessively sweeping, quite apart from the fact that, as the research findings indicate, 
they fail to represent the real situation. As the causal factor in the discrimination which 
results in so much humiliation and suffering, their effects are detrimental to practitioner, 
user and to flourishing mental health practice generally.
In considering binary opposites, practitioners must be aware that in the absence of 
another kind of value, the denial of a positive value not only dismisses this, but supports 
its negative opposite. The paternalistic attitude of ‘my values or none’ is detrimental to 
the user-practitioner relationship, stifling dialogue and inhibiting effective user 
participation and patient-centred practice. The user who recognises this attitude in the 
practitioner, the fieldwork findings show, lies and pretends to conform to these values. 
When the practitioner recognises it in the less powerful user, on the other hand, it can 
result in an increase in medication or compulsory admission to hospital. We tend to
imagine that negation enables us to remain neutral and escape commitment -  that, for 
example, by disregarding ethical values we can avoid them entirely and rely instead 
upon ‘psychological’ arguments. However, this is not the case, for the denial of 
unconditional moral standards undermines morality. To explain morality only in terms 
of its psychological, historical and sociological elements, although these are important, 
replaces genuine virtue with obedience to custom or codes of good practice, something 
which an examination of the disciplinary proceedings of professional organisations 
related to mental health practice shows occurs. Relying upon these elements as the only 
arbiters of good practice can lead to the unjustified complacency, or indifference to such 
matters as those described previously, in which merely meeting the requirements of 
professional codes of good conduct is seen as ethical practice enough (see Chapter 1.2).
In teaching ethics, any illusion that practitioners can constructively concentrate upon the 
positive values or virtues in isolation, disregarding the negative ones, or vices, must be 
dismissed. The fieldwork findings reveal this. ‘It is not possible to develop the capacity 
to see beauty without developing also the capacity to see ugliness, for they are the same 
capacity’ (Macmurray, J., 1962 pp46-7). If someone implied that everything was good 
or hound to work for the good, and we became aware of his/her ignorance or refusal to 
admit anything bad in mental health practice, we should be inclined to dismiss these 
views as unrealistic, even prior to the research findings. In practice, too, in recognising 
and promoting the good, practitioners must also be aware of and aim to eliminate the 
bad.
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The denial of a personal ethical responsibility of this kind does not simply mean 
managing without this concept, but can lead to what might be described as an ethical 
nihilism. It makes no difference that a practitioner merely intended to be cautious in, 
for example, insisting that a user takes a medication which he no longer necessarily 
needs and which seriously damages the quality of his life, or that /he wished to avoid 
the responsibility of making a personal judgement by adhering to a code of practice. 
Commitment cannot be escaped by cautious or sceptical negations and, as has been 
pointed out, the negation of a positive value supports a corresponding negative value. 
From many of the respondents’ comments, it is clear that a dualistic and rather 
simplistic approach frequently prevails in practice. If refusing medication is not ‘good’, 
it must be ‘bad’, if hallucinations are not the mark of sanity, then they are that of 
insanity and so on. Why? Whilst this function of negation is relatively insignificant as 
far as ‘minor’ values are concerned, its importance is greatly enhanced in proportion to 
the values with which this study is concerned. The prior study of value scales and how 
these are created is therefore, inseparable from and essential to good ethical practice in 
mental health.
7.3.5. Counterfactual Desire Theories
Other value theorists, unconvinced by the view that value depends upon a subject’s 
actual interests and theories, have proposed various alternatives. These include theories 
which hold that in fact the value of a thing depends upon what the subject would desire, 
or have an interest in, if he were fully rational or if desires were based upon full 
information. This claim is particularly relevant to issues such as involuntary admission 
and informed consent in mental health practice. Such theories are called
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“counterfactual desire theories” (Audi, p831) since they take value to be dependent not 
upon a subject’s actual interests but upon what a subject would desire if certain 
conditions, which do not currently prevail, were to prevail, for example when rational 
thinking is restored after a psychotic episode. Counterfactual desire theory is evident in 
much mental health practice and legislation, in which it usually known us beneficence.
In terms of human rights there is something deeply disquieting about practitioners and 
family members deciding what someone would desire “were circumstances not as they 
are”. However, counterfactual desire theories do have their uses in good practice, for 
sometimes there is no alternative but for the practitioner, together with users’ families, 
to make decisions for them. Indeed, some ethicists would condemn them for not doing 
so.
Linked to counterfactual desire theory, some philosophers* would deny that sentences 
of the forms “x is good” or “x is intrinsically good” are, strictly speaking, either true or 
false. As with other forms of ethical discourse, they claim that anyone who utters these 
sentences is either expressing his emotional attitudes, or prescribing or commending 
something. The phrase ‘in the best interest o f ...’ (understood as “good for”) so 
frequently employed in the proposed new Mental Health Act, is an example of this. 
Whilst a value expresses the significance which someone ascribes to matters related to a 
particular experience or to his/her life in general -  and this includes rights and 
autonomy -  in mental health practice, respecting the rights and autonomy of the user
may, in certain circumstances, not represent cither good practice or be in the user’s best 
interest.
7.4. Practice and the Law
Acts relating to healthcare arc frequently regulated in law and codes of good practice, 
and morality and law arc closely related in certain areas of mental health care. In the 
interest of user and practitioner flourishing, it is important for morality to guide legal 
processes such as involuntary admission, but it would by no means be desirable for 
these (quasi)-lcgal processes to be the arbiter of ethics, for it is the exercise of the 
conscience which judges the morality o f our acts.
On the whole, law docs not, in spile of what has been said of the proposed new Mental 
Health Act, deliberately limit civil liberties, but endeavours to maintain the kind of 
society in which these can he exercised. The Act itself is intended as a means to these 
ends, although user and human rights groups see it as potentially breaching both human 
rights and civil liberties. Acquiring moral habits, indeed moral education of any kind, 
inevitably involves forming habits of obeying the law, or professional codes, and this 
applies to both practitioners and users. This may provoke moral dilemmas because, as in 
the case described in Chapter Six (p3l7), law and freedom arc often seen as opposed to 
one another, an increasingly controversial topic in mental health practice.
"Charles Stevenson is the best known exponent of "the emotive theory of ethics", which claims that 
moral judgements do not describe properties o f people or actions, but express approval or disapproval and
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7 .5 . T h e  V a l u e s - V i r t u e s  L in k
Today, many positive human characteristics, such as courage, gentleness, justice and 
kindness, are considered to be values. This is partly because, in common with these, 
they must be embodied to become more than merely abstract concepts. They can be 
included in value judgements of actions, as for example, when we say that an act was 
caring or courageous, but the qualities themselves, if present, have to be acknowledged 
as pertaining to the agent’s character and they are, therefore, considered embodiments 
of values. Strictly speaking, this is not the case. They are not values, but virtues. The 
virtues are our moral values. ‘They are values we embody, live and act’ (Compte- 
Sponvillc, 1996, p4). Today, the word ‘virtue’ no longer bears the connotations it once 
did, hut has acquired misleading nuances, which is why it is often replaced by ‘value’, 
although its opposite ‘vice’ continues to be widely used. It would, therefore, be pedantic 
to insist upon the value-virtue distinction. Virtues can be said to be values put into 
action. Hence the inseparability described earlier -  and the possibility of the efficient 
practitioner of emotional labour being considered a virtuous agent, since manifesting 
the appropriate affect in working with users could be claimed to be the result of 
exercising the virtue of practical wisdom (phronesis), which is the ‘ability to judge 
changing circumstances and choose ends and means wisely’ (Fleming, 2000), with the 
intellectual virtue of theoretical wisdom (sopliia).
Psychiatry has, according to Fulford ct al. (2002) traditionally been considered value- 
laden because it is less scientific than other branches of medicine, and Boorsc (like 
Giddcns and Goffman) claims that it is inclined to make "social value judgements a test
seek also to influence Ihe feelings of approval or disapproval of others (Honderieh, 1995, p851).
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of normality” (1977, p380). In mental health practice, these and other authors cited 
throughout this study agree that value judgements are present at all stages of the clinical 
encounter and explicit in diagnostic criteria. Thomas Szasz (1972 & 2001), suggests 
that the fact that psychiatric diagnoses are so value laden proves that mental disorder is, 
in fact, a metaphor for a moral, rather than medical issue. In so doing, it could be said 
that he confuses descriptive language with real phenomena. Simply because the medical 
model is not universally accepted, it cannot be discarded, for like the (caring) heart, the 
(rational) brain is an organ. Many users clearly do benefit from pharmacological 
treatments and some users, such as those in the USA sample, would prefer to believe 
that they have an organic, rather than psychological disorder.
In formulating an ethic for the flourishing of user and practitioner in mental health 
practice, the values upon which this is based are, therefore, necessarily of prior 
consideration. Moral value represents man’s "raison d'etre" and affects the behaviour 
for which the person in question freely assumes responsibility. It is the most influential 
factor in the formation of the individual personality and herein lies its complexity, for in 
mental health practice, as in all areas of life, it must realise a universally valid ideal 
without prejudicing the individual peculiarities of the person in whom it is incarnate.
7.6. Key Claims and Recommendations
Human beings - possibly none more than those who suffer mental disorder - constantly 
query the meaning of life, m an’s function, and the nature of the world in which we live. 
Socrates, according to Plato (Dialogues, The Apology) recognised the worth of this, 
saying that the unexamined life is not worth living. This indicates that as human beings, 
including practitioners and users, in order to flourish we need to find meanings to life.
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to work towards specific objectives, knowing not only where we are going but also, 
following a process of reflection, why. This is particularly relevant to mental health 
care, in which, as cases like those which have been described show, choices are often 
not clear-cut. Exercising as a virtuous agent requires adhering to a scale of values which 
facilitates choosing between different paths. It need not be consulted continually, but 
should be borne in mind as useful to and influencing in the resolution of ethical 
conflicts. Awareness of the role of values will, in each case, generate and guide the 
ethical principles and codes of good practice employed in decision-making and 
encourage a balancing of the views and values of all the parties involved. Mental health 
practice requires not inflexible and dogmatic deontological codes, but a normative 
statement or guidelines based on virtue and care ethics, informed by the principles 
(which are also virtues) of non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy, justice and so on.
Ethical statements should also maintain, reinforce and promote both user’s and 
practitioner’s self-respect. Having one’s values ignored as unworthy of consideration, as 
many users feel is the case, or rejected as “inferior” to those of a more powerful “other" 
is seriously damaging, for I only know who I am if 1 know my own preferences, and 
have clearly defined at least some life (or professional) goals. In the same way, I can 
only know what I want (personally or professionally) after having assimilated values 
which help me understand, give meaning to and express my (albeit unconventional) 
relationship with the world and its contents in an integral fashion, achieving a certain 
inner harmony. To this end, good communication is essential. However, in many mental 
health settings today, as in Goffman’s time ’... the passage of information (is restricted) 
especially that on staff’s plans for inmates. Characteristically, the inmate is excluded
from knowledge of the decisions taken regarding his fate’ (Goffman, 1968, p9). Even 
today, the research findings show that in patient-centred practice not all users are 
consulted in the formulation of their care plans. A virtue ethic informed by an ethic of 
care would promote flourishing, autonomy and the restoration of self-respect. This is 
important, for suffering a mental disorder can leave the user’s personal scale of values 
in complete disarray. S/he and those around him/her may come to conceive the 
condition as a socially deviant act and the resulting stigma ‘can come to dominate both 
ego and (liter's perceptions (Williams, S. 1987, p i37):
‘There’s something particularly awful about being tagged mentally ill. You think
you’ll never belong anywhere again. That’s quite horrible’ (UGJ)
In mental health practice, an ethic, which genuinely puts the patient at the centre of the 
therapeutic community, is therefore urgently needed.
Both practitioners and users have many (although not only moral) potentialities0. They 
therefore need ethical aims at which to direct their efforts. This dissertation has shown 
that these must not, for such attempts arc relatively fruitless, he established in what has 
been described as the inflexible fashion of deontology and conscqucntiulism. It is 
essential that unprescribcd areas of choice of action and decision-making arc left open 
so that the agents involved, whether users or practitioners, can reach their own informed 
choices, based upon individual scales of values, rather than having decisions imposed 
upon them by social, clinical or political “others” 10. Flexible ethical statements, or 
guidelines, informed by notions of virtue and care and whose end is flourishing will, the
' best understood as used in such sentences as ‘T h e  buy is Ihe potentiality of becoming a man" (Oates, 
I%2,p90).
Although there may be necessary exceptions to this rule -  see 7.1.4.
fieldwork findings reveal, better serve current mental health practice than rigid 
deontological codes.
It is also necessary to be aware of the degree to which practitioners fail to recognise 
that, far from lacking a value system, users’ values may simply be different from their 
own, or those of others. This explains the situation previously described in which ‘The 
values of psychiatric patients are all too often eclipsed by those of the service providers’ 
(Fulford et al. 2002. p i2). It is not necessarily the user’s best interest which is served, 
even when this is ostensibly the case, if the service provider’s criteria are based on what 
might be called “trivial” values such as meeting political objectives, unlike the personal 
values of the user, sincerely held perhaps, but having no firm foundation in hard, 
statistical fact.
This dissertation stated, in Chapter One, that anything genuinely in the best interest of 
either user or practitioner must necessarily have as its end flourishing or eudemonia, 
which is the ultimate justification for morality. Aristotle begins his works with an 
account of flourishing and then argues that the best means of achieving this is the 
cultivation and exercise of the virtues. In some cases, ethical eudemonism is combined 
with psychological eudemonism, which is the view that all free, intentional action is 
aimed ultimately at the subject’s happiness, or flourishing. Such action provides a very 
sound basis indeed for good practice.
Aristotle’s view links to that previously given which argues that individual behaviour is 
determined by behavioural intentions shaped by values. A common feature of ancient
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discussions on ethics which distinguishes them from most modem ones is the view that 
an agent would not be rationally justified in taking a course of action that promised less 
flourishing than some alternative open to him/her. In mental health practice, this point 
is debatable and could be considered contrary to the ethos promoted in Chapter Three, 
in which it was argued that different forms of flourishing are in play in this context. 
Whilst ideally an ethic for nourishing would encourage this in both user and 
practitioner, beneficence and caring would, all things being equal, demand the 
prioritisation of that of the user.
Indeed, in Aristotle at least, some of the virtues are dispositions to act from primarily 
"other-regarding’- motives. Although he regards the agent’s personal nourishing as the 
ultimate justification of virtuous action, it is not this which necessarily motivates such 
action, but principles or values -  and it is these, as has been indicated, which in one 
form or another inform all codes of good practice and ethics. Since eudemonia 
(flourishing) is regarded by Aristotle as the ultimate end that justifies our actions, his 
ethical theory seems teleological. This means that right or virtuous action is construed 
as action that contributes to or maximises the good. This initially appears to support the 
consequentialist stance, but this is not the case, for ancient Greek philosophers typically 
regarded virtuous action as inherently valuable and constitutive of the agent’s 
flourishing, regardless of the consequences. This freedom to disregard the consequences 
in terms of the greatest happiness of the greatest number is essential to good practice in 
mental health, in which, for example, the user’s own desires might be preferred to those 
of his entire family, or vice-versa.
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Mental health practitioners are often not confronted by clear-cut choices between good 
and bad actions, but with dilemmas presenting a choice between better and worse. 
Scales of value/virtue can contradict one another. There are conflicting loyalties (the 
user’s ‘best interest’ or that of society?); there is the ‘lesser of two evils’ (medicate and 
ignore the user’s wishes or fail to do so and upset his family?). Consequently, ethical 
decision making must be based on a balancing of varying degrees of value.
In practice, it is essential that such balancing is as clear and well-informed as possible. 
This is often hazardous, for it can only result from real communication between 
practitioner and user, which has little to do with ethical codes and much to do with 
mutual respect. Goffman ‘suggests that a major problem confronting a discredited 
person is that of “managing tension” generated during social interaction, and hence the 
need to manage the impression others have of him or her: a management of spoiled 
identity.’ (Williams, S., 1987,p 141). When communication fails, as given the tensions 
inherent in such situations it often will then, as media coverage of suicides and crimes 
committed by the mentally disordered shows, the consequences may be dire. Goffman 
also talks of ‘managing information’, something which links to claims made by both 
users and mental health workers during the fieldwork research, that they mutually lie 
and withhold information from one another:
‘To display or not to display; to tell or not to tell; to let on or not to let on; to lie
or not to lie; and in each case, to whom, when, and where’ (Goffman, 1968, p57)
Awareness of these contradictions must be maintained in ethical decision-making, for it 
will help to achieve a solution genuinely in the best interest of everyone concerned. In 
dealing with values, contradictions could be said to be the natural rule, for this reason
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the phrase ‘ethical dilemma’ is a commonplace in moral philosophy in general. 
However, like virtues, values are not invalidated if contradicted by one another. To the 
contrary, attempting to unify value scales by basing them on a common denominator -  
something promoted by current codes of practice promote -  distorts ethical judgements. 
Nevertheless, in order to select the scale of values to be applied, a value hierarchy is 
necessary. Those relevant to mental health practice need to be evaluated and placed on a 
scale. When values conflict, this reveals their relative importance.
This is important because we should, for instance, know the relationship between what 
practitioners and users really need, and what they desire because it gives them pleasure. 
Circumstances may arise in which it is impossible for a practitioner to act with the 
loving care demanded by Noddings' ethic of care, and at the same time act responsibly 
in terms of duty to society, colleagues and (perhaps) health insurance companies. 
Difficult choices continually have to be made and it is in this kind of decision-making 
that counterfactual value theory and the virtues of phronesis, courage and justice have 
much to contribute.
When practitioners breach professional codes of conduct, they frequently do so in the 
name of good practice and in the exercise of a principle such as beneficence. Principles, 
as has been shown, arc not inseparable from either virtue ethics or caring. 
Consequently, since the fieldwork reveals that both users and practitioners seek an ethic 
which promotes user autonomy, makes him/her feel cared both for and about, and is 
based on mutual flourishing and respect, a care-informed neo-Aristotelian virtue ethic 
for flourishing appears most adequate to the exigencies of mental health practice today.
This could facilitate both a normative professional statement of good practice and 
professional education in ethics.
Whilst based upon what Hursthouse showed, in Chapter Two, to be normative 
principles, this ethic would be flexible enough to meet the specific needs of mental 
health practice, hence the description “statement”, rather than code or rules. Like that of 
the British Sociological Association referred to in Chapter Four, the aim of this would 
be to develop mental health practitioners’ awareness of the need for reflexivity in 
resolving professional conduct issues. Such a statement would not ‘provide a set 
formula’ for the resolution of ethical dilemmas, but ‘recognise that it will often be 
necessary to make choices on the basis of principles and values, and the interests of 
those involved’11. This is precisely what the majority of the fieldwork practitioner 
respondents already do in practice. If they are educated in virtue and care ethics and 
live out their professional lives aspiring to be virtuous agents, promoting flourishing in 
every aspect of mental health care, the words “shall” and “must” will come to have no 
place in the lexicon of mental health ethics.
None of the practitioners interviewed, or responding to the questionnaire, systematically 
referred to existing codes of ethics in resolving ethical dilemmas in practice. Ethics, 
therefore, needs to be perceived as, and become, an inherent part of practice, a lived 
experience rather than another factor in accountability. Practitioners must be familiar 
with the codes of their own and other disciplines, understanding their purpose and the 
common values upon which they are based. However, ethics cannot, given its *
" From "Good Professional Conduct” -  notes circulated to members by the B.S.A.
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importance to good practice, be reduced to yet another subject on the curriculum. It is 
neither an acceptable outcome, nor bodes well for good practice for students to leave 
training, or qualified practitioners to work, with little or no genuine understanding of 
ethical responsibilities or standards of good practice. A systematic approach which can 
be confidently applied in daily practice, in awareness of promoting flourishing of the 
kind described in Chapter One is required. Recommendations for such an approach, 
which puts a virtue and care ethic for flourishing at the centre of good mental health 
practice, follow.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS
8. 1. Introduction
Having emphasised the essential centrality of values to ethical guidelines and 
education for mental health practice and suggested that virtue and care ethics 
can better inform the latter than deontological codes or casuistry, this chapter 
summarises the conclusions which may be drawn from this doctoral research. 
Although in a cross-disciplinary study (and this research has, of necessity, 
included those of philosophy, applied sociology, mental health policy, gender 
studies and even law) it has been impossible to engage with individual topics 
in as much depth as might be desirable to conclusively prove this, the results 
appear to indicate very clearly that values inform virtues and good practice and 
that the latter could “flourish” if guided by an ethic based upon neo- 
Aristotelian virtue ethics informed by the notions of caring inherent to the 
ethic of care.
Although Chapter Two showed that such an ethic can meet professional 
colleges' requirement for a normative ethic, this is not, strictly speaking, a 
necessary or sufficient condition for this. It has been shown that a set of rigid 
formulae for resolving moral dilemmas overlooks the , mental health 
practitioners do not feel that such codes respond to the needs of their 
profession and that it is desirable to allow flexibility and a degree of choice in 
resolving dilemmas. As an integrated conception of ethics, the virtue and care 
“ethic for flourishing” includes users and their families and mental health
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practitioners in a model of caring based on a deep awareness of values and 
virtues, rather than rules, obligations and rigid principles. This moves away 
from the limitations of the technological ‘curing’ versus emotional ‘caring’ 
debate by recognising that both aspects of treatment are equally necessary. 
Ethical practice based on the notions of virtue and care ethics, informed by a 
deepened awareness of, and respect for, the individual values of practitioner 
and user could, unlike other ethical theories, encourage the maximum 
‘flourishing’ of both.
In mental health practice, the beneficent love which is caring for and about the 
user necessarily includes respecting the values of the ‘other’. It was previously 
said that ‘... this attitude of “my values or none” appears to be greatly 
detrimental to the user-practitioner relationship’ (Chapter 7, p354). Certainly 
the right to refuse treatment is often subsidiary to the issue of the user’s 
competence, questioned more often owing to a refusal of treatment than any 
professionally assessed lack of decision making capacity leading to this 
refusal. Applying the right to refuse in this way is hardly “democratic”. On the 
other hand, Fulford et al. (2002) observe that basing healthcare ethics on a 
recognition of diversity of values, including those of the mental health 
practitioner and the user, ‘opens up crucial issues of methodology and 
practical application’ (p4). This dissertation has shown that such recognition is 
desirable, but is it also possible? How can awareness of the diversity of values 
form the foundation for good practice and ethics education in mental health 
care?
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8 .2 .  P r a c t i c a l  R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
8.2.1 Education in, and the practical application of, a virtue and care ethic 
for flourishing
A virtue and care based ethic for flourishing must, the previous chapter 
indicated, be a posteriori to, or at least simultaneous with, education in values. 
Right conduct, it has been said, 'should come from the inside ou t’ and the 
discussion on values explained that these are generated ‘inside’. If virtue is 
knowledge and getting it right and based on a sensitivity to the demands of the 
particular situation, as McDowell claims, the virtue/value judgement is the 
manifestation of this sensitivity. Since no consideration of an ethical dilemma 
can be value free and the ascription of virtues explains behaviour, how may 
practitioners develop the sensitivity necessary to virtue, value judgements and 
good mental health practice? This dissertation concludes that this can be 
achieved by a combination of the following:
• Education in the nature and formation of values and virtues, 
based upon the notion that virtues are values put into action.
• Exercises in reflexivity, as an aid to developing phronesis.
• Increased emphasis on the responsibility of experienced 
practitioners as role models and mentors in fomenting good 
practice in their more novice colleagues.
• Habituation, empathy and emotional labour
• Increased user participation and an emphasis on user-focussed 
cure in the community, rather than in institutions (see also 
Pilgrim and Rogers, 2001).
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• The replacement of existing mandatory professional codes of 
good practice and ethics, by non-mandatory guidelines similar 
to those of the B.S.A. briefly discussed in Chapter 4 (p217) 
and later in this chapter...
8.2.2. Education in the Virtues
To quote Aristotle: 'W e have the virtues neither by nor contrary to [our] nature 
... we are fitted by [our] nature to receive them’ (Nichomachean Ethics 
1103a24-6). This claim that we are ‘fitted by nature to receive them’ implies 
that having acquired them through the 'sort of moral education and self- 
improvement appropriate to rational social animals’ (Hursthouse, 1999, p251) 
we enjoy exercising them. We can, as a result of these processes, become 
“habituated” to behaving in a virtuous fashion. In the case of mental health 
practice this process of moral education, self-improvement and habituation can 
be encouraged in training and practice. Many expectations concerning 
professional health care centre on the way in which practitioners ‘manage’ 
their emotions. Nurses and doctors, for example, must learn new set of 'feeling 
rules' which help them to maintain a professional demeanour whilst 
performing deeply unpleasant tasks (Lawler, 1991). Fineman (1993) labels 
these the ‘implicit feeling rules’ of a professional discipline, but Salamen, 
more in keeping with the recommendations of this and the previous chapter 
refers to the as ‘a professional value system’.
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In answering the question “what kind of life should I lead?", Chapter Two 
explained that, according to Hutchinson (1986), virtue ethics must describe 
specific human virtues to which individual users (in spite of the fact that their 
responsibilities are rarely discussed in mainstream medical ethics) as well as 
mental health care workers can aspire. ‘... showing values for what they are, 
taking them out of the closet ... is a key function of ethical reasoning in 
healthcare matters’ (Fulford,1994, pl62). Sound knowledge of the values and 
culture of those with whom they work is essential to all mental health 
professionals if good communication is to be established. Its absence promotes 
a situation which, rather than promoting the flourishing of the user, adds to 
the inarticulatable “angst” of the experience of the disorder, inarticulatable in 
the sense that s/he might have no common cultural capital with a practitioner 
versed in the western medical model:
‘...many important issues are not adequately covered in training 
programmes. These include cultural sensitivity, gender issues, 
traumatisation of the patient and sensory impairment’ (N & MC
News, Spring, 2002, p 16)
8.2.3. P h ro n es is  and Reflexivity
Loyalty to the group continues to be generated when social structures are 
characterised by interaction rituals. In some mental hospitals, and to a lesser 
degree in the community, a “them-us” dichotomy continues to exist between 
users and practitioners. This is founded upon value based notions of 
paternalism, or moral judgements representing the mentally disordered person 
as in some way “defective". Shared interaction rituals, such as the 
"ceremony” of giving out the medication, perpetuate this dichotomy. Treating
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the user as “other”, as would be the case in applying a deontological ethic1 in, 
for example, a case in which the user refused to take his prescribed medication 
and was forced to do so, makes the practice of an ethic for flourishing 
impossible, given that the aim of this is to achieve the user’s own flourishing 
qua respected member of the community. Not just users, but mental healthcare 
professionals in hospitals, too, have been shown by the research findings to 
feel stigmatised and undervalued. Demoralised practitioners may project their 
frustrations onto equally demoralised users. Practitioners should therefore be 
taught reflexive practices in which they are encouraged to think about the 
personal and professional values necessary to flourishing of the kind described 
in Chapter One.
Whilst phronesis has been a constant theme in this work, reflexivity has so far 
merited only a brief mention (Chapter Five). It is essentially self-reference and 
in the context of mental health, requires that practitioners recognise themselves 
not as external to the ethical dilemmas with which they are dealing but as 
active, possibly causative, participants in these as members of the therapeutic 
(or not) community. Reflexivity manifests itself most oddly when individuals 
unwittingly enact the very behaviours being criticised. In the ward context, for 
example, the research findings reveal that this may involve confronting 
bullying behaviour with (equally or more) bullying behaviour.
' In the case of Kant, for example, anyone who failed to conform to the 
Categorical Imperative was automatically excluded from the realm of ends
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Learning to exercise reflexivity in practice is particularly important for in­
patient hospital care as in this, a relatively neglected staff group is caring for a 
relatively neglected client group. Programmes such as BAITS (described in 
Chapter Five) have been highly successful in teaching health care workers of 
all disciplines to practice reflexivity. Having acknowledged their own 
negative thoughts and feelings, by combining phronesis and reflexivity, to 
arrive at an understanding of their own reactions to challenging behaviour, as 
well as those of the user in question, mental health practitioners are better 
equipped to think constructively about the dynamics of violent or disruptive 
behaviour, or negative relationships with (or amongst) users. Rather than 
considering this kind of situation to be exclusively the users’ problem, 
exercising reflexivity increases practitioners’ awareness of the numerous 
factors involved in its genesis.
The nature of mental health practice is more emotionally complex that that if 
the air stewardess described by Hochschild and informed by completely 
different motivations. This means that their emotion management 
performances cannot be categorised under one heading. Recognising that 
practitioners move in different frames of action, in which they ’perform' 
according to different sets of feeling rules, reveals multi-situated systems of 
activity (Goffman, 1961). The type of training offered by programmes such as 
BAITS gives staff the confidence to intervene in a confrontational situation, 
thus avoiding, or at least diminishing the frequency of incidents potentially 
highly damaging to the flourishing (in the sense described here) of either
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practitioner and user. This does not imply that practitioners leam to 
‘transmute’ (Hochschild, 1983) their private feelings. It is simply that their 
emotional skills become developed to the degree that they can mix and 
manage different styles of emotion management according to the rules which 
they have developed for themselves, rather than those imposed upon them by 
the profession or organisation.
Further reflection, following resolution of the incident, enables user and carer 
to benefit from an otherwise negative situation. It also involves considering 
ways in which, in order to avoid recurrences, users' lives can be enriched and 
autonomy encouraged. Promoting practitioner flourishing by promoting 
phronesis in this way also pays incalculable dividends in terms of user 
flourishing.
8.2.4. Role models: the virtuous practitioner
Deontologists and consequentialists have been described as thinking that it is 
possible to separate questions about the rightness of an action from those about 
the goodness of this. However, virtue ethicists would claim that this is neither 
desirable nor even feasible. How we act is as important as what we do and 
who, we are determines how we act.
It was suggested that role models are the ideal form of fomenting good 
practice in training mental health professionals. Various studies (Salvage, 
1985, Smith, 1991, 1992, Svenson and Rothsteen, 1996, Robertson, 1998b)
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find that students learn professional feeling rules as a result of being immersed 
in the professional culture and by observing the behaviour of more senior staff, 
rather than in training schools. Aristotle himself, in Nichomachean Ethics 
(1142a. 12-29) says that moral knowledge is unlikely to be found in those 
lacking prudence and experience of life, and this cannot be achieved merely by 
attending lectures. The introduction of clinical mentors, who have the 
character and experience necessary to demonstrate the values essential to good 
mental health practice, as guides and role models for students would be one 
way of achieving this.
Robertson (1998), in his study o f patient-centred medicine and medical school 
training, describes social research as showing that medical students view 
clinical role models as key influences in their own learning of skills and 
values. However, such models require careful selection, for the fieldwork 
findings reveal that practice does not always ensure perfection. Indeed, many 
mental health practitioners claim to have observed malpractice amongst their 
older colleagues. Nonetheless, users and practitioners also describe caring, 
“flourishing” practitioners. Mentors and role models should be recruited from 
amongst these.
The fact that not every agent in this context is virtuous is an important 
problem. How to redefine and recognise the virtuous agent in terms of mental 
health practice is the next objective. What is sought in the virtuous mental 
health practitioner is not all those virtues required of Aristotle’s virtuous
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agent, for an ethic for flourishing must specifically meet the needs of mental 
health practice, not those of the Athenian polis. The practitioner “agent of 
flourishing" requires specific and “special” virtues, those necessary for 
completing the professional task well.
What it means to complete a task “well” is defined from within the particular 
practice discipline, for whilst the common aim is flourishing, this demands a 
variety of tasks and qualities from different mental health practitioners. 
Deciding the “special” virtues for each of these could require observing those 
who are considered particularly good at their job (the previously mentioned 
role models) and identifying the character traits which they possess.
Patience, technical expertise, kindness and honour would be desirable in all 
healthcare professionals and the majority appear to possess some or all of 
these virtues. However, those nurses in close contact with potentially violent 
users, for example, might require more courage than the doctor who spends 
little time with these and is not likely to be involved in dangerous situations at 
first hand. A highly developed sense of justice, in terms of human rights 
would, on the other hand, be necessary to doctors and social workers 
responsible for “sectioning", and so on.
This is not to trade off the question: “How do I live a good life?” with a 
question on professional skill: ‘How do I be a good X?” where X is whichever 
discipline is being considered. In good practice these notions are inseparable.
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When discussing the virtues necessary to the virtuous agent, Hursthouse 
(1999, ppl67 & 247) describes what she terms ‘Plato's requirement on the 
virtues’. This claims that the virtues, as we have seen, not only benefit their 
possessor, enabling him/her to flourish and both be and live a life which is 
euclemon, they also make him/her a good human being. These two features are 
interrelated. Wright, S. (1996) evaluates students’ requirements in seeking role 
models and finds that that these are a combination of clinical skills and ability 
and a compassionate personality, characterised by concern for the users and 
their families and attentiveness to the needs of the students and other 
healthcare workers. Essentially, students value role models who value patient- 
centred medicine.
The relevance of this stress on agent, rather than act, in ethics is illustrated by 
the fact that although generally sympathetic to practitioners, users complain 
not so much of treatment decisions per se but of the manner in which these are 
delivered or acted upon. No expression of regret or concern seems considered 
necessary once practitioners have made the morally “right" decision, 
regardless of the user’s feelings. But if the user suffers, or feels humiliated and 
undervalued by the decision (as for example, in the case of “sectioning”), 
even if it were unquestionably correct, something which is always a moot 
point in mental health practice, surely some kind of regret, or respect for the 
user’s own feelings, views and values is required? Exercising an ethic for 
flourishing in the manner described above might make health care workers
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concentrate more on their responses, less complacent in the knowledge of
having made the “right” decision.
8.2.5. Habituation and Empathy
Male and female practitioners are described as generally caring and 
empathetic. In some cases this is attributed to an inherent desire to care, in 
others the adoption of the expression of emotion appropriate to the moment 
was considered to be a form of emotional labour and part of the professional 
task. That empathy (or at least an efficient “performance” of this) is a 
teachable skill (Platt, 1992, Fine and Therrien, 1997) is a view which concurs 
with both Goffman’s (1959) ‘presentation of the self and Hoschschild’s 
(1983) ‘emotional labour’. It may be learnt in the sense of reaching, through 
reflexivity and practice, an intellectual understanding of the user’s feelings 
and emotions. Whilst classes on ethics are desirable, they will be insufficient 
unless preceded or accompanied by a training in emotional labour and 
presentation of the self which also promotes intellectual understanding of 
user’s and practitioner’s values. Ethical theory alone makes of this a dry, 
abstract discipline, unrelated to practice.
Howard Spiro (1992) claims that in order to empathise with users, the 
practitioner must recover his/her ability to emotionally identify with them, a 
skill he believes to have been neglected, rather than fostered, during an 
excessively ‘scientific’ training process. For practitioners, ‘being value-pur- 
blind can be an effect of a dominant role model’ (Fulford 2002, pl2) Spiro
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suggests that practitioners are taught humanities in order to foster this 
empathy. These views are echoed in Moore et al. (1994), Platt (1992) and 
Robertson (1998) all of whom recommend the fostering of the empathic skills 
of emotional labour in medical school curricula and believe that these can be 
learnt by practice.
The care component of an ethic for flourishing asserts the importance of an 
active concern for the good of others and of community. It also requires a 
capacity for sympathetic and imaginative projection into the position of the 
other (empathy) and of situation-attuned responses to other’s needs. It 
therefore meets Aristotle’s community requirement for virtue, as well 
indicating some of the characteristics to be desired in the professional role 
model.
8.2.6. Increased User Participation: Alterity and Discrimination
It was pointed out in Chapter Two that the concept of universal flourishing is 
questionably realisable and that good practice is only as good as its 
practitioners, regardless of the codes of practice stipulated by professional 
bodies (and against deontology and consequentialism, which favour act, rather 
than agent). It is apparent that if mental health practitioners are to be educated 
in what to strive for in good practice, this aim must be clear. "This-ness”, as 
described in Chapter 2, must be considered and there can be no rigid 
prescriptions or rules of good conduct in dealing with this or that particular 
sufferer from schizophrenia or psychopathy. The “good” practitioner should be
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capable of discerning the individual interest and values of each individual user, 
whilst the “good” user would, in awareness of this, participate fully in 
informing family and practitioner as to his/her aspirations and fears, and in the 
treatment plan which has been mutually agreed between him/her and these.
As the research findings reveal, users consider their own views and agendas 
vital to any care plan and, indeed ‘doctors’ attention to them can ... result in 
symptomatic and even health status improvement’ (Robertson, D, 1998, p9). 
However, the fieldwork findings show that mental health workers often fail to 
appreciate and understand users’ own agendas in terms of values and 
priorities, whilst at the same time creating tensions amongst themselves for the 
same reason. Nurses, for example, may feel that although due to their close 
contact with them they possess real expertise as far as the user is concerned, 
they are not consulted enough by the psychiatrists treating these. They 
frequently also see themselves as advocating for the user (caring versus 
curing) and in consequence may be perceived as threatening the authority of 
doctors and social workers, as well as “owning” the users. (The use of the 
possessive pronoun is prevalent -  “my patients”, “my ward”). There could, 
therefore, be said to exist a democratic deficit in health in which professional 
knowledge is seen as pre-eminent.
Ethical practice, in terms of a virtue and care ethic for flourishing, is not about 
neglecting one’s own interests in favour of those of others, as in the traditional 
"female” role of self-abnegating carer described in Chapter Three, but about
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serving both simultaneously. When practitioners engage in good caring, they 
are acting to fulfil a natural desire to be and remain related.
8.2.7. Guidelines, not Rules or Codes
In order to promote nourishing, it is essential to leave unprescribed areas of 
choice of action and decision-making. Decisions should be based upon ethical 
alternatives, not rigid codes. The virtuous, caring agent does not need these, 
but sufficient flexibility to be able to exercise virtues and caring, phronesis and 
love, professional expertise and legal considerations appropriately. This 
requires a universal concept of eudemonia (flourishing) for collective practice 
and its antithesis for the individual (see Chapter Two). Guidelines, or a 
statement, are necessary, but these must be realistic if they are not to be 
impracticable and possibly even opposed to the interest of the user and/or 
society. At the same time, they must not be so low-level as to impede good 
practice. In theory, a dialectical process comes of good practice, but given the 
nature and peculiar dilemmas inherent to mental disorder, it is necessary to 
remember that this must also be enshrined in law.
In view of what has been said so far, current codes or ethics, since they contain 
requirements ultimately impossible to obey in every possible ethical dilemma 
in mental health practice, should be rewritten as "guidelines” such as those 
described of the British Sociological Association (BSA). ‘The guidelines do 
not provide a set of formulae for resolving choices or dilemmas surrounding 
professional conduct, but recognise that it will often be necessary to make such
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choices on the basis of principles and values, and the interests of those 
involved’.2 This study has shown that in mental health practice this stance is 
particularly relevant, for rules cannot be categorical or imperative where the 
situations with which they are intended to cope are not only distressing, but 
frequently highly disconcerting. Practitioners must be educated to assume 
responsibility for their own ethical practice and where good practice would 
appear, as it frequently does, to clash with procedures or codes established by 
professional colleges, should seek to change the latter, in the interest of the 
former
However, as far as law is concerned, the question is one of whether autonomy 
becomes overvalued when it conflicts with other values. Mental health 
practitioners must necessarily be concerned with whether the user is truly 
competent to make decisions in a complex situation. They must endeavour to 
combine the Aristotelian virtues of phronesis and justice with caring for and 
about the user and society. Their interests are not always compatible.
Some philosophers, as has been indicated, dissatisfied with the view that value 
depends upon a subject’s actual interests and theories, have proposed inter alia
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theories which hold that the value of a thing depends entirely upon what a 
subject would desire or have an interest in i f  s/he were fully rational, or i f  
desires were based upon fu ll information. Such theories (the counterfactual 
desire theories described in Chapter Seven) take value to be dependent, not 
upon a subject’s actual interests, but upon what they would desire if certain 
conditions, which do not obtain, were to obtain. ‘The intuitive weighing of 
values to which principles reasoning points is, in the end, a matter for 
individual (value) judgements' (Fulford et al. 2002, plO).
As long as one is aware of the possibility inherent in them for abuses of 
power, counterfactual desire theories may have their uses in good caring 
practice and, indeed, in promoting the flourishing of the user on those 
occasions of crisis which occasionally occur in mental disorder. It has been 
argued that there may be times, for example, when “sectioning” is necessary 
and in spite of the fact that this is rarely something users desire at the time, the 
research findings show that retrospectively they are often prepared to admit the 
need for such measures. Acting as an “agent of flourishing” occasionally 
requires doing something when the user would prefer that one did nothing. 
When this occurs, the flourishing of the practitioner in question also requires 
ensuring that s/he is legally and morally empowered to act in this way, and not 
likely to later be abused or blamed for having so acted.
^Taken from a statement entitled “Good Professional Conduct”, approved on 
the 1“ March 2002 and circulated by the BSA to its members in the form of 
notes. I
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8.3. Practical Steps towards Flourishing.
Given the stigma attached to mental hospitals, a first practical step in 
eliminating discrimination, achieving good practice and user's and mental 
health care worker’s flourishing, would be to accelerate the excessively slow 
closure of these (Rogers and Pilgrim, 2001). There is wide agreement today 
that these institutions are the “dustbins” of the health service (see Chapter 
One) and that this status is endowed upon those in treatment and those who 
work in them. Custodial institutions of this kind provoke power dynamics and 
hierarchical structures which foment the representation of mental disorder as a 
moral, rather than physical or psychological disorder. Users in hospital settings 
are often at best infantilised by excessively matemalistic or paternalistic staff 
and, at worst, treated as “prisoners” by the power-drunk. In both cases users 
claim to feel humiliated and disempowered.
However, this is not inevitably a one-way process. Power is a more insidious 
notion than is immediately obvious. Some users report the powerlessness of 
practitioners themselves, in an alarming reversal of conventional hierarchies in 
which a particular user, as likely to be female as male, will ‘tyrannise’ both 
staff and other users by means of manipulation and subtle forms of bullying. 
The weaker user in this situation feels safe in being allied to the “boss” figure, 
whilst nursing staff, unable to control the situation, "hide” in the nursing 
station. To quote:
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”It is very difficult to control a ward [in these circumstances] 
unless the users are so zomped3 that there’s no problem' (UOA).
Consequently excessive “zomping” and restraint are also not uncommon. This
kind of situation creates an image of mental hospitals as remarkably similar to
prisons and, indeed, much of the vocabulary and imagery reinforces this. In a
recent publication for nurses and midwives, the management of violence in
health care was discussed in the following terms:
‘Sixty-one percent of respondents reported that they were trained in 
the application of controlled pain to induce compliance in resistant patients’
‘Specific concerns were raised about training in the use of the 
figure-four leg lock’ (N&MC News, 2002)
One could be forgiven for thinking that these are techniques for prison guards, 
rather than mental health practitioners caring for the “ill”. It is not surprising 
that even users who have not undergone in-patient hospital treatment for many 
years may describe returning to hospital as one of their greatest fears.
However, the concern of health professionals for their own safety are also 
legitimate. For every assault on a user, there are two on members of staff. But 
whilst hospitals do exist, so does a duty of care to those who are being treated. 
Although the attitude and approach of carers is widely considered a question 
of character, rather than gender, several women expressed discomfort at 
sharing wards with male patients. At least during periods of acute crisis, men 
and women should be separated, in the interest of both. Sexual harassment is 1
1 By "zomped" was understood sedated, although this was, perhaps 
unfortunately, not clarified at the time.
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not unique to men and for this reason, returning to single sex wards is widely 
considered to be desirable. However, since most users and practitioners 
believe that communication is often better between members of the opposite 
sex these should, somewhat paradoxically, be staffed by mental health workers 
of both sexes
If a hospital is not a place of asylum, in the truest sense of the word (although 
some clearly are seen as places of “safety” by users), but of fear and 
manipulation, then it fails in its duty of care. Whilst custodial care is 
necessary for users in crisis, the potentially violent or self-harming, who 
cannot adequately be cared for at home, ideally they should be attended not 
only by trained professionals, but also by other users who know their 
experience, share their values and are not caught in hierarchical nets which 
enmesh the more powerful ‘us’ and the vulnerable ‘them’. Any threat of 
violence is often far better resolved by users amongst themselves than in the 
clinical context, in which staff anxious to preserve their personal integrity and 
the smooth-running of the ward "control” the first sign of disturbance by 
means of drugs, restraint and isolation, possibly exacerbating rather than 
defusing the situation4 by their manifestation of power, rather than good 
practice.
4 Whilst carrying out fieldwork interviews at a survivors' centre, a severely 
disturbed man entered. The other users, without raising their voices, told him 
that he must leave as he had been “banned" from the premises until he was less 
disruptive. Initially, he refused to go, but after a cup of coffee with some of the 
regulars, he agreed to leave and did so quietly. During the half-an-hour or so in 
which he was there, the only person apparently alarmed or frightened by his 
behaviour was me.
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Not that all types of in-patient care should be abolished. For users who need to 
be protected from themselves and their own destructive acts, crisis units 
staffed by professionals and users and providing psychopharmacological, 
psychotherapeutic and alternative therapies, are considered the ideal model by 
users and many practitioners. These offer a safe, appropriate and more socially 
acceptable alternative to hospital in-patient care and could be designated to 
meeting the needs of specific vulnerable groups, such as for example, women 
with small children5.
Many ‘critical’ practitioners, as well as users consider conventional care so 
inadequate that they suggest that people in crisis survive better if they avoid it 
altogether. They recommend alternatives offered by user groups or volunteers 
in the community, employing a minimum of medication and a wide selection 
of alternative therapies. “Anam Cara”, a four-bedroom house in Birmingham, 
offers this kind of approach and is enormously successful, in spite of the 
reticence which greeted its opening. The Mental Health Foundation opened 
this project because research amongst service users (in keeping with that 
described in this thesis), indicated distrust and dissatisfaction with hospital 
care, something they saw as punishing them for being in crisis. They sought 
alternative care centres and moral support from others who had undergone
! A highly successful example o f this is the Drayton Park Crisis Project. This 
is a 12-bedded unit for slays of up to 4 weeks for women with children. The 
staff work together with community workers, encouraging them to continue 
regular contact with these women whilst they are at Drayton Park, helping to 
ensure continuity of care and support after leaving.
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similar experiences. Of these projects, staffed or.managed by service users, the
director of Mental Health Foundation says:
'We can now say with confidence that our projects were 
and are successful, favoured by the service users and well 
integrated with mainstream care. Others must now be developed 
along these lines and the values which underpin them must also 
inform the long overdue overhaul of hospital in-patient care’
The Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health formally evaluated the scheme and its 
report reveals ‘startling benefits for a severely troubled client group’, most of 
whom were on enhanced CPA”6. One hundred percent of users felt that the 
service had met their needs. This appears to be a fine example of flourishing 
practice
Such examples of genuinely “flourishing” practice show that traditional 
hierarchies can be avoided. The therapeutic team needs to be exactly that, the 
user forming the nucleus of a caring community which moves into him/her, 
rather than removing an already isolated person from familiar surroundings. 
Community care, when not in the form of a conventional hospital out-patient 
clinic, provides a way to establish valued lifestyles and social relationships for 
people in care who have been devalued by institutional care. To flourish, as 
Aristotle knew, we need to form part of the community, not be isolated from it.
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8.4. Overcoming Adverse Discrimination
Adverse discrimination has been the topic central to discussion and 
conclusions. Flourishing mental health practice necessitates particular 
sensitivity to this issue. Inequalities described in the context of employment 
and education prevail in mental health, in which, as has been shown, class, 
gender, and ethnicity can exacerbate discriminatory treatment in terms of 
diagnosis, communication or length of stay. An ethic for flourishing must, 
therefore, give serious consideration to resolving questions of discrimination 
which impede this.
It is also necessary to remember that such inequalities pertain not only in 
coercive, but also in consensual relationships, The fact that some users “don’t 
mind” being treated as children by “kind” practitioners, does not eliminate the 
undesirable inequalities inherent in such a relationship. Being known 
“fondly"  as “Mad Barry”7 does not make this kind of labelling any less 
discriminatory. “Concessions” or “privileges” afforded to users by mental 
health practitioners often serve the interests of the latter, rather than the former 
insofar as they impose a kind of “moral obligation” upon the user. This can 
result in coercive exchanges which although sometimes going under such 
sophisticated labels as “therapeutic alliance” are little more than means of 
persuading the user to "cooperate” with the treatment plan in exchange for 
their "right” to continued “privileges”. 6
6 CPA is the care programme approach, advanced CPA is the more rigorous 
version of this clinical protocol.
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Such discrimination, as opposed to coercion, is always the result of not 
conforming to the dominant social ideology. Such conformity should not be a 
necessary condition for flourishing. Integration and well-being, even public 
acclaim, are possible without conforming to an ideological mainstream. A new 
breed of users is emerging ‘up-front and radicalised people with mental health 
issues who are working to change perceptions, legislation and services’ (The 
Observer Magazine, 21.10.01., p58) and who refuse to accept that the only 
valid and socially acceptable ideology is that imposed by a white, male, 
middle-class hierarchy.
Many users and practitioners, including some of those of those interviewed in 
the fieldwork, describe their “madness” as heightening sensitivity to 
experiences of all kinds, colours are brighter, music transports to celestial 
heights -  and all this is lost once “sanity” is restored. Little wonder that some 
users no longer wish to take medication and/or have leamt to disguise or not 
disclose their hallucinations or delusions to an unsympathetic public. One of 
the respondents talks to his “voices" with impunity by pretending to use a 
mobile phone as he does so, whilst another has continued to experience exactly 
the same delusions for which she was “sectioned”, but simply keeps quiet 
about them. As a result of such or insight into the workings of the system, 
neither of these is any longer considered “mad”, nor in need of medication. 
Both are, by any criteria, “nourishing". 7
7 The Times, Times 2, 3.7.01, p5
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Given that so many users do speak of heightened (flourishing) creativity and 
sensitivity in mental disorder, the suggested use of the word “condition”, 
described earlier, rather than “disorder”, would be ethically and “politically” 
correct. As would therapies designed to harness and foment these gifts. 
Encouraging flourishing invites the re-thinking of all pre-conceived notions on 
mental illness. Whilst not rejecting pharmaceutical treatments, in addition to 
these users would greatly benefit from talk therapies and physical treatments 
such as massage and Reiki. They also speak highly of drama, art and 
bibliotherapy as a helpful means of communicating that which cannot be 
expressed easily in words -  even when there is someone there to listen.
Nothing, it would seem, is so therapeutic as a good listener and caring 
practitioners can “listen” with their eyes, as well as ears. All forms of 
expression and communication are valid in the treatment of the troubled mind 
and in eliminating stereotypical images which provoke “alterity”, the notion of 
the mentally different as a “them” who fail to conform to the dominant 
ideology, compared to "us”, who not only conform to and defend this, but 
stigmatise and label those who do not.
Restoring the user's faith in him/herself is one of the aims of the flourishing 
practitioner, for this forms part of that of the user. The interpretation of mental 
illness as a moral disorder is a causative factor in users’ symptoms being 
treated as “bad” and worthy of punishment. If mental disorder is a crime, or a 
moral defect, then hospitals and clinics are not the place to treat it. Whilst they
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are, any kind of moral discourse in relation to it should be avoided for it is 
instrumental in creating the stigmatisation so damaging to users’ (and 
practitioners’) lives.
For some users (and carers), too, religion is a very important issue, and a 
potentially highly sensitive one. Some faiths attribute mental illness to 
“spiritual sickness” and it is possible that religious crises are wrongly 
diagnosed as mental disorders in today’s lay society. Religion is inextricably 
bound with culture and as such is fundamental to the lives of many users. For 
some, secular and spiritual are indivisible. However, in an example of either 
insensitivity or malpractice, mental health care traditionally overlooks this 
spiritual dimension, both in diagnosis and in treatment.
Officially, the development and delivery of culturally and spiritually 
appropriate services is now an obligation, but as any Muslim wishing to fast 
during Ramadan and eat at sunset, or “dreadlocked” Rastafarian will testify, 
this is far from being the case. Religious observance and taking medication 
with food can be reconciled where there is a will to do so -  and the virtuous, 
caring practitioner, as a virtuous agent, would so wish. Today’s multi-cultural 
psychiatric polis requires respect for all ethnicities and creeds if it is to be 
eudemon, and flourish.
An ethic for flourishing (and everything said so far) is essentially about 
respect, based on recognising the values and beliefs of the other as equally
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legitimate as one’s own, regardless of how dissimilar. It also involves 
respecting the views of other practitioners, for in ethical dilemmas, as in 
treatment plans, these are often different. Flourishing practice requires a care 
team whose very strength lies in the diversity of the points of view -  including 
those of the user and his/her family - considered in the care plan.
Practitioners, too, need an appeal which can awaken their personal and 
professional potentialities (see Chapter 7) in such a way that they, in turn, 
provoke moral actions, for all human beings. Both they and users have a 
multitude of potentialities, something recognised by Aristotle. Technical 
knowledge, in the form of familiarity with recent developments in 
pharmacological and physical treatments, the desire to promote flourishing 
inherent in the practice of the virtuous agent and the love of the ethic of care 
are all necessary to practice. If these factors are combined, practice will not 
only be genuinely “good”, but encourage the maximum flourishing of practice, 
health care worker and user, as described in Chapter One.
Finally, mental health ethics must necessarily be considered in the context of 
the law. There has been a recent tendency, exacerbated, perhaps, by the 
proposed new Mental Health Act, towards a withdrawal of user rights, towards 
qualification of these or ‘toward the affirmation of symbolic rights without 
any concrete existence’ (Susan Stefan, cited in McCubbin and Cohen, 1999). 
From the fieldwork findings, it is clear that users’ rights are “interpreted” or 
ignored by many health care professionals and policy makers. The right to
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treatment may be interpreted as the right to receive forced treatment, even if 
this was not the original intention. Informed consent, for example, when that 
process is actually made explicit, is frequently little more than a bureaucratic 
gesture to meet the needs of the practitioner’s conscience and the possibility of 
future litigation.
In addition, the notion of dangerousness, which should be a severe test for 
justifying the exceptional deprivation of liberty of a severely psychologically 
disturbed person, has been shown to be employed in practice as a need for 
treatment. One user (UOA) who ran away from home one night rather than 
harm his mother, was arrested (and physically assaulted) by the local police, 
waking up sedated and ‘sectioned’, in hospital. He would have been prepared 
to voluntarily enter a hospital the previous night, had anyone thought to ask 
him. This incident illustrates the tendency of institutions and the general public 
to act in accordance with stereotypical notions of “madness”, independently of 
the law, much less the user’s rights. However, in defence of hospitals, another 
did confess that, having experienced both, they were ‘much better than prison' 
(UOD).
Those users in “continuing care" rarely have the possibility of defending their 
rights. The advocacy service is limited in its powers and users often have only 
the most meagre financial means. In consequence, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for them to afford legal assistance from experts in health law or 
civil rights. Equally, if not more difficult, is finding a psychiatrist who is
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prepared as an ‘expert witness’ to contest the views of a colleague, invariably 
given more weight than the conflicting evidence of other care professionals.
The law currently does little to promote users’ flourishing. It is not sufficient 
to simply “give” rights to users. When rights are given, rather than grabbed, 
they can be distorted beyond all recognition and in the case of chronic users of 
mental health services, it is too easy to identify the attributed needs of users, as 
defined by experts and families involved in their care and treatment as being 
their “rights”. This is a category error in values similar to that described in 
Chapter Seven in which the embodiment of a value is confused with the value 
itself.
Respect for the values of justice, as well as for the user as an independent adult 
implies that some of the power currently invested in institutions and mental 
health professionals must be ceded to the users themselves. Tentative steps 
made in this direction have proved far more successful in terms of users’ and 
carers' flourishing than could ever have been imagined. There is now 
sufficient evidence that in being allowed some power and autonomy, 
individuals and groups learn better ways of exercising it. However, 
responsibility cannot be learnt in the absence of trust. If practitioners and 
policy-makers can demonstrate a willingness to cede much of their power to 
the users themselves, they will be showing that as “flourishing” practitioners 
they are ready to make a “gift” of freedom, in freedom, for freedom. This
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“gift” will be motivated by a recognition of values and virtues based on sound 
moral reasoning (phronesis), caring and a true desire to see the user flourish.
8.5. Concluding Thoughts
Jonathan Glover’s book Humanity (1998) examines the psychological and 
political sources of the twentieth century’s worst moral tragedies. In this work, 
Glover discusses the way in which our moral resources are undermined or 
overcome, allowing us to perpetrate vile acts. Moral resources (in mental health 
practice, as in all other aspects of life) are undermined and disappear when we 
fail to comprehend that as a consequence of such processes we forfeit both a 
“good” life and the means to human flourishing. Glover appeals for the 
cultivation of moral imagination and a programme of ‘tentative, exploratory and 
partly empirical research’ that will base morality on ‘human needs and human 
values’ (p406). He supports the cross-disciplinary approach adopted here, 
believing that empirical sciences, such as applied sociology, should inform 
understanding of human flourishing, thus assisting philosophers in what he 
conceives as their “public role” , that of keeping alive the critical examination of 
beliefs, to encourage independence and rationality in others and the incitement 
not to defer to authority or to conventional views’ ibid). His words are a 
blueprint for the empowerment of the mentally disordered and the attempt to 
reconsider mental health ethics which has just concluded.
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A P P E N D IX  1
Possible questions for interviews with users
1. What do you understand by the terms “duty” and “obligation” in the mental health 
practitioner-user relationship? What do you think the duties/obligations of the 
people who care for you are, for example?
2. Do you think that you as a user have any specific obligations or duties?
If yes, what are these?
If no, why not?
3. What, in your opinion, is the main role of the practitioners who attend you?
4. Do you think their first duty is towards you, society, the place at which you are 
being treated, or something or someone else?
5. Is it your impression that practitioners’ are aware of and put into practice the codes 
of ethics of their professional colleges?
6. Do you see any one obligation as being more important in mental health practice 
than another?
7. Do obligations ever conflict? Can you describe such a dilemma in your own 
experience? (For example, confidentiality being breached because the practitioner 
felt that an employer/family member should know about a user’s condition.)
8. Do you think that practitioners are “obliged” to ensure that the user always 
complies with prescribed treatments?
9. What do you see as being the “rights” of the mental health service user?
10. Are there, in your opinion, any circumstances at all in which a mentally disordered 
person could justifiably lose those rights, as in “sectioning”, for example?
11. Do you feel that users’ rights and views are generally respected in practice?
12. Are there any circumstance in which it is morally permissible for the practitioner 
to knowingly override the patient’s rights?
13. If the patient and his family want one thing and the mental health practitioners 
another, how should this situation be dealt with? (And in the case of the family 
and the practitioners wanting one thing and the patient another?)
14. What are the most important character traits of a “good” mental health 
practitioner?
15. What are those of a “good” user?
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16. How would you describe yourself as a user?
17. Do you feel that you are (or have been) empowered, or disempowered as a result 
of your experience as a user?
18. Do you remember any practitioners, amongst the more experienced of these, 
whom you consider to be the kind of person who would make a good “role 
model” for student practitioners? If so, what were his/her special characteristics?
19. Is there anyone you remember (from domestic assistant to psychiatrist) who was 
particularly supportive or helpful?
20. It has been said that genuine caring involves caring both for and about the object 
of care. What do you understand by this in the mental health context?
21. Would you describe the practitioners with whom you have been involved as 
generally “caring"? If so, why? If not, why not?
22. Do you think that practitioners should become personally involved the user’s 
situation, or should they be objective and “stand back”?
23. What do you think are the best things your practitioners can do for you?
24. How do you personally envisage the “good life” for you? What would it include?
25. What do you understand by the term “happiness”?
26. Do you think that maximising the clients’ well-being is this the main priority in 
mental health practice?
27. In what ways do you personally believe the user-practitioner relationship could be 
improved?
28. Is there anything you would particularly like to say about the treatment which you 
have received/are receiving from mental health practitioners (psychiatrists, nurses, 
social workers) generally?
A P P E N D IX  2
Possible questions for interviews with PRACTITIONERS
1. What do you understand by the terms “duty” and “obligation” in the mental health 
practitioner-user relationship?
2. Do you think that you as professional carer have any specific obligations or 
duties?
If yes, what are these?
If no, why not?
3. Do you think your first duty is towards the user, society, the place at which you 
work, or something or someone else?
4. Is it your impression that you and your colleagues are aware of and put into 
practice the codes of ethics of your professional colleges?
5. Do you see any one obligation as being more important in mental health practice 
than another?
6. Do obligations ever conflict? Can you describe such a dilemma in your own 
experience?
7. Do you think that practitioners are “obliged” to ensure that the user always 
complies with prescribed treatments?
8. What do you see as being the “rights” of the mental health service user?
9. Are there, in your opinion, any circumstances at all in which a mentally disordered 
person could justifiably lose those rights, as in “sectioning”, for example?
10. Do you feel that users’ rights and views are generally respected in practice?
11. Are there any circumstance in which it is morally permissible for the practitioner 
to knowingly override the patient's rights?
12. If the patient and his family want one thing and the mental health practitioners 
another, how should this situation be dealt with? (And in the case of the family 
and the practitioners wanting one thing and the patient another?)
13. What are the most important character traits of a “good” mental health 
practitioner?
14. What are those of a “good” user?
15. How would you describe yourself as a practitioner?
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16. Do you know any practitioners, amongst the more experienced of these, whom 
you consider to be the kind of person who would make a good “role model” for 
student practitioners? If so, what were his/her special characteristics?
17. It has been said that genuine caring involves caring both for and about the object 
of care. What do you understand by this in the mental health context?
18. Do you think that practitioners should become personally involved the user’s 
situation, or should they be objective and “stand back”?
19. What would be the best thing a user could say about you as a carer?
20. How do you personally envisage the “good life” for the user? What would it 
include?
21. What do you understand by the term “happiness”?
22. Do you think that maximising the clients’ well-being is this the main priority in 
mental health practice?
23. In what ways do you personally believe the user-practitioner relationship could be 
improved?
24. Is there anything you would particularly like to say about the treatment which 
users receive from mental health practitioners (psychiatrists, nurses, social 
workers) generally?
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What will participants be asked to do?
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to meet with Anita to be 
interviewed by her. Usually, this will be on one occasion only, for approximately one 
hour. Should you wish, someone else, such as a friend, relative or advocate may also be 
present.
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choose to take part, you may withdraw at any time and have your interview material 
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What data or information will be collected and what use will be made of it?
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‘ethics in mental health practice’. In talking with you, Anita will make notes and/or 
audiotape the interview, if that is acceptable to you. You will be shown a transcript of the 
audiotape, or given the tape itself, so that you can, if you wish, verify this personally. 
Anita will use this material to help her gain an understanding of current ethical practices 
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work, which will later be submitted for assessment of, amongst other things, its accuracy 
and credibility. She may also submit some parts of her study to an academic journal for 
publication.
Confidentiality.
I wish to assure you of confidentiality in all matters relating to the material that you 
provide. The data will be securely stored in such a way that only Anita and her 
supervisors may have access to it. Original material, including audiotapes, will be 
destroyed or erased upon completion of the project. Your name, or any other identifying 
information will not be used in any written account of this work. You may read Anita’s 
notes at any time you wish and request deletions or changes.
What if participants have any questions?
If you have any questions about the study, either now, or in the future, please feel free to 
contact either:
Anita Noguera,
Post-graduate Research student,
Tel: 024 76 572739
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Coventry CV4 7AL
Dr. Gill Benedelow 
Dept, of Sociology, 
University of Warwick, 
Coventry CV4 7AL.
Should you decide to work with Anita, thank you for your contribution. Your 
involvement is one way in which we may develop our understanding of mental health 
ethical practice and research thought and strategies in this area.
If you agree to take part in this project, please complete the form attached.
QUESTIONNAIRE ON MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICE
1. W ere y o u  g e n e ra lly  sa tis f ie d , o r  d is sa tis f ied  w ith  th e  tre a tm e n t/tre a tm e n ts  w hich  
y o u  h a v e  rece ived : (p le a se  c irc le )
3 . W as th e r e  a n y  q u a li ta t iv e  d ifferen ce  in  th e  w a y  in  w h ic h  do cto rs , n u rse s  a n d  
so c ia l w o rk ers  tr e a te d  y o u ?
4. I f  y o u  h a ve  a n sw e re d  “y e s ” to  th e  p re v io u s  q u e s tio n , w h ich  d o  y o u  c o n sid er  to  
h a ve  tr e a te d  y o u  b e s t?
a) Nursey b) Doctors c) Social Workers
5. W hich  w o rd  w o u ld  b e s t d e sc r ib e  m o s t o f  th e  n u rse s , s o c ia l w o rk ers  a n d  d o c to rs
w h o m  y o u  h a v e  m e t d u r in g  tr e a tm e n t?  ,
6. D o  y o u  th in k  th a t  y o u  w ere  a llo w e d  su ff ic ie n t p a r t ic ip a tio n  in  d ec is io n s  a b o u t  
y o u r  tre a tm e n t?
7. D o  y o u  th in k  th a t  y o u r  fa m i ly  w as a llo w e d  s u f f ic ie n t p a r tic ip a tio n  in d ec is io n s  
a b o u t y o u r  tr e a tm e n t?
8. H a v e  y o u  e v e r  c o n sc io u s ly  w ith h e ld  in fo rm a tio n  f r o m  y o u r  p sy c h ia tr is t?
9. I f  y o u  a n sw e re d  “y e s ” to  th e  p re v io u s  q u e s tio n , p le a s e  b r ie f ly  g iv e  y o u r  rea so n s
2. In  trea tm en t, h a v e  y o u  f e l t  th a t p ra c titio n e rs :  (p lea se  c ir c le )
a) cared for you? 
c) both?
b) No
b) Doctors .. . . .
a) Yes
b)No.
b) No
f o r  h a v in g  ’
.........¿ i*
v ^ ^ o u s ^ u e s t i o n , h ^ n v ^ v ^ v o w .
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10. D id /  tf f iv o u  f e e l  d is c r im in a te d  a g a in s t o r  s tig m a tise d  a s  a  r e s u lt o f  y o u r  m en ta l 
d iso rd er?
(a^Yes^) b) No.
11. D id /ty f 'y o u  f e e l  d is e m p o w e re d  a s a  r e s u lt  o f  y o u r  m e n ta l d iso rd er?
'a) Y b) No c) Both
12. O f  a ll  th e  c a re r s  e n c o u n te re d  in  th e  h o sp ita l se ttin g , w h ich  s p e n t m o s t tim e  
ta lk in g  to  y o u ?
/ a )  Nurses/ b) Doctors c) Social workers / d) Domestic stpfr ,e) Students 
f) Others (in which case, please state their role)
13. W as th e r e  a n y  d if fe re n c e  in  th e  w a y  in  w hich  m a le  a n d  f e m a le  p ra c tit io n e rs  
tr e a te d  y o u ?
c) Social Workers: Yes/No
d) Students: Yes/No A / / ^ -
a) Nurses:
b) Doctors/Y<
14. I f  y o u  h a v e  a n sw e re d  “y e s ”  t o a n y  o f  th e  a b o ve , p le a s e b r ie f ly  sa y  in  w h a t th is
d if fe re n c e  c o n s is te d .. A A / t t i / & & & $ & . A.... A & e? .firwf.'fT. . . . . • • £ & < . ........
............. ££& £ ...... ............................................................................
15. D o  y o u  f e e l  th a t su ffe r in g  a  m e n ta l d iso rd er  le a v e s  y o u  in  so m e  w a y  n eg a tive ly  
“la b e l le d ”  a s d if fe re n t f r o m  o th e r  p e o p le ?
^ Y m)  b) No
16. H a s  su f fe r in g  a  m e n ta l d iso rd e r  c h a n g e d  th e  a ttitu d e  o f  y o u r  f a m i l y  a n d  f r ie n d s  
to w a rd s  y o u ?
a) Family attitudes have changed: for the better/for the worse 
h) F panda’ attitudes have changed: for the better/for the worse 
d) Nothing has changed^ (  5C C £ /O f~  ^
17. D o y o u  th in k T h a t c o m p u lso ry  a d m iss io n  to  a  p sy c h ia tr ic  c e n tre  ( “S e c tio n in g ”)  
is  e v e r  a d m iss ib le?
a) Yes, in a crisis/ b) No, never.
18. D o y o u  th in k  th a t  c o m p u lso ry  m e d ic a tio n  is  e v e r  a d m iss ib le ?
a) Yes, if the doctor considers it to be necessary, in any circumstances 
$>^Yes, in a situation of crisis, but not once this has been resolved j  
cj mo, nevef -----------------------------------------------
T c r o  / r t f '  S to p s ' 
b s t  c / '
19. D o  y o u  th in k  th a t th e  m e d ic a tio n  w h ich  y o d  h a v e  b ee n /p re sc r ib e d  f o r  y o u r  
co n d itio n  h a s  n e g a tiv e ly  a f fe c te d  th e  q u a l i t y o f y b u f f i f e  ?
¿ O e /fX S ' ?  4 * ^  / r  O A ~9l
20. D o  y o u  th in k  th a t th e c u r r e n t  c o d e s  o f  g o o d  p r a c t ic e  a re  o b se rv e d  b y  
p ra c tit io n e rs?
a) By Nurses^Ye^No b) By Doctors: (^es^No
c) By Social Workers^
F in a lly , h o w  w o u ld  y o u  lik e  to  s e e  th e  m e n ta l h e a lth  se rv ic e s  im p ro v e d ?
..... !< i......
! . . . . .  ¿ p f... . . . .  \
•  • • • • • • • • • a  • *  •  • • ■ • • • •  •  a  •  a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a  a « a ^ » a a a a  a  a a a a a a  • a*a •  a
C /.p e # :........... . . .
........... ....................
a a a a a a a a a  V*  •  •  H i m  « a  a • *  a  a a l r y a  a a a  v *  a ^ a  a •  a T a  a  r >  H » a  a a fi a a a a a a a a  a a  a a a  a a a r s  a a a a a a a
A .
/O /K  ‘¿? /¿ ¡L  ___
Thank you very much indeed for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.
Anita Noguera,
Dept, of Philosophy and Ethics of Mental Health,
University of Warwick.
CV4 7AL.
e-mail: pyrhf@warwick.ac.uk
APPENDIX 5
PRACTITIONERS’ QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Are you: a) a nursing practitioner? ..XL..
b) a social worker?..........  (Tick where appropriate)
c) a psychiatrist?.......................
d) other.........
2. In which of the following settings do you work?
a) Hospital
b) community care..... (Tick where appropriate)
c) other............
3. Are you satisfied with your working conditions? YesQMo
4. If you have answered “no” to the above question, please state 
briefly why you are dissatisfied
feetó. ulq$o)reu .- to few
o. de. 11 ver. .<^ p{?.roc?r k&fce.. levbb .obcsre
.couch. f^perwarK..... :..............................
5. Is the treatment given to the users in your practice satisfactory, in 
your opinion? Yes^Nq)
6. If you have answered “no” to the previous question, please state 
briefly why youfionsider it unsatisfactory.
D q . ctel.ivgrc& .te.,.. . I Q .  .m u c h  o u p er .w o rK
. . t o m .  m i x t e . c o .  . a a - c e .-...............^
. . a a  yy .m c h . cl.vvECte. rrorri
m o a e  u j f f o  q c a  u -u -n ay  n e e d  - m e  s e r v i c e  •
7. Which, if any, of the following do you consider to be problems in 
mental health practice today? (Please tick)
a) Understaffing .rC ...
b) Lack of time to talk to users ..vC...
c) User violence/aggression towards practitioners
d) Inadequate training/education.................
e) Demoralisation . y T ..........
f )  Other (please state)............................................................
8. Do you think that users are given enough information and allowed 
sufficient participation in decisions about their treatment?
(Y egfio) D s p e n d c  o n  -th e  ¿ L t u a u o n  u n a b l e  Ho
c a n s w e r  <3 c t m e c L  S 2 6  o r  M o.
3 1 0
9. Do you think that users’ families are given enough information and 
allowed sufficient participation in decisions about the proposed 
treatment? Yes/No. f tô  M° S'
10. Have you ever consciously withheld information from a user or his 
family? (ŸësftMo.
11 .Do you think users sometimes deliberately withhold information 
from or lie to practitionersT^Ye^No.
12. Have you ever consciously breached confidentiality in your 
professional practice? Ye^No)
13. Do you think users who have been diagnosed as mentally 
disordered suffer discrimination/stigmatisation as a result of this?
(^Yesfoo.
14. Do you spend as much time as you would like in talking to users? 
Yes(No)
15.If you have answered “No” to the above question, please explain 
thereasons for this: .
- Fb pr^JQUi.^teJteOr.¿<0.Quebh.cn.K  *..b . ......
16. Do you feel that the time you spend in bureaucratic functions is:
(Please tick as appropriate)
a) Excessive ..yo .
b) Reasonable......
c) Insufficient .....
17. Do you think there is any difference in the way male and female 
practitioners interact with the users? Yes/No -  O c p Z T C i t  OH-rng Posentioni
18. If you have answered “Yes” to the above question, please explain 
what this difference is:
19. Is compttteorv admission to mental hospital ever morally 
admissible?(Yes/JNo
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